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ABSTRACT 
 
By enabling passengers to compare easily and book directly from airline inventories, Internet-
based ticket distribution has forced airlines to compete for the lowest price level and more 
importantly, to ensure seat availability at that price.  To retain market share, many airlines track 
and match the lowest fare of their competitors – both the price level and the associated seat 
availability through the use of revenue management seat inventory controls. 
 
This thesis uses simulation to examine the impacts of an airline matching its competitor’s lowest 
fare seat availability.  In a single symmetric market, simulations demonstrate that the airline using 
a more sophisticated revenue management system generally obtains lower revenues the more it 
matches the seat availability of its competitor’s lowest fares – losing as much as 9.2%.  At the 
same time, the matched airline benefits consistently in terms of improved revenues.  
 
These findings extend to a much larger mixed-fare simulation network with four airlines: when a 
legacy airline matches the lowest fare seat availability of a “low-cost carrier” (LCC), the legacy 
airline loses at least 3.4% and as much as 8.5% in revenue.  At the same time, the LCC and the 
other two peripheral competitors gain as much as 5.3% in revenue.  The legacy airline’s revenue 
management system recovers from the damage done to a degree that depends on the 
sophistication of the revenue management methods it uses.  In the absence of seat availability 
matching, the network revenue management system using hybrid forecasting and DAVN for 
inventory control outperforms the leg-based system using standard forecasting and EMSRb for 
inventory control by 3.0% in revenues.  Moreover, using the network system, the matching airline 
loses 3.4% to 5.8% in revenue from seat availability matching, significantly less than the 6.2% to 
7.0% of revenue it loses using the leg-based system.  Unlike leg-based inventory control, network 
inventory control isolates the revenue loss to the LCC markets, where hybrid forecasting 
performs better than standard forecasting. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Peter P. Belobaba 
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
Thesis Reader: Dr. Nigel H. M. Wilson 
Titles: Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Chair, Master of Science in Transportation Program
 
- 5 - 
Acknowledgements 
 
I must thank Dr. Peter Belobaba, my academic and research advisor, who has taught me 
how to navigate the complexities of airline revenue management and the industry in 
general through coursework and research assignments.  I appreciate his insightful 
comments and patience in guiding my thesis. 
 
I would like to thank Professor Nigel Wilson for reading my thesis. 
 
I am grateful to Singapore Airlines for the financial support through the past four years at 
Penn and MIT.  In addition, I would like to show my appreciation to my colleagues and 
superiors who mentored me during my summer internships and to the Human Resources 
department for their understanding and administrative support.  I hope I have proved to 
be a worthwhile investment and look forward to working at SIA. 
 
My thesis would not have been possible without the Passenger Origin-Destination 
(PODS) Consortium.  I would like to thank Craig Hopperstad for programming the 
simulator.  I appreciate the sponsoring airlines for their data and feedback and in 
particular, Thomas Fiig from SAS for his ideas on lowest fare seat availability matching. 
 
Many thanks to my PODS/ICAT colleagues for their help: Matt, Megan, Nik, Emmanuel, 
Charles and especially Val.  Special thanks to my pals for the good times at MIT, with 
special mentions for my “Harpoon” buddies Zoran and Rahul, architecture enthusiast 
James and fellow idealist Rachelle. 
 
I am truly thankful for the support from my dad and my two wonderful sisters.  I am 
lucky to have my mother whom I seek to emulate in her entrepreneurial and generous 
ways and my grandmother who has given me unconditional love and the love of good 
food.  
 
Thank you Jen, for your love, support and accepting me for who I am.  This thesis is 
dedicated to you. 
 
  
 
- 6 - 
Author’s Biography 
 
The author comes from Singapore.  He originally aspired to be a geneticist through his 
years at Dunman High School and Victoria Junior College.  Instead, he decided that 
traveling abroad will allow him to learn more and make greater contributions.  Under the 
generous sponsorship of Singapore Airlines, he started at the University of Pennsylvania 
in 2003 intending to major in Biological Basis of Behavior.  In 2006, he graduated 
summa cum laude with an Economics degree.  In between, he participated actively as a 
Benjamin Franklin Scholar at Penn, studied abroad at the London School of Economics 
and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, took Professor Robert Rescorla’s amazing 
course on learning, wrote a research paper on the decolonization of Sri Lanka under 
Professor Lynn Hollen Lees and topped Professor Jeremy Siegel’s introductory course in 
Finance.  He learned many valuable lessons as an intern at Singapore Airlines at the 
departments of Singapore Sales, Product Innovation and Network Revenue Management.  
He also cultivated an interest in Game Theory and Industrial Organization from courses 
taught by Professor Steven Matthews, Dr. Philipp Schmidt-Dengler and Professor Patrick 
Van Cayseele. 
 
In September of 2006, he entered the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a 
candidate for the Master of Science in Transportation.  He learned from many inspiring 
teachers, including Dr. Peter Belobaba, Professor Amedeo Odoni, Professor Cynthia 
Barnhart, Professor Nigel Wilson and Professor Joseph Sussman.  MIT was a wonderful 
place for his curious mind and he attended many incredible events like Media Lab’s 
Human 2.0 Symposium, architecture talks by Rem Koolhaas, Olafur Eliasson, Nicholas 
Negroponte and Zaha Hadid, the MIT Communications Forum and the Sigma Xi speech 
by Associate Professor Amy Finkelstein. 
 
He researched under MIT’s Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS) Consortium 
led by Dr. Peter Belobaba, and presented findings in Houston (January 2007) and 
Minneapolis (May 2007).  The fruitful year at MIT will conclude at the PODS meeting in 
Frankfurt in September 2007, a few days before he officially embarks on his career at 
Singapore Airlines. 
 
- 7 - 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF FIGURES                 11 
LIST OF TABLES                 15 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS               17 
 
1 INTRODUCTION             19 
1.1 The Beginnings of Airline Revenue Management           20 
1.2 Traditional Applications of Airline Revenue Management         21 
1.3 The Rise of the Low Cost Carriers and the Internet          22 
1.4 Responses and Enhancements to RM Systems           23 
1.4.1 Integrated into Revenue Management Systems          23 
1.4.2 Post-RM Adjustment of Inventory Availability          23 
1.5 Objectives and Methods of the Thesis            24 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis                    24 
 
2 LITERATURE AND THEORY REVIEW         26 
2.1 Overview of Airline Revenue Management           26 
2.1.1 Conventional Airline Revenue Management           26 
2.1.1.a Fare Class/Leg-based Control           28 
2.1.1.b Origin-Destination Control            29 
2.1.2 Low Cost Carriers and Today’s Fare Environment          30 
2.1.2.a The Spiral Down Effect            31 
2.1.3 Revenue Management Methods for the New Environment         32 
2.1.3.a Q-forecasting              33 
2.1.3.b Hybrid Forecasting             34 
2.2 Airline Revenue Management and Competition           35 
2.2.1 The Future of Airline Revenue Management           35 
2.2.2 Price Matching              35 
2.2.3 Inventory Control Under Competition           36 
2.3 Summary                37 
 
3 SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT – PODS         38 
3.1 General Architecture              38 
3.2 Passenger Choice Model              40 
3.2.1 Demand Generation              40 
3.2.2 Passenger Characteristics             41 
3.2.3 Passenger Choice Set              42 
3.2.4 Passenger Decision              42 
- 8 - 
3.3 Implementing RM Systems and Theories            42 
3.3.1 EMSRb with Standard Forecasting            43 
3.3.1.a Input Frat5s              43 
3.3.1.b Estimating Frat5s             44          
3.3.1.c Probability of Sell-up             45 
3.3.1.d Q-forecasting              47 
3.3.1.e Hybrid Forecasting             48 
3.3.2 Load Factor Threshold Algorithm            48 
3.3.2.a Fixed Threshold             48 
3.3.2.b Adaptive Threshold             48 
3.3.3 Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN)          49 
3.4 Availability Matching Capabilities in PODS           50 
3.4.1 Closure Matching              51 
3.4.2 Open Matching              52 
3.4.3 Bi-directional Matching             53 
3.5 Summary                54 
 
4 SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
(SINGLE SYMMETRIC MARKET)          55 
4.1 Overview of the Single Symmetric Market           55 
4.2 EMSRb with Standard Forecasting Closure Matching AT90          57 
4.2.1 Inputs                57 
4.2.2 Base Cases               58 
4.2.3 Impacts on Airline 1              60 
4.2.3.a Less Revenue-effective at Low Demand          62 
4.2.3.b Very Revenue-effective at High Demand          63 
4.2.3.c Market Share              64 
4.2.4 Impacts on Airline 2              65 
4.2.5 Conclusions               66 
4.3 EMSRb with Standard Forecasting Closure Matching  EMSRb with 
Q-forecasting                66 
4.3.1 Inputs                67 
4.3.2 Base Case               67 
4.3.3 Impacts on Airline 1              68 
4.3.3.a Revenue Increases at High Demand           69 
4.3.3.b Market Share              70 
4.3.4 Impacts on Airline 2              70 
4.3.5 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5           71 
4.3.6 Conclusions               73 
- 9 - 
4.4 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Open Matching AT90          74 
4.4.1 Inputs                74 
4.4.2 Base Case               74 
4.4.3 Impacts on Airline 1              76 
4.4.3.a Market Share              78 
4.4.4 Impacts on Airline 2              78 
4.4.5 Even Lower (0.60) Demand             79 
4.4.6 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5           79 
4.4.7 Conclusions               81 
4.5 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Closure Matching AT90          82 
4.5.1 Impacts on Airline 1              82 
4.5.1.a Revenue Losses at Restrictive Thresholds          82 
4.5.1.b Revenue Gains at Loose Thresholds           84 
4.5.1.c Market Share              85 
4.5.2 Impacts on Airline 2              85 
4.5.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5           86 
4.5.4 Conclusions               87 
4.6 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Bi-directional Matching AT90         88 
4.6.1 Impacts on Airline 1              88 
4.6.1.a Market Share              89 
4.6.2 Impacts on Airline 2              89 
4.6.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5           91 
4.6.4 Conclusions               92 
4.7 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Open Matching EMSRb with Q-
forecasting                92 
4.7.1 Base Case               92 
4.7.2 Impacts on Airline 1              93 
4.7.3 Impacts on Airline 2              94 
4.7.4 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5           95 
4.7.5 Both Airlines Match              96 
4.7.6 Conclusions               97 
4.8 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Closure Matching EMSRb with Q-
forecasting                97 
4.8.1 Impacts on Airline 1              97 
4.8.2 Impacts on Airline 2              98 
4.8.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5           98 
4.8.4 Both Airlines Match            100 
4.8.5 Conclusions             101 
4.9 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Bi-directional Matching EMSRb with Q-
forecasting              101 
4.9.1 Impacts on Airline 1            101 
4.9.2 Impacts on Airline 2            103 
4.9.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5         103 
4.9.4 Both Airlines Match            103 
4.9.5 Conclusions             105 
4.10 Summary              105 
- 10 - 
5 SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
(NETWORK ‘S’)            107 
5.1 Overview of the Network ‘S’           107 
5.1.1 Route Networks and Revenue Management Systems       107 
5.1.2 Mixed Fare Structures           109 
5.2 AL1 (EMSRb with Standard Forecasting) Matching AL3 (AT90)   110 
5.2.1 Inputs              110 
5.2.2 Base Case             110 
5.2.3 Overview of Changes            111 
5.2.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes        113 
5.2.3.b Market Share            114 
5.2.4 Impacts on Airline 1            115 
5.2.5 Impacts on Airline 3            115 
5.2.6 Impacts on Airlines 2 and 4           116 
5.2.7 Conclusions             117 
5.3 AL1 (EMSRb with Hybrid Forecasting) Matching AL3 (AT90)       118 
5.3.1 Inputs              118 
5.3.2 Base Case             118 
5.3.3 Overview of Changes            120 
5.3.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes        121 
5.3.3.b Market Share            122 
5.3.4 Impacts on Airline 1            122 
5.3.5 Conclusions             128 
5.4 AL1 (DAVN with Standard Forecasting) Matching AL3 (AT90)     129 
5.4.1 Inputs              129 
5.4.2 Base Case             129 
5.4.3 Overview of Changes            131 
5.4.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes        132 
5.4.3.b Market Share            133 
5.4.4 Impacts on Airline 1            134 
5.4.5 Conclusions             135 
5.5 AL1 (DAVN with Hybrid Forecasting) Matching AL3 (AT90)       136 
5.5.1 Inputs              136 
5.5.2 Base Case             136 
5.5.3 Overview of Changes            138 
5.5.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes        139 
5.5.3.b Market Share            140 
5.5.4 Conclusions             140 
5.6 Summary              141 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS            143 
6.1 Summary of Objectives            143 
6.2 Summary of Findings and Implications for Airlines        143 
6.3 Future Research Directions            146 
 
BIBLOGRAPHY                   147 
- 11 - 
List of Figures 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Figure 1-1: Differential Pricing – Additional Revenues, Rejected Passengers         21         
 
2 LITERATURE AND THEORY REVIEW 
Figure 2-1: Third Generation Airline RM System            27 
Figure 2-2: Nested Booking Limits and Class Protection Levels                   29 
Figure 2-3: Spiral Down                32 
Figure 2-4: Overview of Q-forecasting Process             33 
 
3 SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT – PODS 
Figure 3-1: PODS Architecture               39 
Figure 3-2: Arrival Curves by Passenger Type             41 
Figure 3-3: Inventory Control Optimizer              42 
Figure 3-4: Frat5 Curve: Input “C”              43 
Figure 3-5: Relationship between Probability of Sell-up and Frat5          46 
Figure 3-6: Probability of Sell-up Across Time Frames            47 
Figure 3-7: Availability Matching Overlay             51 
Figure 3-8: Closure Matching               51 
Figure 3-9: Open Matching               53 
Figure 3-10: Bi-directional Matching              54 
 
4 SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
(SINGLE SYMMETRIC MARKET) 
4.1 Overview of the Single Symmetric Market  
Figure 4-1: Supply in the Single Symmetric Market            56 
Figure 4-2: Demand in the Single Symmetric Market            56 
4.2 EMSRb with Standard Forecasting Closure Matching AT90 
Figure 4-3: Spiral Down in Fully Undifferentiated Fare Environment          58 
Figure 4-4: Fare Class Mix: Fully Undifferentiated Fares, Without Matching         59 
Figure 4-5: Base Cases (Without Matching)             60 
Figure 4-6: Changes as AL1 Closure Matches             61 
Figure 4-7: Fare Class Mix: With Closure Matching (At Medium Demand)         61 
Figure 4-8: At Low Demand, AL2 Underperforms before Closure Matching         62 
Figure 4-9: Fare Class Mix: with Closure Matching (At Low Demand)          63 
Figure 4-10: Fare Class Closure by Time Frames (At High Demand)          64 
Figure 4-11: Closure Matching: Impacts on Market Shares           64
- 12 - 
4.3 EMSRb with Standard Forecasting Closure Matching EMSRb with Q-
forecasting 
Figure 4-12: Base Cases without Matching (Input Frat5 “C”)           68 
Figure 4-13: Revenue Changes as AL1 Closure Matches (Input Frat5)          69 
Figure 4-14: Market Share Changes as AL1 Closure Matches           70 
Figure 4-15: Base Cases without Matching (Estimated cf. Input)           71 
Figure 4-16: Revenue Changes as AL1 Closure Matches (Estimated Frat5)         72 
Figure 4-17: Frat5 Changes as AL1 Closure Matches            73 
4.4 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Open Matching AT90 
Figure 4-18: Base Cases without Matching (Input Frat5)            75 
Figure 4-19: Fare Class Mix: at Medium Demand without Open Matching         75 
Figure 4-20: Changes as AL1 Open Matches             76 
Figure 4-21: Fare Class Mix: at Medium Demand with Open Matching          77 
Figure 4-22: AL1 Revenue Changes by Fare Class            77 
Figure 4-23: Sources of Losses               78 
Figure 4-24: Base Cases without Matching (Estimated cf. Input)           80 
Figure 4-25: Changes as AL1 Open Matches (Estimated Frat5)           81 
4.5 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Closure Matching AT90 
Figure 4-26: Changes as AL1 Closure Matches             82 
Figure 4-27: Difference between AL1 and 2 Closure Rates in Base Case          83 
Figure 4-28: Changes in AL1’s Closure Rates (Restrictive Thresholds)          84 
Figure 4-29: Changes in AL1’s Closure Rates (Loose Thresholds)          85 
Figure 4-30: Changes as AL1 Closure Matches (Estimated cf. Input)          87 
4.6 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Bi-directional Matching AT90 
Figure 4-31: Changes to AL1’s Revenues as It Matches in Both Directions         88 
Figure 4-32: Changes to AL1’s Revenues as It Matches            89 
Figure 4-33: Changes to AL2’s Revenues as AL1 Matches in Both Directions         90 
Figure 4-34: Changes to AL2’s Revenues as AL1 Matches           90 
Figure 4-35: Changes as AL1 Matches in Both Directions            91 
(Estimated cf. Input) 
4.7 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Open Matching EMSRb with Q-forecasting 
Figure 4-36: Base Cases (Input Frat5s)              93 
Figure 4-37: Changes as AL1 Open Matches (Input Frat5s)           93 
Figure 4-38: Fare Class Mix: at High Demand when AL1 Open Matches          94 
Figure 4-39: EMSRb with QF vs. EMSRb with QF (Estimated cf. Input Frat5s)         95 
Figure 4-40: Changes as AL1 Open Matches (Estimated cf. Input Frat5s)         95 
Figure 4-41: Differences between AL1 and AL2 Closure Rates           96 
Figure 4-42: Changes in AL1’s Closure Rates as it Open Matches          96 
4.8 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Closure Matching EMSRb with Q-forecasting 
Figure 4-43: Changes as AL1 Closure Matches (Input Frat5s)           97 
Figure 4-44: Fare Class Mix: Medium Demand with AL1 Closure Matching         98 
Figure 4-45: Changes as AL1 Closure Matches (Estimated Frat5s)          99 
Figure 4-46: Fare Class Mix: Low Demand with AL1 Closure Matching          99 
Figure 4-47: Fare Class Mix: Low Demand when Both Airlines Closure Match       100 
 
- 13 - 
4.9 EMSRb with Q-forecasting Bi-Directional Matching EMSRb with Q-
forecasting 
Figure 4-48: Changes as AL1 Matches in Both Directions          102 
Figure 4-49: Changes as AL1 Matches in Both Directions          102 
Figure 4-50: Changes as AL1 Matches in Both Directions (Estimated)        103 
Figure 4-51: Changes as Both Airlines Match in Both Directions (Input)        104 
Figure 4-52: Changes as Both Airlines Match in Both Directions (Estimated)       104 
 
5 SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
(NETWORK ‘S’) 
5.1  Overview of Network ‘S’ 
Figure 5-1: Route Network of Airline 1 (MSP/Legacy)          108 
Figure 5-2: Route Network of Airline 2 (ORD/Legacy)          108 
Figure 5-3: Route Network of Airline 3 (MCI/LCC)          108 
Figure 5-4: Route Network of Airline 4 (DFW/Legacy)          108 
5.2  AL1 (EMSRb with SF) Matching AL3 (AT90)    
Figure 5-5: Baseline Metrics in Network ‘S’           111 
Figure 5-6: Baseline Metrics in LCC Markets           111 
Figure 5-7: Baseline Metrics in Non-LCC Markets          111 
Figure 5-8: Overview of Changes as AL1 Matches AL3          112 
Figure 5-9: Changes in LCC Markets as AL1 Matches AL3         113 
Figure 5-10: Changes in Non-LCC Markets as AL1 Matches AL3        113 
Figure 5-11: Fare Class Mix of AL1 as AL1 Matches AL3         115 
Figure 5-12: Changes in Fare Class Mix of AL1           115 
Figure 5-13: Fare Class Mix of AL3 as AL1 Matches AL3         116 
Figure 5-14: Fare Class Mix of AL2 as AL1 Matches AL3         117 
Figure 5-15: Fare Class Mix of AL4 as AL1 Matches AL3         117 
5.3  AL1 (EMSRb with HF) Matching AL3 (AT90) 
Figure 5-16: Baseline Metrics in Network ‘S’           119 
Figure 5-17: Baseline Metrics in LCC Markets           119 
Figure 5-18: Baseline Metrics in Non-LCC Markets          119 
Figure 5-19: Overview of Changes as AL1 Matches AL3          120 
Figure 5-20: Changes in LCC Markets as AL1 Matches AL3         121 
Figure 5-21: Changes in Non-LCC Markets as AL1 Matches AL3        121 
Figure 5-22: Difference in Availability of AL3 and AL1 (EMSRb with SF)       123 
Figure 5-23: Difference in Availability of AL3 and AL1 (EMSRb with HF)       124 
Figure 5-24: Difference in Availability of AL3 and AL1  
(EMSRb with SF cf. HF)                 125 
Figure 5-25: Change in Fare Class Availability when AL1 Open Matches AL3       126 
Figure 5-26: Change in Fare Class Availability when 
AL1 Closure Matches AL3                  127 
Figure 5-27: Fare Class Mix of AL1 as AL1 Matches AL3         127 
Figure 5-28: Changes in Fare Class Mix of AL1           128 
 
- 14 - 
5.4  AL1 (DAVN with SF) Matching AL3 (AT90) 
Figure 5-29: Baseline Metrics in Network ‘S’           130 
Figure 5-30: Baseline Metrics in LCC Markets           130 
Figure 5-31: Baseline Metrics in Non-LCC Markets          130 
Figure 5-32: Overview of Changes as AL1 Matches AL3          131 
Figure 5-33: Overview of Changes in LCC Markets          132 
Figure 5-34: Overview of Changes in Non-LCC Markets          132 
Figure 5-35: Fare Class Mix of AL1 as AL1 Matches AL3         135 
Figure 5-36: Changes in Fare Class Mix of AL1           135 
5.5  AL1 (DAVN with HF) Matching AL3 (AT90) 
Figure 5-37: Baseline Metrics in Network ‘S’           137 
Figure 5-38: Baseline Metrics in LCC Markets           137 
Figure 5-39: Baseline Metrics in Non-LCC Markets          137 
Figure 5-40: Overview of Changes as AL1 Matches AL3          138 
Figure 5-41: Overview of Changes in LCC Markets          139 
Figure 5-42: Overview of Changes in Non-LCC Markets          139 
Figure 5-43: Fare Class Mix of AL1 as AL1 Matches AL3         139 
Figure 5-44: Changes in Fare Class Mix of AL1           139 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.2  Summary of Findings and Implications for Airlines 
Figure 6-1: AL1’s Revenue Changes (Single Symmetric Market)        144 
Figure 6-2: AL1’s Revenue Changes (Network ‘S’)          145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 15 - 
List of Tables 
 
3 SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT – PODS 
Table 3-1: Time Frames                38 
 
4 SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
(SINGLE SYMMETRIC MARKET) 
Table 4-1: Unrestricted Fare Structure – Six Fares without Restrictions         56 
Table 4-2: Three Types of Initial Fare Class Load Thresholds for AT90         57 
Table 4-3: Semi-restricted Fare Structure             58 
Table 4-4: Changes to AL2 as AL1 Matches             65 
Table 4-5: Sources of Changes in Revenue             65         
Table 4-6: Fare Class Mix before AL1 Closure Matches AL2           68 
Table 4-7: Metrics after AL1 Closure Matches AL2            69 
Table 4-8: Changes to AL2 as AL1 Closure Matches            71 
Table 4-9: Changes to AL2 as AL1 Closure Matches (Estimated Frat5s)         72 
Table 4-10: Market Share with Open Matching (and without Open Matching)         78 
Table 4-11: At Lower (0.60) Demand, Figures Hardly Change            79 
Table 4-12: Fare Class Mix Improvements for AL1 at Low Demand           
(Estimated Frat5s)                 81 
Table 4-13: AL1’s Change in Fare Class Mix from Closure Matching  
(Restrictive Thresholds)                83 
Table 4-14: AL1’s Change in Fare Class Mix from Closure Matching 
(Loose Thresholds)                 84 
Table 4-15: Market Share                85 
Table 4-16: AL2’s Improvements from Closure Matching           86 
Table 4-17: AL2’s Load Factors               86 
Table 4-18: Market Share Change with Bi-directional Matching           89 
Table 4-19: AL2’s Change in Fare Class Mix from Open Matching          94 
Table 4-20: Changes when Both Airlines Open Match            96 
Table 4-21: Changes when Both Airlines Closure Match (Input Frat5s)        100 
Table 4-22: Changes when Both Airlines Closure Match (Estimated Frat5s)       101 
Table 4-23: Summary              105 
 
- 16 - 
5 SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
(NETWORK ‘S’) 
Table 5-1: Summary of Network ‘S’ Route Networks          109 
Table 5-2: Fare Structure for Markets with LCC           109 
Table 5-3: Fare Structure for Markets without LCC          109 
Table 5-4: Loose Initial Fare Class Thresholds for AL3          110 
Table 5-5: Metrics after Matching (AL1: EMSRb with SF)         112 
Table 5-6: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: EMSRb with SF)        114 
Table 5-7: Metrics after Matching (AL1: EMSRb with HF)         121 
Table 5-8: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: EMSRb with HF)        122 
Table 5-9: Metrics after Matching (AL1: DAVN with HF)         132 
Table 5-10: Revenues of LCC Market SFO-PHL and    
Associated Non-LCC Markets (Standard Forecasting, EMSRb cf. DAVN)        133 
Table 5-11: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: DAVN with SF)        134 
Table 5-12: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: DAVN with HF)        140 
Table 5-13: Summary              141 
 
 
- 17 - 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AP  Advance Purchase 
AT  Adaptive (Accordion) Threshold 
DAVN  Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting 
DFW  Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport 
DWM  Decision Window Model 
EMSR  Expected Marginal Seat Revenue 
emult  Elasticity Multiplier 
FA  Fare Adjustment 
FCYM  Fare Class Yield Management 
Frat5  Fare Ratio at which 50% of the passengers sell-up 
FT  Fixed Threshold 
GDS  Global Distribution System 
HF  Hybrid Forecasting 
KI  Karl Isler (Discrete) Fare Adjustment 
LCC  Low Cost Carrier 
Loco  Lowest Competitor Class Open 
LP  Linear Programming 
MCI  Kansas City International Airport 
MR  Marginal Revenue (Continuous) Fare Adjustment 
MSP  Minneapolis-St Paul International Airport 
O-D  Origin-Destination 
OR  Operations Research 
ORD  Chicago O’Hare International Airport 
PE  Price Elasticity 
PODS  Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator 
pp  Percentage point 
QF  Q-forecasting 
RM  Revenue Management 
SF  Standard Forecasting 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
By the time Farecast launched as an airfare prediction website in June 2006, it was 
already renamed from Hamlet.  The question it answers for consumers seeking the lowest 
fare available remains – “to buy or not to buy?”1  For the past forty years, airline Revenue 
Management (RM) has been shaping, and shaped by, consumer behavior.  Airlines 
maximize revenues through revenue management processes: segmenting their limited and 
perishable inventories of seats as fare products using restrictions and prices and then, 
depending on the demand forecasted, allocating seats to customers who arrive at different 
times and have dissimilar willingness-to-pay (WTP).  Revenue management was the 
major airline success story after deregulation enabled pricing variations in 1978 – 
American Airlines reported in 1992 a “quantifiable benefit at $1.4 billion” over three 
years.2   
 
The tide began turning against traditional revenue management methods when the steady 
climb of the Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) like JetBlue and AirTran ensued.  These upstarts 
led in depressing airfares and abolishing ticket restrictions.  In addition, LCCs pushed the 
Internet to prominence as a distribution channel and thereby slashed search costs for 
consumers – the costs of comparing prices of competing products.  As passengers were 
exposed to unprecedented cheap choices and price transparency, their sensitivity to prices 
heightened.  Their interest in paying for products eroded – business-travel managers 
started refusing the exceedingly high walk-up fares.3  Farecast, a business model built on 
analyzing, predicting and insuring the cheapest fares for passengers, is a culmination of 
the trend of consumers demanding the lowest fare available.  In 2007, Scott Nason, Vice-
President – Revenue Management at American Airlines, regards “pricing transparency” 
and “understanding of consumer behavior [online]” as two primary factors that will 
determine the future of revenue management.4 
 
The popularity of websites like Farecast and web-based fare availability “screen 
scraping” tools like FareChase and Cliqbook force airlines to compete solely on price.  In 
fact, some airlines began using these powerful software tools themselves to find the 
lowest competitor fare.  Prompted in part by the fear of losing market share and in part by 
the desire to deprive rivals of revenues, some airlines participate in ad-hoc fare class 
availability matching, overriding their revenue management systems.  Such matching 
                                                
1 University of Washington.  (April 1, 2003).  Airfare analyzer could save big bucks by advising when to 
buy tickets.  University of Washington Press Release.  Retrieved April 25, 2007, from the World Wide 
Web: http://www.washington.edu/newsroom/news/2003archive/04-03archive/k040103.html 
2 Smith, B.C., J.F. Leimkuhler, R.M. Darrow.  (1992).  Yield Management at American Airlines.  
Interfaces, 22(1), 8-31. 
3 The Economist.  (April 20, 2002).  Saturday Night Fever – US Airlines and Ticket Prices.  The 
Economist.  Retrieved June 15, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.factiva.com 
4 Nason, S. D.  (2007).  Forecasting the Future of Airline Revenue Management.  Journal of Revenue and 
Pricing Management, 6(1), 64-66. 
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threatens to undo the benefits brought by the more analytic revenue management process.  
In addition, it exposes the gap in revenue management systems – the systems do not take 
competitors’ fares and availabilities directly into account in spite of their immense 
impacts on revenue outcomes.   
 
Theoretically, revenue management systems should incorporate the real-time availability 
of rival fares, forecast the impact on passenger choices and optimize the inventory 
allocation accordingly.  However, since the cost of such implementation is prohibitive but 
the benefit remains unclear, airlines should understand the effects of the lowest fare seat 
availability matching they already engage in, for a start. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the impacts of matching the seat availability of the 
lowest competitor fare available, on metrics such as revenues, load factors, yields and 
market shares.  In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will describe in greater detail the history 
of airline revenue management, from the beginnings and the traditional applications to 
the ascendance of LCCs and the responses from the legacy airlines.  I will then discuss 
the goals and methods and lay out the structure of the thesis in further detail.  In Chapter 
2 I will review the literature and theory related to this thesis.  Following that, in Chapter 
3, I will describe the simulation environment used in this thesis.  In Chapter 4, I will 
describe the simulation inputs and evaluate the results in a single symmetric market 
before moving on to simulating a network in Chapter 5.  Finally, in Chapter 6, I will 
summarize of the main findings and propose future directions for research. 
 
 
1.1 THE BEGINNINGS OF AIRLINE REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
 
Before 1972, when fares for a cabin on a given route were typically uniform, airlines 
focused their research on controlling overbooking.5  They maximized revenue through 
maximizing the number of passengers carried.  As the name suggests, overbooking is the 
deliberate selling of seats beyond capacity on certain high demand flights.  That happens 
when the expected number of cancellations, no-shows and go-shows maximize revenue, 
depending on the likelihood of offloading extra passengers or the airplane taking off with 
empty seats. 
 
In the 1970s, in bid to attract new passengers to fill seats that still departed empty, BOAC 
(British Airways), American Airlines and other airlines introduced discounted fares.6  To 
reduce diversion of full-fare passengers, these fares carried a requirement of an advance 
purchase (AP) of a specified number of days before flight departure and a restriction of a 
minimum stay of seven days.  Revenue management became more complex with 
differential pricing.  On top of maximizing passenger count, airlines had to optimize the 
mix of passengers – the allocation of seats between discount and full-fares that would 
maximize revenue.  In situations where demand exceeded capacity (Figure 1-1), the 
                                                
5 McGill, J. I., G. J. van Ryzin.  (1999).  Revenue Management: Research Overview and Prospects.  
Transportation Science, 33(2), 233-256. 
6 Belobaba, P.P.  (1998).  Airline Differential Pricing for Effective Yield Management.  In G.F. Butler & J. 
Peel (Eds.).  The Handbook of Airline Marketing (pp. 349-361).  New York: McGraw Hill. 
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airlines had to reject the early-booking discount passengers to protect seats for late-
booking full-fare passengers.  Conversely, airlines could not focus completely on yield 
when expected demand was low, since the number of seats was fixed in the short-run and 
the unsold product would expire upon departure. 
 
FIGURE 1-1
Differential Pricing – Additional Revenues and Rejected Passengers
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1.2 TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF AIRLINE REVENUE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Deregulation of the US airline industry in 1978 brought about even greater flexibility and 
market influence in pricing.7  Over the years, airlines introduced additional fare products 
in attempt to approach the absolute maximum revenue situation in theory, where each 
accepted passenger’s fare reflects his maximum willingness-to-pay. 
 
In order to extract revenues by making passengers reveal their true willingness-to-pay, 
airlines created numerous fare products, or fare classes, by bundling their fares with 
restrictions and AP requirements to fence passengers with higher willingness-to-pay out 
of lower fares.  The restrictions included mandatory Saturday night stay, non-refundable 
tickets and round trip purchase requirement.   
 
As alluded to earlier, a main complication is that low-yielding leisure travelers tend to 
book earlier than high-yielding business travelers, creating the need for inventory control 
based on forecasts of various passenger types.  When their expected contributions are 
higher and demand exceeds supply, higher-fare passengers have seats saved for them by 
an inventory allocation system that rejects lower-fare passengers.  That is achieved by 
adjusting fare class availability. 
 
                                                
7 General Accounting Office.  (1999).  Airline Deregulation: Changes in Airfares, Service Quality, and 
Barriers to Entry.  Report to Congressional Requestors.  GAO/RCED-99-92.  Washington, D. C. 
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Over the years, seat allocation algorithms have progressed from leg-based control to 
Origin-Destination (O-D) control and allocation based on network contribution of the 
passenger.8  Since the seat inventories are limited, concepts of displacement and 
opportunity costs became central to their allocation. At the same time, progressively 
sophisticated theory, computer systems and databases have enabled more accurate 
forecasting at a disaggregate level. 
 
Conventional applications of revenue management were successful in limiting dilution 
from higher-fare passengers buying lower fares because the “fare fences” erected 
between different fare classes were effective, especially the compulsory Saturday night 
stay dreaded by businessmen.9  The business and leisure consumers were clearly 
separated by those restrictions.  Moreover, search costs were high and pricing was more 
opaque due to commission-based travel agents. 
 
 
1.3 THE RISE OF THE LOW COST CARRIERS AND THE 
INTERNET 
 
The proliferation and subsequent rise to prominence of LCCs coupled with the Internet as 
a dominant booking platform violated the foundations conventional revenue management 
systems were built upon. 
 
Contrary to the existing legacy airlines, the low-fare airlines used much simplified fare 
structures.  There are three major reasons why LCCs removed the fare restrictions and 
requirements used to segment demand.  Firstly, LCCs removed the restrictions because 
they could afford to do so in terms of economics.  With relatively low overhead costs 
from young fleets and workforces, they required less revenue to break even or turn 
profits.  The second reason is that LCCs were technically less capable of capitalizing on 
the restrictions.  Relative to the full-fledged revenue management systems owned by 
legacy carriers, LCCs’ basic or non-existent revenue management processes could not 
fully utilize the independent demands created by fare restrictions.  Thirdly, the entrant 
LCCs were eager to stimulate demand and capture market share from incumbents.  The 
low-fare airlines pursued consumers who were ready to defect because they were weary 
of the legacy carriers’ complicated fare restrictions and wide variations in fares. 
 
The successful incursions by LCCs forced the incumbent legacy carriers to similarly 
streamline their fare products – major restrictions were eliminated or diluted, advance 
purchase was simplified and fares were capped.10  Fare product simplification degraded 
                                                
8 Belobaba, P.P.  (2002).  Airline Network Revenue Management: Recent Developments and State of the 
Practice.  In D. Jenkins (Ed.).  The Handbook of Airline Marketing (pp. 141-156).  New York: McGraw 
Hill. 
9 Lee, S.  (2000).  Modeling Passenger Disutilities in Airline Revenue Management Simulation.  Master’s 
Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
10 Delta Airlines.  (Jan 5, 2005).  Delta Slashes Everyday Fares up to 50 Percent as Airline Introduces 
SimpliFaresTM Nationwide.  Delta Airlines Press Release.  Retrieved June 21, 2007, from the World Wide 
Web: http://news.delta.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=9584 
- 23 - 
assumptions like fare class demand independence that are crucial to the standard form of 
forecasting.  In turn, the traditional revenue management systems that rely on standard 
forecasting were weakened. 
 
Concurrently, the Internet came to the fore as a distribution channel and modified 
consumer behavior.  To keep costs low, LCCs avoided the orthodox distribution channels 
like the costly Global Distribution System (GDS).  Many LCCs sold tickets online 
exclusively, diverting booking traffic from travel agents to the Internet.  Realizing the 
potential cost savings and revenue potential, major corporations including Sabre, 
Microsoft and several airlines also founded Internet booking sites like Expedia, 
Travelocity and Orbitz.  These sites featured price comparisons prominently, fueling the 
trend of consumers seeking the lowest fare available.  With price movements becoming 
more transparent and search costs significantly lowered, consumers became more price-
sensitive.  Legacy airlines were often forced to match LCCs’ low-fares availability 
frequently to retain market share. 
 
The increased transparency afforded by LCCs and the Internet awakened the passengers’ 
awareness to fare variations.  Sophisticated Internet-based fare tracking companies like 
Farecast and later Yapta emerged to capitalize on consumers’ desire to secure the lowest 
fare in face of the wide fare fluctuations caused by airlines’ revenue management 
systems.  In turn, the popularity of these Internet tools among users and the media 
deepened consumers’ familiarity with fare trends. 
 
 
1.4  RESPONSES AND ENHANCEMENTS TO RM SYSTEMS 
 
1.4.1  Integrated into Revenue Management Systems 
 
The dismantling of fare restrictions disrupted the legacy airlines’ revenue management 
systems.  To stem their loss of revenue, research has been focused on new methods to 
enhance conventional revenue management systems to function effectively in the less-
restricted fare environment and respond suitably to the altered consumer behavior.  The 
core idea behind some of these enhancements is to close fare classes at optimal points to 
force sell-up.  Sell-up refers to a passenger purchasing a higher fare class as a result of his 
first-choice fare class being unavailable.  To determine where these ideal points of fare 
closure are, the airlines have to estimate the probability and willingness of passengers 
buying a higher fare class.  The concept of sell-up and two related enhancements: Q-
forecasting (QF) and Hybrid Forecasting (HF) are explained in further detail in Chapter 
2. 
 
 
1.4.2  Post-RM Adjustment of Inventory Availability 
 
In order to curtail the market share growth by entrant low-fare airlines and in response to 
passengers’ heightened sensitivity to prices, legacy airlines began to match seat 
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availability of the lowest competitor fare on certain routes.  That helped them show up on 
top of the list in Internet compare-then-buy searches.  Such availability matching is not 
incorporated fully into revenue management systems.  Instead, the availability matching 
overrides the fare class closures already calculated as optimal by the revenue 
management systems.  Since the matching activity lies outside of the revenue 
management system, it may be redundant or even regressive, harking back to the days 
before formal revenue management systems were used, when designated route controllers 
relied on instincts to shut fare classes.   
 
The post-RM adjustment of inventory availability is merely a Band-Aid for airlines 
before they fully incorporate competitor fare availably data and model the competitive 
effects in their revenue management systems.  Existing revenue management systems 
rely heavily on their own historical booking trends although competitor fares and 
availability have a significant impact on bookings.  Dennis Cary, Vice President, 
Revenue Management at United Airlines, calls for the integration into revenue 
management systems “more intelligence about the shifting competitive landscape.”11 
 
 
1.5 OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF THE THESIS 
 
The goal of this thesis is to use simulation to examine the impacts of seat availability 
matching on airlines.  To cover the range of scenarios where availability matching is 
being done or could be of interest to airlines, different types of seat availability matching 
and various combinations of revenue management systems are simulated.  Two market 
settings are used in this thesis: a single symmetric market and a network of 572 markets 
where four asymmetric airlines compete. 
 
Specifically, three types of availability matching are investigated: firstly Open Matching, 
where an airline re-opens fare classes already made unavailable by the revenue 
management system, to be as available as the least restrictive rival; secondly Closure 
Matching, where an airline closes fare classes that the are still available from the revenue 
management system but are lower then the lowest fare among competitors, and thirdly 
Bi-directional Matching, where an airline does both of the above. 
 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is organized into five further sections: a review of related literature and theory 
of revenue management, an explanation of the simulation environment of the Passenger 
Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS), a discussion of the simulation inputs, results and 
analyses in a single symmetric market and then in a network, and finally a conclusion 
summarizing the main findings and proposing directions for future research. 
 
                                                
11 Cary, D.  (2004).  Future of Revenue Management: A View from the Inside.  Journal of Revenue and 
Pricing Management, 3(2), 200-203. 
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Chapter 2 presents an overview of literature that is relevant to the thesis.  It provides a 
historical framework, explaining the fundamental concepts of revenue management, 
highlighting the shifts in the field brought by LCCs and the future changes likely in the 
field.  The goal of the chapter is to substantiate the need to simulate the effects of lowest 
fare seat availability matching on airline revenue management. 
 
The first part of Chapter 3 introduces three aspects of how PODS works to simulate 
accurately the competitive booking process: of the general architecture, of the passenger 
choice model and of the implementation of RM systems and theories used by actual 
airlines.  The focus of the second part is the implementation of lowest fare seat 
availability matching in PODS. 
  
Having explained the underlying theory and construction of the simulator, in Chapter 4 I 
will describe the inputs and take an analytic look at the outcomes of the simulation runs.  
I will start investigating of the effects of lowest fare seat availability matching from the 
proof-of-concept stage by studying simulations of two airlines competing in a single 
symmetric market that has no fare restrictions.  There are three main groups of scenarios.  
Firstly, I will study the hypothetical use of availability matching to make an airline with a 
rudimentary revenue management system more protective of higher fare classes.  This is 
to reduce the extent of which their passengers pay less than their willingness-to-pay in an 
unrestricted fare environment.  The second group examines whether it is lucrative or 
tactical for an airline with an advanced revenue management system to match an airline 
with a simple system in terms of the lowest fare seat available.  Thirdly, I will examine 
the scenarios where two airlines with the same revenue management system match each 
other in lowest fare availability. 
 
In Chapter 5, I will simulate scenarios where a legacy airline availability matches an 
LCC, in an asymmetric network with four airlines and 572 markets.  Half of the markets 
are traditional and restrictive while the other half of the markets are less restrictive 
because of the presence of an LCC.  I will compare the performance of the matching 
airline when it uses combinations of leg-based inventory control or O-D inventory control 
with standard forecasting or hybrid forecasting. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I will summarize the key findings of the thesis and suggest future 
directions for research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE AND THEORY REVIEW 
 
 
The primary goal of this chapter is to review the literature that precede and motivate this 
thesis – to show why this thesis is necessary.  The secondary aim is to explain the 
concepts that will be used in the rest of this thesis.   
 
The chapter is divided into two main sections: first, an overview of the development of 
airline revenue management so far and then a discussion focused on the relationship 
between airline revenue management and competition.  The first section provides a 
historical overview of conventional revenue management methods used by airlines and 
how they were then adapted for the less restrictive fare environment brought by LCCs. 
 
The second section on airline revenue management and competition covers three sub-
topics: the future of airline revenue management, the literature on price matching and 
inventory control under competition.  The future of airline revenue management is a 
discussion on the inadequacies of the current systems and possible future enhancements 
that incorporate competitors’ fare availability.  The section on price matching literature 
acknowledges that competitive effects on airlines have been studied, but only at a macro, 
fare pricing level.  A micro, fare availability level is required for revenue management.  
The third sub-section discusses two papers that examined the specific issue of inventory 
control under competition.  Although these two studies studied micro, availability level 
issues, they use analytical methods, whereas this thesis uses simulation. 
 
 
2.1 AIRLINE REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
 
This section starts with an overview of the conventional methods of airline revenue 
management, tracing the progress from leg-based algorithms to Network-based systems 
with Origin-Destination inventory control.  Following that, I will explain the disruption to 
conventional revenue management systems caused by the rise of LCCs and the Internet, 
in particular, the effects when crucial fare restrictions were removed.  I will then focus on 
the methods of Q-forecasting and hybrid forecasting that were developed to improve the 
performance of conventional revenue management systems in the undifferentiated fare 
environment.   
 
 
2.1.1 Conventional Airline Revenue Management 
 
The goal of airline revenue management is to maximize revenue given limited, perishable 
inventories of seats that have predominantly fixed operating costs in the short run.  There 
are various approaches to solving the revenue maximization problem.  However, for 
historical reasons described in Chapter 1, conventional airline revenue management has 
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relied on a central assumption – the demand for different fare classes are independent.  
Legacy airlines successfully segmented seats into fare classes that carry certain 
restrictions, requirements and fares, creating the traditional fare environments.  Using 
fare classes, the airlines encouraged most passengers to purchase only products that fit 
their profile, depending on their sensitivity to time and price, and their propensity to 
cancel or change flights. 
 
Barnhart, Belobaba and Odoni12 identify the third generation of airline revenue 
management systems, already installed at major airlines of the world, as at least capable 
of generating forecasts and booking controls by fare class and have Operations Research 
(OR) models incorporated.  The systems’ three main components, as illustrated in Figure 
2-1, are the models for forecasting, overbooking and inventory control.  Airlines 
maximize their revenues through forecasting demand and allocating supply to that 
demand through pricing and controlling their seat inventories.  Historical bookings are 
used in conjunction with actual bookings received in the demand forecasting model.  The 
forecast produced is then combined with revenue data to generate booking limits in the 
optimization model, otherwise known as the inventory control model.  Concurrently, the 
demand forecast is combined with no-show data, actual bookings and booking limits for 
use by the overbooking model to recommend an optimal overbooking level.  Eventually, 
the overall recommended booking limits are obtained by combining outputs from the 
inventory control model and the overbooking model. 
 
FIGURE 2-1
Third Generation Airline RM System
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For the rest of this section, I will concentrate on the optimization component of inventory 
control, in particular the methods used in this thesis.  There are two literature reviews that 
go into much more depth, especially for forecasting and overbooking.  McGill and van 
Ryzin5 describe the development of revenue management in the traditional fare 
                                                
12 Barnhart, C., P. P. Belobaba, A. R. Odoni.  (2003).  Applications of Operations Reseach in the Air 
Transport Industry.  Transportation Science, 37(4), 368-391. 
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environments and provide a comprehensive survey of the literature.  Boyd and Bilegan13 
present a more up-to-date and technical overview of revenue management, with an 
emphasis on the enabling electronic media like centralized reservation and revenue 
management systems.   
 
The inventory control methods reviewed can be conceptualized alternatively as pricing 
methods.  This is because pricing and inventory control intertwine to the extent that they 
are essentially two perspectives to solve the same revenue maximization problem.  
However, as Pak and Piersma14 have argued, fare class closures can be more directly 
formulated as an inventory allocation issue rather than a pricing problem. 
 
 
2.1.1.a Fare Class/Leg-based Control 
 
At the start of revenue management, when airlines moved away from a simplistic first-
come-first-served system, in order for them to decide “to sell or not to sell” as bookings 
arrived, Littlewood15 introduced the concept of displacement costs.  He created a rule for 
protecting full-fare seats conditional on the probability that a discount-fare passenger 
would displace a full-fare passenger.  Belobaba16 expanded on Littlewood’s work by 
building quantitative decision rules that determine the revenue maximizing protection 
levels and therefore booking limits for multiple nested fare class inventories (Figure 2-2).  
The decision rules are based on the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) – the 
expected revenue obtained if there is an additional “marginal seat” on a flight, calculated 
based on the fare and forecasted demand. 
 
                                                
13 Boyd, E. A., I. C. Bilegan.  (2003).  “Revenue Management and E-Commerce.”  Management Science, 
49(10), 1363-1386. 
14 Pak, K., N. Piersma.  (2002).  Airline Revenue Management.  ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-
2002-12-LIS. 
15 Littlewood, K.  (1972).  Forecasting and Control of Passenger Bookings.  12th AGIFORS Symposium 
Proceedings. 
16 Belobaba, P. P.  (1987).  Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, Ph.D. Thesis, 
Flight Transportation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
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FIGURE 2-2
Nested Booking Limits and Class Protection Levels
Reproduced from Barnhart, et al. 
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EMSR was refined by BELOBABA17 in 1992 to become the EMSRb probabilistic 
decision model that has since been extensively incorporated into many airlines’ revenue 
management systems.  EMSRb is a base algorithm used frequently in this thesis. 
 
Assuming demand to be stochastic (Gaussian) and independent for each fare class, the 
EMSRb model determines the leg-based nested booking limits, based on the expected 
revenue from having an incremental, marginal seat protected for higher fare classes.  In 
other words, a seat is saved for the higher fare classes so long as the revenue expected 
from protecting it exceeds the revenue from the fare class below them.  It is a nested 
approach in that protection levels, and therefore booking limits, are figures jointly held 
by several higher or lower fare classes respectively.  A more in-depth explanation of 
EMSRb is given by Belobaba and Weatherford.18 
 
 
2.1.1.b Origin-Destination Control 
 
With leg-based control, bottlenecks are likely – for itineraries connecting multiple legs, 
the same fare class must be available throughout for successful booking.  Moreover, leg-
based control only guarantees yield maximization but not revenue maximization in a 
network because it ignores network effects.  For example, a passenger booking in a lower 
fare class and connecting from a relatively empty leg to an almost full leg could bring 
more revenues to the airline overall, but would be displaced by a high fare class local 
passenger on the second leg.  Leg-based control is sub-optimal because it favors local 
passengers. 
                                                
17 Belobaba, P. P.  (1992).  The Revenue Enhancement Potential of Airline Revenue Management Systems.  
ASTAIR Proc. Adv. Software Tech. Air Transport, London, U.K. 
18 Belobaba, P. P., L. R. Weatherford.  (1996).  Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer 
Diversion in Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations, Decision Sciences, 27(2), 343-363. 
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To overcome the shortcoming, Origin-Destination (O-D) control was developed to 
allocate inventories based on the revenue contributions of the passengers’ itineraries.  O-
D control is especially beneficial to airlines operating extensive hub-and-spoke networks. 
 
“Virtual buckets” was developed at American Airlines by Smith and Penn19 to replace 
fare classes for inventory control.  Based solely on its revenue contribution, each 
combination of itinerary and fare type is assigned to a “virtual” booking class that is 
internal to the airline’s reservation system.  Seat availability is then determined by the 
booking limits set for that booking class.  The downside to relying only on revenue 
contribution is that it is “greedy” and always prefers connecting passengers, even though 
if the flights are full, local passengers could contribute more overall. 
 
The revenue contribution method was refined into Displacement Adjusted Virtual 
Nesting (DAVN) to take into displacement costs into account.  DAVN controls 
inventories based on the Network Revenue value, which is the total itinerary fare adjusted 
by the costs of displacing local passengers.  Detailed discussions of virtual classes and 
DAVN can be found in Williamson20, Vinod,21 Lee22 and Wei23.  DAVN is used for 
network simulations in this thesis. 
 
An alternative method for O-D control is based on bid prices.  A booking is accepted if 
its fare exceeds the bid price established for that itinerary.  This competing approach was 
developed and discussed by Simpson24, Wei23, Talluri and van Ryzin25. 
 
In the late 1990s, most major airlines were busy upgrading their revenue management 
systems to handle virtual nesting and O-D control, not expecting the upcoming upheaval 
brought by the Low Cost Carriers and the Internet.11 
 
 
2.1.2 Low Cost Carriers and Today’s Fare Environments  
 
Although LCCs carry one out of four U.S. domestic passengers today, there was no 
obvious tipping point that marked their success.  Some LCCs have existed for decades, 
                                                
19 Smith, B. C., C. W., Penn.  (1988).  Analysis of Alternative Origin-Destination Control Strategies, 
AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings, 28, 123-144.  
20 Williamson, E. L.  (1992).  Airline Network Seat Inventory Control: Methodologies and Revenue 
Impacts.  Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
21 Vinod, B. (1995).  Origin and Destination Yield Management.  The Handbook of Airline Economics, D. 
Jenkins (ed.).  The Aviation Weekly Group of the McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, NY, 459-468. 
22 Lee, A. Y.  (1998).  Investigations of Competitive Impacts of Origin-Destination Control using PODS.  
Master’s Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
23 Wei, Y. J.  (1997).  Airline O-D Control using Network Displacement Concepts.  Master’s Thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
24 Simpson, R. W. (1989).  Using Network Flow Techniques to Find Shadow Prices for Market and Seat 
Inventory Control, Memorandum M89-1, MIT Flight Transportation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, MA.  
25 Talluri, K. T., G. J. van Ryzin.  (1999).  A Randomized Linear Programming Method for Computing 
Network Bid Prices, Transportation Science 33, 207-216. 
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and others have come and gone.  Rather, a host of factors created the conducive 
environment for their ascendance, of which we will highlight two here. 
 
First, in the 1990s, demand for air travel mirrored the vigorous growth of the U.S. 
economy.  Buoyed by the robust demand for fully flexible, walk-up fares, legacy carriers 
priced those fares higher than before.11  However, even as load factors remained healthy, 
the high fare ratio annoyed business travelers and left legacy carriers vulnerable to the 
no-frills, low-fares entrants, as Bender and Stephenson noted.26  The high level of 
demand also meant that the airline operations were strained and passengers were more 
likely to receive poor service and willing to defect to a new airline. 
 
Second, as the legacy airlines matured, their costs, especially unionized labor costs, 
became harder to contain.  Once again, that meant they were susceptible to losing market 
share to low-cost, low-fare entrants. 
 
For a comprehensive understanding of the growth of LCCs, refer to Gorin27 for the 
impact of LCCs on revenue management and network flows and to Ito and Lee28 for the 
conditions favoring market entry by LCCs. 
 
By offering lower fares and removing ticket restrictions like mandatory Saturday Night 
Stay, LCCs quickly gained popularity among consumers.  Not willing to cede market 
share, the legacy airlines matched these moves in the affected markets.  Since the fare 
restrictions are crucial to the segmentation of demand in revenue management systems 
employed by the legacy carriers, the growth of the less restricted fare structure disrupted 
the functionality of traditional revenue management systems.   Specifically, less restricted 
fare structures cause the “spiral down” phenomenon – the partial breakdown of 
traditional revenue management systems and the dilution of revenue as a result of 
passengers booking in a lower fare class than they are willing to pay for. 
 
 
2.1.2.a The Spiral Down Effect 
 
Facing the market share growth by entrant LCCs, the legacy carriers responded by 
matching the LCC pricing and less restrictive fare structures.  While such reactions 
slowed the erosion of the legacy airlines’ customer bases, the removal of fare restrictions 
were detrimental to conventional revenue management systems.  Traditional revenue 
management is built on the foundation of restrictions that effectively segment demand 
into significantly independent fare classes.  With the restrictions eliminated or weakened, 
the performance of traditional revenue management systems based on standard 
forecasting deteriorated –he problem was “spiral down.” 
                                                
26 Bender, A. R., F. J. Stephenson.  (1998).  Contemporary Issues Affecting the Demand for Business Air 
Travel in the United States,  Journal of Air Transport Management 4(2), 99-109. 
27 Gorin, T. O.  (2004).  Assessing Low-fare Entry in Airline Markets : Impacts of Revenue Management 
and Network Flows.  Doctoral Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
28 Ito, H., D. Lee.  (2003)  Low Cost Carrier Growth in the U.S. Airline Industry: Past, Present and Future.  
Brown University Department of Economics Paper No. 2003-12.   
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Spiral down is the phenomenon that begins when the less restrictive fare structures result 
in “buy down” or passengers purchasing tickets of fare classes lower than they previously 
would, because they now can.  Subsequently, the records of fewer higher fares purchased 
feed back into the revenue management system resulting in a lower forecast of high fare 
passengers – causing fewer seats to be protected for high-fare passengers.  This then 
cycles as weaker protection once again allows passengers to purchase tickets of lower 
fare classes.  The vicious cycle is illustrated in Figure 2-3.   
 
FIGURE 2-3
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For a detailed, mathematical treatment of the spiral down phenomenon, refer to Cooper, 
Homem-de-Mello and Kleywegt.29 
 
While many airlines were still adjusting to their new, sophisticated O-D revenue 
management systems, LCCs brought the new problem of spiral down.  In response, 
academics have developed revenue management tools for the new, less restricted fare 
environment, although industry practice lags behind slightly.  I will introduce the two 
methods used in this thesis, Q-forecasting and hybrid forecasting, in the next section. 
 
 
2.1.3 Revenue Management Methods for the New Environment 
 
Passengers who buy a fare lower than what they are willing to pay for initiate spiral 
down.  Naturally, the revenue management methods developed to counteract spiral down 
prevent the “buy down” from happening.  The cornerstone of these new methods is 
controlling inventory based on passengers’ estimated willingness-to-pay instead of 
relying on fare class demand independence. 
 
                                                
29 Cooper, W.L., T. Homem-de-Mello, A. J. Kleywegt.  (2006).  Models of the Spiral-Down Effect in 
Revenue Management, Operations Research, 54(5), 968-987. 
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2.1.3.a Q-forecasting 
 
Belobaba and Hopperstad30 developed Q-forecasting as a forecasting approach that does 
not require fare class demand independence.  Instead, Q-forecasting assumes that fare 
classes are fully undifferentiated – there is no distinguishing restriction or requirement 
attached to a fare class except for its price. 
 
The willingness-to-pay of a passenger is literally the maximum price a passenger is ready 
to spend on the itinerary.  With the knowledge of passengers’ willingness-to-pay, airlines 
are able to cause sell-up, where a passenger denied booking on their first choice of a 
particular path and fare class purchases the next higher fare class available.  As suggested 
by Bohutinsky31 in her Master’s thesis, the airline can capitalize on sell-up by rendering 
the cheaper fare class unavailable and profiting the difference in fares.  This is assuming 
the passenger stays with the airline, whether on the same flight or on another flight. 
 
The Q-forecasting method starts by forecasting only the demand for the lowest class 
(known as the Q class), converting demand forecasts into the number of “Q-equivalent” 
passengers.  It then re-partitions the demand strategically by forcing sell-up.  It achieves 
sell-up through closing lower fare classes based on projected passenger willingness-to-
pay.  The concept of sell-up that was initially utilized under circumstances where fares 
carried restrictions was transplanted and adapted for the undifferentiated fare 
environment.  An overview of the process is illustrated in Figure 2-4. 
 
FIGURE 2-4
Overview of Q-forecasting Process
Consider historical bookings where sell-up occurs (Q was closed)
Convert historical bookings in each fare class to “Q-equivalent” bookings
via scaling by the inverse of sell-up probability
Sum up the forecasted “Q-equivalent” bookings, detruncating when needed
Re-partition the forecasted bookings into different fare classes
Compute the booking limits using a traditional optimizer
Reproduced from Cléaz-Savoyen
 
 
                                                
30 Belobaba, P., C. Hopperstad.  (2004).  Algorithms for Revenue Management in Unrestricted Fare 
Markets.  INFORMS Meeting on Revenue Management, Massachusetts of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
31 Bohutinsky, C. H.  (1990).  The Sell Up Potential of Airline Demand.  Master’s Thesis, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
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Cléaz-Savoyen concluded in his Master’s thesis that based on simulations, airlines using 
Q-forecasting effectively recover part of the revenues lost due to the dismantling of fare 
restrictions.32   
 
   
2.1.3.b Hybrid Forecasting 
 
While Q-forecasting performs well in the completely unrestricted fare environment, such 
fare structures relying solely on price as the differentiator are not yet seen in reality.  
More frequently, fare restrictions are only partially removed.  Boyd and Kallesen33 argue 
that in the simplified, semi-restricted fare structure created, instead of breaking 
passengers down according to traditional lines of business versus leisure, the demand 
should be segregated into yieldable (product-oriented) demand and priceable (price-
oriented) demand.  A more in-depth discussion of these two forms of demand is given by 
Reyes34 in his Master’s thesis on hybrid forecasting.  In short, yieldable demand cares 
about the product rather than the price and standard forecasting should be applied.  On 
the other hand, priceable demand should be forecasted with a method like Q-forecasting 
to prevent revenue dilution and spiral down. 
 
Belobaba and Hopperstad30 developed the hybrid forecasting method to categorize 
bookings into the two demand categories and then forecast the demand of product-
oriented and price-oriented passengers in order to set the optimal level of protection for 
seat availability.  Reyes found through simulation that with assumptions of higher 
willingness-to-pay, hybrid forecasting improves an airline’s revenues by about 3% when 
used instead of standard, pick-up forecasting.34 
 
The successful incursion of LCCs and the elimination of certain fare restrictions have 
encouraged legacy airlines to modify their revenue management systems away from 
relying on fare class demand independence.  However, for a variety of reasons like high 
costs of implementation, these systems still do not incorporate competitive effects.  In the 
next section, I will cover the literature discussing the future of airline revenue 
management.  They argue that inventory control systems in the future should take 
competition into account. 
 
 
                                                
32 Cléaz-Savoyen, R. L.  (2005).  Airline Revenue Management Methods for Less Restricted Fare 
Structures.  Master’s Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
33 Boyd, E.A., R. Kallesen.  (2004).  The Science of Revenue Management when Passengers Purchase the 
Lowest Available Fare.  Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 3(2), 171-177. 
34 Reyes, M. H.  (2006).  Hybrid Forecasting for Airline Revenue Management in Semi-Restricted Fare 
Structures.  Master’s Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
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2.2 AIRLINE REVENUE MANAGEMENT AND COMPETITION 
 
2.2.1 The Future of Airline Revenue Management 
 
A common criticism of existing revenue management methods is that they fail to take 
into account the effects of competition.  Nason4 argued that as a result of the transparency 
created by online fare comparison companies, in the near future, revenue management 
systems need to be aware of competitors’ prices and integrate them into the demand 
forecasts and elasticity measures.  Ratliff and Vinod35 indicated “competitive awareness” 
as the primary driver of revenue management systems change in the coming years.  In 
particular, they stress the need for “real-time” control of pricing and availability and 
describe some recent vendor systems that have begun to include competitor fare 
availability information. 
 
These papers imply that although legacy airlines have addressed the simplified fare 
structure brought by LCCs, they have not properly tackled the other issue of price 
transparency and low consumer search costs brought by the Internet.  For revenue 
management systems, competitors’ prices and availabilities have become as important as 
historical databases of bookings.  There is a need to account for the competition.  As a 
result, in the short term, airlines have been matching the lowest fare seat availability of 
their competitors. 
   
Consumer behavior has also shifted.  Focusing on the “strategic consumer” who 
postpones purchase if he believes a low-fare class will re-open, Anderson and Wilson36 
showed that the growing passenger awareness of fare trends can significantly influence 
airlines’ revenues.  Airline revenue management systems need to understand such 
strategic consumer behavior in the future when controlling fare class closures or re-
openings.  This is especially true with seat availability matching, since it causes airlines 
to modify their fare class availability more often. 
 
 
2.2.2 Price Matching 
 
Competitive effects on airline fares have not been ignored in the literature.  However, the 
studies so far have focused on the macro level of price matching and are too broad for 
understanding the effects of competition on the micro level – of seat availability 
matching. 
 
Evidence of the effects of price matching or the influence competition holds over prices 
is extensive in economics literature.  Borenstein and Rose37 concluded in their empirical 
                                                
35 Ratliff, R., B. Vinod.  (2005).  Airline Pricing and Revenue Management: A Future Outlook.  Journal of 
Revenue and Pricing Management, 4(3), 302-307. 
36 Anderson, C. K., J. G. Wilson.  (2003).  Wait or Buy?  The Strategic Consumer: Pricing and Profit 
Implications, Journal of the Operational Research Society, 54, 299-306. 
37 Borenstein, S., N. Rose.  (1994).  Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry.  The 
Journal of Political Economy, 102(41), 653-683. 
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study that price dispersion witnessed in airfares suggests that price discrimination 
variation over routes is based on passengers’ readiness and ability to switch between 
competing airlines.  Evans and Kessides38 formed a statistical basis to substantiate the 
unstated industry “golden rule” – where airlines with multi-market contract do not 
provoke price wars in a route because they fear a backlash in other markets.  Varian39 
highlighted the practice of “price signaling” between airlines to maintain steady prices 
and referred to Nomani’s40 account of the practice. 
 
With LCCs, proof of competitive price matching and their impacts is similarly strong.  
Morrison41 estimated passengers’ savings as a result of Southwest Airlines entry into 
markets.  The US Department of Transportation’s report in 199642 also recorded legacy 
airlines price matching entrant LCCs. 
 
Since pricing and inventory control remain separate at airlines, it is not sufficient to only 
examine the broad issue of pricing under competition.  In the next section, I will compare 
two papers that analyze the specific problem of inventory control under competition. 
 
 
2.2.3 Inventory Control Under Competition 
 
Mahajan and van Ryzin43 extended the newsvendor or inventory competition game and 
examined how competing symmetric firms selling limited substitutable goods affect each 
other with their inventory decisions when consumers can choose dynamically.  Their 
analytic conclusion is that under competition, firms tend to overstock.  In other words, at 
Nash equilibrium, firms are pressured by competition to make goods available to the 
detriment of their profits.  In the context of airlines, the results should be interpreted as 
discount, lower-yield seats being overstocked at the expense of under-protecting seats for 
higher-yield passengers.  In this thesis, I will use simulation to examine the revenue 
effects when airlines overstock lower fare classes by re-opening fare classes when 
availability matching the lowest competitor fare available. 
 
Netessine and Shumsky44 showed a contradictory finding with his analytic framework: at 
equilibrium, an airline would provide fewer low-fare seats when competing with another 
airline on the same flight leg than when it is a monopoly or monopolist.  The caveat is 
                                                
38 Evan, W. N., I. N. Kessides.  (1994).  Living by the “Golden Rule”: Multimarket Contact in the U.S. 
Airline Industry.  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 341-366. 
39 Varian, H. R.  (1999).  Market Structure in the Network Age.  Understanding the Digital Economy, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
40 Nomani, A. Q.  (1990).  Fare Warning: How Airlines Trade Price Plans.  The Wall Street Journal, 9 
October 1990, pp B1. 
41 Morrison, S. A.,  Actual, Adjacent and Potential Competition Estimating the Full Effect of Southwest 
Airlines.  Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 35(2), 239-256. 
42 US Department of Transportation.  (1996).  The Low Cost Airline Service Revolution.  Report of the 
Office of the Secretary. 
43 Mahajan, S., G. van Ryzin.  (2001).  Inventory Competition under Dynamic Consumer Choice.  
Operations Research, 49(5), 646-657. 
44 Netessine, S., R. A. Shumsky.  (2005).  Revenue Management Games: Horizontal and Vertical 
Competition.  Management Science, 51(5), 813-831. 
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that such an outcome is dependent on the assumption that high-fare passengers, but not 
low-fare passengers, overflow from one airline to another. 
 
Since this thesis will use simulation instead of analysis, both types of overflow are 
possible.  Although airline inventory control under competition has been studied using 
analytic and empirical frameworks, it has yet to be examined using simulation.  Many 
airline situations get too complicated to be handled elegantly by direct analysis without 
simplifying assumptions.  Simulation appears to be a good step next. 
 
 
2.3 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has provided the historical perspective and theoretical motivations for 
simulating inventory availability matching under competition.  As highlighted by the 
papers discussing the future of revenue management, the current generation of revenue 
management systems reviewed has been more focused on internal records of historical 
bookings rather than competitor seat availability.  As airlines tackle the problem of 
“spiral down” due to less restricted fare structures, they have to concurrently face 
complications from the external forces of competitor seat availability.  Consumers’ 
awareness of fares and fare trends, made possible by the increasing price transparency 
with Internet-based fare tracking companies, means airlines have to respond to the certain 
segment of customers who demand the lowest fare available.  Although the effects of 
competition on price matching have been explored, there is a need to examine the 
impacts of competition on fare class availability matching.  So far, the studies on 
inventory availability under have been analytical.  This thesis will instead investigate 
how availability matching of inventory affects airline revenue management systems using 
simulation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT – PODS  
 
 
A simulation approach is used to investigate the revenue impacts of seat availability 
matching.  Simulation captures the characteristics of a competitive airline network, 
especially two types of the dynamic interactions: first, between passenger choice and 
inventory control and second, between airlines.  While analytical methods can be useful 
for obtaining results in some situations, like to find game theoretic equilibrium positions, 
they are usually static.  As Netessine and Shumsky’s analytical paper44 noted, the 
complexities of network interactions mean that competitive airline models rapidly 
overwhelm direct analysis, as the number of fare classes and booking limits increase. 
 
The first half of this chapter describes the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator 
(PODS) used in this thesis and has three sections: an overview of the general architecture, 
a detailed look at the passenger choice model and a close examination of the revenue 
management system.  The second half is focused on the PODS capabilities for simulating 
seat availability matching of the lowest competitor fare.  The aim of this chapter is to 
describe how PODS is used to simulate real-life scenarios and verify theoretical 
knowledge. 
 
 
3.1 GENERAL ARCHITECTURE  
 
PODS is a simulation program that realistically integrates passenger decisions of airline, 
path and fare class over multiple observations of a single day of the week.  A typical run 
is made up of five trials, with each trial consisting of 600 samples.  Since the simulations 
begin with user defined inputs, the first 200 direct observations calculated are used to 
progressively initiate the historical bookings database, and are then discarded.  In other 
words, a single run in PODS averages results from five trials of 400 departure dates, or 
2000 iterations. 
 
In PODS, the pre-departure process is modeled as 16 consecutive time frames and the 
airlines’ revenue management systems modify the seat availability by paths and fare 
classes at the start of each time frame.  The database is then updated at the end of each 
time frame. 
 
The days to departure for the time frames are inputs that can be adjusted by users.  For 
the purpose of this thesis, the 16 time frames start off from 63 days prior to departure and 
being a week long, but are compressed to just a few days as departure approaches. 
 
Table 3-1: Time Frames 
63           Days to Departure           49        35             28                    21      14              7              3          0 
13 14 159 10 11 125 6 7 81 2 3 4  
 
     56                     42  31        24               17  10                 5              1 
16 
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The architecture of PODS consists of two halves: the passenger side and the airline side 
(Figure 3-1).  The passenger half, known as the passenger choice model, is an enhanced, 
evolved version of the Decision Window Model (DWM) developed originally at 
Boeing.45  There are four successive steps.  First, it generates demand in the simulation as 
total demand per Origin-Destination market for each passenger type (business or leisure) 
and each departure date.  It then imbues these individual passengers with various 
characteristics like their decision windows (their tolerance for total time spent on flight), 
airline preference, maximum willingness-to-pay and disutility costs caused by ticket 
restrictions.  The third step is determining the passenger choice set from the passenger 
characteristics and the path/class availability given by the inventory control optimizer.  
Finally, the passengers pick the fare and path option with the lowest total cost in terms of 
fares and disutilities.   
 
The airline half is made up by the airline’s revenue management system.  The forecaster 
predicts future bookings based on current and historical bookings.  Based on these 
predictions, the inventory control optimizer determines and supplies the path and fare 
class availability.  The bookings or cancellations are continuously updated to the airlines 
databases.  The revenue management systems employed by airlines in PODS are the third 
generation revenue management models described earlier in Chapter 2.1.1.  A range of 
revenue management methods from the more basic like leg-based EMSRb, Adaptive 
Threshold to the more sophisticated involving DAVN can be simulated. 
                                                
45 The Boeing Company.  (1997).  Decision Window Path Preference Methodology Description, Seattle, 
WA.  
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3.2 PASSENGER CHOICE MODEL 
 
The passenger choice model in PODS determines how passengers behave when faced 
with choices from different airlines.  The four consecutive steps involved will be outlined 
in this section.  For a more detailed and technical treatment of the PODS demand model, 
please refer to Carrier’s46 Master’s thesis on modeling passenger choice. 
 
 
3.2.1 Demand Generation 
 
For this step, the Passenger Choice Model generates an average daily air travel demand 
for each of the O-D markets in the user-defined network.  The demand is then divided 
between leisure and business travelers.  The basis of this demand is data provided by the 
airlines forming the PODS Consortium.  Variability is then created randomly, though 
neither seasonal nor day-of-week variability are modeled. 
 
Two inputs in PODS influence the stochastic demand generation process: the base fares 
and the numbers of passengers that would travel at those base fares.  There is a base fare 
and an associated number of passengers for each of the passenger types. 
 
The mean demand resulting from the inputs of the base fares and the passenger numbers 
is designated as 1.00.  If a specific multiple of that baseline demand is desired, lower or 
higher demands can then be obtained from scaling.  For example, a demand level of 2.00 
would generate twice the demand caused by that number of passengers willing to travel at 
those base fares. 
 
As for deciding when the demand arrives, in PODS, users can modify the arrival curves, 
or the percentage of bookings that arrive against days to departure, by passenger type – 
business or leisure.  For this thesis, the booking curves used, adapted from actual airline 
data, are as shown below in Figure 3-2.  They manifest the trend that business travelers 
tend to book later than leisure passengers. 
 
Specifically, the figure illustrates that leisure passengers book much earlier – by the time 
half the leisure passenger have arrived to make their bookings, only about a quarter of 
business travelers have done so. 
 
                                                
46 Carrier, E.  (2003)  Modeling Airline Passenger Choice: Passenger Preference for Schedule in the 
Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS).  Master’s Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, MA. 
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3.2.2 Passenger Characteristics 
 
In the second step, three sets of characteristics are endowed upon the passengers 
generated by the earlier step.  Each passenger is first assigned a decision window – a 
period of time framed by the earliest acceptable departure time and the latest acceptable 
arrival time.  Paths that fall completely within the decision window will be considered by 
the passenger.  If no path qualifies, the passenger has to re-plan his/her trip at additional 
cost. 
 
The passenger is also assigned a characteristic of maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) – 
the maximum fare a passenger is prepared to pay to travel.  The WTP is generated from 
price-demand curves for business and leisure passengers, based on user inputs.  The 
formula for the curves is given as: 
 




=
basefareemult
basefaref
f *1)-(
)-(*ln(0.5)
e1,min   )least at P(pay  
 
where:  f is the fare 
basefare is an input in PODS, at which an input specified number of 
passengers are willing to pay to travel 
emult is the elasticity multiplier such that 50% of passengers are willing to 
pay emult*basefare to travel 
 
Business passengers have higher emult, meaning their price-demand curve drops off 
more slowly since they are less price-sensitive.  In contrast, once the fare is past a certain 
multiplier of the basefare, the probability of a leisure traveler willing to pay that fare falls 
quickly. 
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The third characteristic given to a passenger is the disutility costs randomly generated 
based on his/her passenger type.  These costs indicate the passengers’ sensitivity to a 
range of restrictions such as advance purchase, schedule preference, airline preference 
and path quality.  For a more comprehensive description of disutility costs, refer to Lee.47  
 
 
3.2.3 Passenger Choice Set 
 
The third step involves ruling out certain path/fare class choices provided by the revenue 
management system because these choices have either advance purchase requirements 
that have lapsed or a fare higher than the passenger’s WTP.  If the airline has closed the 
fare class/path, those options are also absent from the passenger choice set.  In addition, 
the choice of not booking is always included in the choice set. 
 
As I will explain later in Chapter 3.4, the passenger choice set is where seat availability 
matching overrides the revenue management system, resulting in more or fewer choices 
available to the passengers. 
 
 
3.2.4 Passenger Decision 
 
The passenger will then calculate the total costs of the fare and disutility costs and select 
the path/fare option with the lowest costs.  This booking decision is then returned to the 
revenue management system. 
 
 
3.3 IMPLEMENTING REVENUE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
AND THEORIES 
 
Three types of inventory control schemes, out of many more available in PODS, will be 
used in the simulations for this thesis: AT90, DAVN and variants of EMSRb.  At the start 
of each time frame, the inventory control optimizers sends information of path and fare 
class availability to provide the passenger choice set (Figure 3-3). 
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47 Lee, S.  (2000).  Modeling Passenger Disutilities in Airline Revenue Management Simulation.  Master’s 
Thesis, Massachusetts of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
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3.3.1 Fare Class Yield Management (FCYM) – EMSRb with Standard 
Forecasting  
 
The Fare Class Yield Management (FCYM) scheme performs all its processes on a flight 
leg basis: detruncating data, forecasting demand, optimizing using the EMSRb algorithm 
(discussed in Chapter 2.1.1.a) and determining nested fare classes booking limits.  FCYM 
is the baseline scheme of inventory control in PODS. 
 
FCYM is a traditional revenue management scheme reliant on fare class restrictions.  As 
previously discussed in Chapter 2.1.2.a, it spirals down in an unrestricted fare 
environment because standard forecasting fails.  In response, enhancements like Q-
forecasting, based on sell-up, were developed by researchers to reduce spiral down.  In 
this section, I will first explain the parameter “Frat5” that is used to represent the 
probability of sell-up in PODS.  Frat5s can either be inputs or estimated.  Then, I will 
describe how sell-up behavior is incorporated in PODS using Frat5s.  Finally, I will show 
how Q-forecasting and hybrid forecasting, based on sell-up, are implemented in PODS. 
 
 
3.3.1.a Input Frat5s 
 
Frat5 exists only as a parameter in PODS.  It is used by a simulated airline as a proxy to 
determine passengers’ willingness-to-pay.  It is the acronym for Fare ratio (relative to the 
lowest fare) at which 50% of passengers are expected sell-up from the lowest fare class 
(Q) to a higher, more expensive fare class during a certain time frame.  Therefore, a 
higher Frat5 represents a higher probability of sell-up and WTP among passengers. 
 
FIGURE 3-4
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An input Frat5s curve is a set of Frat5s entered into PODS by the user.  Frat5s typically 
increase progressively across time frames towards the date of departure, reflecting mainly 
the change in the mix of business and leisure travelers as shown earlier in Figure 3-2.  
Business travelers, who are willing to pay relatively more, book comparatively later.  As 
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such, an input Frat5s curve showing Frat5s across time frames obtains an S-shape, as 
seen in Figure 3-4.  This implies that a business traveler who is willing to pay and 
therefore sell-up more has a higher probability of being informed that his/her first choice 
is not available and pushed to sell-up. 
 
The input Frat5s curve shown in Figure 3-4 and used in this thesis is labeled as “C” in 
PODS, the middle of five S-shaped curves A to E arbitrarily created by Cléaz-Savoyen32 
to perform sensitivity analyses on input Frat5s.   
 
 
3.3.1.b Estimating Frat5s – Average Conditional Forecast Prediction 
 
Using input Frat5s is somewhat unrealistic because airlines would not directly know their 
passengers’ willingness-to-pay.  While input Frat5s can be used for “proof-of-concept,” 
PODS also has the functionality for estimating Frat5s based on historical bookings, 
which is more in line with what airlines are able to do.   
 
The method of estimating sell-up was introduced by Hopperstad and explained in detail 
by Cléaz-Savoyen.32  For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on the specific sell-up 
method used in this thesis.  My explanation of the conditional forecast prediction 
(average) method is based on Hopperstad’s detailed description.48 
 
 
“Conditional” 
The theory of conditional probability of sell-up is that sell-up is affected by, or 
conditional upon, the lowest open competitor class (Loco).  Airlines are able to ascertain 
rival fare availability easily today – Loco can be found with methods like “screen 
scraping” or GDS information.   
 
In PODS we have information for two observed types of demands: for a certain fare class 
i of our airline and for our lowest fare class (fare class Q) if the Loco is a certain Fare 
Class j.  For the conditional probability of sell-up, we use these two observed types of 
demand that are conditional on the Loco to derive the ratio for the conditional probability 
of sell-up. 
 
The ratio 
j is Loco if Q class fareour for  Demand
j is Loco if i class fareour for  Demand
 gives us the probability that a 
passenger whose first choice is our fare class Q would sell-up to our fare class i given 
that during his/her booking, the Loco is j. 
 
“Forecast Prediction” 
The main idea of forecast prediction is that the number of actual bookings in a fare class 
relative to the earlier forecasted prediction provides a correction to the previously 
                                                
48 Hopperstad, C.  (2007).  Methods for Estimating Sell-up: Part II.  AGIFORS Joint Revenue Management 
and Cargo Study Group Meeting. 
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estimated sell-up figure.  As the sell-up figure is progressively corrected, a more accurate 
number emerges.  Regressions are performed across time frames and Loco. 
 
“Average” 
The term “average” means that the conditional forecast prediction estimate is weighed by 
the historical distribution of Loco. 
 
Implementation of Average Conditional Forecast Prediction in PODS 
In PODS, the estimated Frat5s for the average conditional forecast prediction method are 
obtained with the formula: 
 
1
))1(1(
)5ln(.5 , +
⋅++⋅
−
= dtfclocob
frat tfloco  
 
where:  tf is the time frame 
  and the coefficients b, c and d are obtained from minimizing: 
 
2
))1(1)(1(
,∑ ∑ ⋅++−−⋅− 
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
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dtfclocofratlbeaobs levlevloco  
 
where: obsloco,lev is the ratio of the historical bookings to the Q forecast for a 
certain Loco and level 
 fratllev is the fare ratio associated with the level 
 
The fare ratios are not weighed by the number of observations because the revenue 
management system is a biased experimenter that produces observations at various levels 
for itself. 
 
 
3.3.1.c Probability of Sell-up 
 
PODS offers two choices for incorporating sell-up behavior.  The user can choose to 
input an arbitrary figure as the probability of sell-up (psup).  Alternatively, the 
probability of sell-up can be derived from the Frat5s curve.  A comparison of the two 
ways can be found in Soo’s Master’s thesis.49  In this thesis, only the Frat5 method is 
used. 
 
                                                
49 Soo, Y. S., Fare Adjustment Strategies for Airline Revenue Management and Reservation Systems.  
Master’s Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
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For the Frat5 method, the probability of sell-up is assumed to be a negative exponential 
distribution, as shown in the function below. 
 
 fqpsup → =
econ
fare
fare
e q
f




−− 1
 
 
where:  faref = Fare of higher fare class, f 
  fareq = Fare of lowest fare class, q 
econ = Elasticity constant 
 
The elasticity constant for a certain time frame (econtf) is calculated from the Frat5 for 
that time frame (Frat5tf).  
 
15
)5ln(.
−
−
=
tf
tf
Frat
econ  
 
Figure 3-5 illustrates that for a given fare ratio, as Frat5s increases, the probability of sell-
up increases.  The figure also makes clear that each Frat5 corresponds to the fare ratio at 
which there is a 0.5 probability of sell-up.   
 
FIGURE 3-5
Relationship between Probability of Sell-up and Frat5
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Assuming fares of $125 to $500 from fare class 6 (lowest) to fare class 1 and input Frat5s 
curve “C,” Figure 3-6 shows that the probability of sell-up curves across time frames 
retain the S-shape of the Frat5s.  This is because passengers arriving later are more likely 
to sell-up.  The largest increases in probabilities happen in the middle time frames of the 
booking process.  It is also clear that passengers are much more likely to sell-up from the 
lowest fare class (6) to the next higher fare class (5) than subsequently higher fare classes 
(4 to 1). 
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FIGURE 3-6
Probability of Sell-up across Time Frames
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3.3.1.d Q-forecasting Implementation in PODS 
 
Building on the theory of Q-forecasting covered in Chapter 2.1.1.a, this section will 
explain how it is modeled in PODS, based on a presentation by Hopperstad.48 
 
Historical bookings in higher classes are transformed into “Q-equivalent” bookings via 
scaling by the inverse of sell-up probability. 
  
fq
f
q
psup
bookbook
→
=  
 
where:   bookq is “Q-equivalent” bookings 
bookf  is historical bookings in higher-than-Q fare class f 
 psup is sell-up probability. 
 
In PODS, the Q-forecasting forecast is produced by time frame.  The Q-forecast is then 
partitioned into fare class forecasts using time frame sell-up probabilities. 
 
fc f,tf = Qfc ( psup q→f+1,tf  - psup q→f,tf ) 
 
where:  fc is fare class forecast 
f is fare class 
tf is time frame 
Qfc is Q-equivalent forecast 
psup is sell-up probability. 
 
The last of this multi-step process aggregates forecasts across time frames to generate 
forecasts for each fare class. 
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3.3.1.e Hybrid Forecasting Implementation in PODS 
 
Hybrid forecasting is necessary for the optimal performance of an inventory control 
optimizer if the fare structures are mixed – a combination of traditional, restricted fare 
markets and simplified, less-restricted markets.   
 
An important step is to classify the historical bookings into product-oriented or price-
oriented demand.  In PODS, there are three options.  The first option, called the “path 
rule,” is used in this thesis.  Under that rule, a passenger is considered product-oriented if 
the next lower class available is on the same path.  The other two options, the “airline 
rule” and the “market rule,” involve a passenger buying a product when the next lowest 
fare class available is with the same airline and in the market respectively.  The two types 
of demands, product-oriented demand and price-oriented demand, are then forecasted 
using standard pick-up forecasting and Q-forecasting respectively. 
 
 
3.3.2 Load Factor Threshold Algorithm 
 
The Load Factor Threshold methods are used in PODS to reflect the simpler processes 
used by LCCs that generally eschew complex revenue management systems. 
 
 
3.3.2.a Fixed Threshold 
 
For the Fixed Load Factor Threshold Algorithm, a cumulative load over capacity 
threshold between 0% and 100% is determined for each fare class from the lowest fare 
class up.  The threshold for the highest fare class is therefore the overall load factor 
target.  A fare class is closed when its corresponding load threshold has been reached.  It 
is a rather rigid and basic way of managing bookings. 
 
 
3.3.2.b Adaptive Threshold (AT) 
 
The Adaptive Threshold method is a refined form of the Fixed Load Factor Threshold 
method.  It has a target load factor but initial fare class load thresholds that are allowed to 
fluctuate.  At every time frame, its fare class load values are calculated and fare class 
thresholds are re-optimized in response to the number of bookings so far, in order to 
achieve the target load factor.  The type of AT currently implemented in PODS is the 
“Accordion” threshold, where the user can control the amount of fluctuation allowed by 
changing the minimum and maximum level of the accordion parameter convergence 
constant. 
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The re-optimization process is achieved by changing the accordion parameter (apv’) 
using this equation: 
 

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where:  apvn is the minimum accordion parameter value allowed 
  apvx is the maximum accordion parameter value allowed 
  hapvl is the average historical accordion parameter value for leg l 
  tgtlf is the target load factor 
  hlfl is the average historical load factor, leg l 
  cnvgcon is the convergence constant 
 
AT90, with the “90” referring to a 90% load factor target, is used in PODS to replicate 
the simpler inventory control system a LCC competitor employs in the absence of more 
formal revenue management systems. 
 
 
3.3.3 Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN) 
 
Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting, is the O-D inventory control method, based on 
O-D forecasts, outlined earlier in Chapter 2.1.1.b.  The central issue with O-D control is 
that a connecting passenger may bring higher revenues overall to an airline if the legs are 
generally not full, but could displace higher-yield local passengers if the legs are full.  
DAVN presents a passenger’s contribution to the airline suitable for comparison by 
deducting the displacement costs of the other flight legs from the connecting passenger’s 
fare.  These passenger values are then placed in “virtual buckets” or “virtual” booking 
classes that are “nested,” or jointly protected from lower classes. 
 
∑
≠
∈
=
km
itinerarym
mk Leg d  -Fare ODFare Bucketed  
 
To compute the displacement costs, a linear programming (LP) problem is solved where 
total revenue is maximized subject to constraints of capacity and demand forecasted.  
Displacement costs and details of the LP can be found in Williamson’s doctoral thesis.20 
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The LP is formulated like this: 
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Subject to constraints: 
jj
ii fx <    ji class,OD∀  Fare class demand constraint 
k
OD Class
kj
i Cix
i j
<∑ ∑ δ   klegs∀   Capacity constraint 
 
where:  i represents an O-D market 
j represents a fare class 
k represents a leg 
p represents the fare 
x represents the actual number of passengers 
f represents the forecasted number of passengers 
C represents the capacity of an aircraft 
δik is 1 if leg k is part of path i and is otherwise 0 
 
The “dual solution” of the LP provides, for each leg k, the optimal number of passengers 
for each O-D market and fare class.  More importantly, it provides the marginal revenue 
obtained by expanding the capacity by one seat.  The marginal revenue is used to 
calculate displacement costs. 
 
Finally, for each leg, all fares are sorted by their “bucketed fares” and the EMSRb 
optimizer is used to determine the booking limits for each of these “nested virtual 
buckets.” 
 
 
3.4 AVAILABILITY MATCHING CAPABILITIES IN PODS 
 
The treatment of Lowest competitor class open (Loco) availability matching in PODS is 
similar to what is done at airlines in that it is not directly integrated into the revenue 
management system.  It is implemented as an overlay that overrides the path/class 
availability information sent from the inventory control optimizer to the passenger model 
(Figure 3-7).  It could make unavailable fares classes originally left open or re-open 
classes shut down by the revenue management system.   
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FIGURE 3-7
Availability Matching Overlay
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The availability matching overlay follows evaluates the Loco at the end of each time 
frame and modifies seat availability at the beginning of the next time frame.  As the name 
of Lowest Competitor Class Open implies, the emphasis on the Loco is to find the lowest 
fare class available, and it can be a different competitor airline each round.  Airlines 
simulated in PODS are capable of three types of matching: closure, open and bi-
directional.   
 
 
3.4.1 Closure Matching 
 
Closure Matching enables an airline to be at least as restrictive as the least restrictive 
rival.  The implementing airline scans competitors’ fare class availability and shuts down 
fare classes that are lower than the Loco, even if the revenue management system kept it 
open.  An airline performing Closure Matching does not wish to keep a cheaper fare class 
available for longer than the most available rival.   
 
An example illustrated in Figure 3-8 shows Airline 1 having fare classes 1 to 4 left open 
and available by the revenue management system.  As it implements Closure Matching, it 
cannot be more open than its rivals and therefore shuts down fare class 4. 
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Closure Matching
Airline 1’s Inventory Control Optimizer shuts
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Availability matching does not change seat availability if the implementing airline is 
already at least as restrictive as the Loco.  For example, if it has fare classes 1 to 3 open 
and Loco is one of fare classes 3 to 6 (i.e. equally or more open), the availability 
matching mechanism takes no action – the airline is comfortable with being equally or 
more restrictive 
 
The basic equation in PODS for Loco Closure Matching is: 
 
hiclosep = max[1, locop+matchp]+1 
 
where:  hiclosep is the highest closed class for path p 
  locop is the lowest competitor class open for path p 
  matchp is the matching parameter chosen by the airline 
  implementing Closure Matching 
 
Through matchp (discrete values -2 to 2), PODS offers the additional option of offsetting 
the matching by one or two fare classes.  In other words, instead of Closure Matching 
with Loco as a target, an airline can perform Closure Matching with the target being one 
or two fare classes higher or lower than the Loco.  This thesis will focus on exact 
matches, where the matchp is always set to 0.  This means that the implementing airline 
targets the Loco exactly. 
 
 
3.4.2 Open Matching 
 
On the other hand, Open Matching enables an airline to keep a fare class open for as long 
as any rival does.  After ascertaining competitors’ fare class availability, the airline re-
opens any fare class that is higher than the Loco but was already shut down by the 
revenue management system.  This imitates the real world phenomenon of an airline 
wishing to always appear as the lowest fare available in fare searches.  To retain market 
share, airlines are known to have employees who override revenue management decisions 
to match availability based on screen-scraping rival availability information.   
 
The implication is that fare classes that were initially shut down by the revenue 
management system in anticipation of higher revenue passengers are now re-opened, 
suggesting fewer than revenue-optimal seats are saved for higher-fare passengers.  
Airlines that open match do not override their revenue management systems if they are 
already equally or more open than their rivals – they aim to be at least as open as the 
most open competitor. 
 
An example of a situation where an implementing airline takes action, as shown in Figure 
3-9, is when it has only fare classes 1 to 2 open but a rival airline still has a cheaper fare 
class 3 open.  The Open Matching mechanism will re-open class 3 for booking because 
the airline does not wish to be more restrictive. 
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Open Matching
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The basic equation in PODS for Loco Open Matching is: 
 
lopenp* = max[lopenp, locop +matchp] 
 
where:  lopenp is the lowest open class for path p 
  locop is the lowest competitor class open for path p 
  matchp is the matching parameter chosen by the airline 
  implementing Open Matching 
 
 
3.4.3 Bi-directional Matching 
 
Bi-directional Matching combines Closure and Open Matching.  It is a tactic used by an 
airline trying to be as restrictive and open as the competing airline with the Loco.   
 
Based on competitor fare class availability, the airline now shuts down the fare class that 
has a lower fare (fare class 4) than the Loco (fare class 3) but have not been shut down by 
its own revenue management system yet (Figure 3-10).  It also reopens the fare class (fare 
class 2 in Figure 3-10) that has a higher or equal fare as the Loco but has already been 
shut down by the revenue management system. 
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FIGURE 3-10
Bi-directional Matching (Both Open and Closure Matching)
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3.5 SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, I described the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator used in this thesis 
to test the impacts of lowest fare seat availability matching.  The first half of the chapter 
explains how the characteristics of a competitive airline network are simulated, 
specifically the two components: the passenger choice model and the airline revenue 
management system.  The passenger choice model describes how demand is generated, 
given specific characteristics, choice sets and then fare/path decisions.  The airline 
revenue management system section explains how two methods that were created to suit 
a less-restricted fare environment – Q-forecasting and hybrid forecasting – are 
implemented and the difference between simulating leg-based and O-D based inventory 
control systems.  The second half of the chapter introduces the availability matching 
capabilities in PODS used for this thesis. 
 
Having established the background literature and PODS simulation environment, the next 
two chapters will be used to describe and analyze simulations of lowest fare seat 
availability matching in airline revenue management systems.  In Chapter 4, the scenarios 
are simulated in a single symmetric market with unrestricted fares, while in Chapter 5, 
the scenarios are expanded to a much bigger network with 572 markets, four airlines and 
a mixed fare structure. 
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CHAPTER 4   
SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF 
RESULTS (SINGLE SYMMETRIC MARKET) 
 
 
The purposes of this chapter are to explain the various scenarios simulated and to analyze 
the outcomes.  All the simulations in this chapter involve two airlines competing in a 
single symmetric market that has a completely unrestricted fare structure.  Section 4.1 
provides an overview of this single symmetric market.  The scenario results are then 
analyzed as three groups.  The first group, examined in sections 4.2 and 4.3, tests the 
hypothesis that Closure Matching the seat availability of better-performing revenue 
management systems reduces the spiral down of a system based on EMSRb and standard 
forecasting.  The second group of scenarios, discussed in sections 4.4 to 4.6, has an 
airline using a revenue management system based on EMSRb with Q-forecasting match, 
in terms of lowest fare seat availability, an airline using the Adaptive Threshold method.  
The motivation of this second group of scenarios is to find out how a sophisticated 
revenue management system reacts to availability matching a simple, threshold-based 
method.  Symmetric simulations where both airlines use the advanced revenue 
management system of EMSRb with Q-forecasting form the third group that is covered in 
sections 4.7 to 4.9. 
 
For each scenario, I will describe the inputs, such as the revenue management system 
settings chosen for the modeled airlines, and explain their significance.  Following that, I 
will highlight the main features of the base cases – the situations where neither airline 
matches seat availability.  I will then analyze the simulation outputs when availability 
matching of the lowest priced seat is used, first the effects on Airline 1, the matching 
airline, then the impacts on Airline 2, the matched airline.  The focus will be on the 
changes in metrics such as revenue, load factor, yield, fare class mix and fare class 
closure curves.  Where Q-forecasting is used, I will first examine the outputs resulting 
from the use of input Frat5s as “proof-of-concept” before verifying them with the results 
obtained when Frat5s are estimated.  
 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE SINGLE SYMMETRIC MARKET 
 
Simulations are set up for a single Origin-Destination market where two airlines compete.  
The total supply of seats for the market is 600.  Airline 1 has three daily flights, each with 
100 seats, paired to depart at the same time as the Airline 2’s three daily flights, as shown 
in Figure 4-1. 
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FIGURE 4-1
Supply in the Single Symmetric Market
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None of their six fare classes carry restrictions (illustrated in Table 4-1), making them 
undifferentiated, implying that traditional revenue management methods using standard 
forecasting will not perform well.   
 
Table 4-1:  Fully Unrestricted Fare Structure – Six Fares without Restrictions 
Fare Class Fare  Advance 
Purchase 
Restriction 
1 
Restriction 
2 
Restriction 
3 
1 $500 Highest 
fare class 
None None None None 
2 $400  None None None None 
3 $315  None None None None 
4 $175  None None None None 
5 $145  None None None None 
6 $125 Lowest 
fare class 
None None None None 
 
To see if the impacts of availability matching change with demand, three demand levels 
are simulated: low (0.80), medium (1.00) and high (1.20).  Both the low and high demand 
levels are scaled to the medium, baseline demand level.  Demand generation is explained 
in detail in Chapter 3.2.1.  The demand for the single symmetric market is shown 
graphically in Figure 4-2. 
 
FIGURE 4-2
Demand in the Single Symmetric Market
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4.2 EMSRB WITH STANDARD FORECASTING CLOSURE 
MATCHING AT90 
  
It is unlikely that an airline today would use standard forecasting as the part of its revenue 
management system when it faces a completely or partially restriction-free fare structure.  
Such a system would spiral down because the assumption standard forecasting relies on – 
the demand independence of fare classes – is no longer true.  As a result, passengers will 
book only in the cheapest fare class.  However, it remains theoretically interesting to 
investigate the effects of availability matching through the hypothetical use of Closure 
Matching to reduce spiral down.  If an airline’s revenue management system spirals 
down, it would naturally be interested in Closure Matching a more restrictive system that 
resists spiral down.   
  
I first established a situation where Airline 1 uses the inventory control algorithm 
EMSRb incorrectly with standard forecasting in a completely unrestricted fare structure – 
the revenue management system spirals down.  I then set up Airline 1 to closure match 
Airline 2 that uses the Adaptive Threshold system, which spirals down less. 
 
 
4.2.1 Inputs 
 
Airline 2’s Adaptive Threshold (AT) system is set to target a load factor of 90% in order 
to represent a typical high load achieved or desired by a LCC today.  The system is given 
the acronym of “AT90.”  The minimum level of the accordion parameter convergence 
constant, an input explained in Chapter 3.3.2.b, is 0.50 and the maximum is 1.50.  Within 
the AT90 system, we input three levels of initial Fare Class Load Threshold – restrictive, 
medium and loose, as indicated in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2:  Three Types of Initial Fare Class Load Thresholds for AT90 
LOOSE  MEDIUM  RESTRICTIVE 
Fare 
Class 
Load 
Threshold 
 Fare 
Class 
Load 
Threshold 
 Fare 
Class 
Load 
Threshold 
1 100%  1 100%  1 100% 
2 90%  2 90%  2 90% 
3 80%  3 80%  3 80% 
4 70%  4 65%  4 60% 
5 60%  5 50%  5 40% 
6 50%  6 35%  6 20% 
 
The fare class load threshold levels are initial parameters that could be changed by the 
system as bookings come in.  For example, if an airline uses the “Restrictive” set of 
thresholds, it would initially target to have only 20% of the plane filled by the cheapest 
Fare Class 6 before shutting it down.  However, if demand for the airline’s seats is weak, 
it may loosen its Fare Class 6 threshold at later time frames to allow more bookings in 
order to achieve the target load factor. 
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For the base case scenario, neither airline uses Closure Matching.  We then have Airline 
1 use Closure Matching.  Each run is repeated for the three demand levels of low, 
medium and high and the three threshold levels restrictive, medium and low. 
 
 
4.2.2 Base cases 
 
In the baseline situations where no matching takes place, because of standard forecasting, 
Airline 1’s revenue management system spirals down in the unrestricted fare 
environment much more than Airline 2 does.  To demonstrate the spiral down 
phenomenon, the revenues obtained by the airlines in the semi-restricted fare 
environment (seen in Table 4-3) are compared to those achieved in the unrestricted fare 
environment (shown earlier in Table 4-1). 
 
Table 4-3: Semi-restricted Fare Structure 
Fare Class Advance 
Purchase 
Restriction 
1 
Restriction 
2 
Restriction 
3 
1 None No No No 
2 3 days No Yes No 
3 7 days No Yes Yes 
4 14 days No Yes Yes 
5 14 days No Yes Yes 
6 21 days No Yes Yes 
 
The example where demand is set to the medium level and Airline 2 uses medium fare 
class load thresholds is illustrated in Figure 4-3.  Compared to the semi-restricted fare 
environment, Airline 1 loses 28% of revenue in an unrestricted fare environment and 
underperforms Airline 2.  Airline 2 loses 16% of its revenues. 
 
FIGURE 4-3
Revenues: Spiral Down in Fully Undifferentiated Fare Environment
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The revenue management method using standard forecasting relies on fare class 
independence and effective fare restrictions that are no longer true in this situation.  As 
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seen in Figure 4-4, almost all of Airline 1 is filled with passengers who successfully make 
their bookings in the cheapest fare class – a clear indication of a meltdown of the RM 
system. 
 
FIGURE 4-4
Fare Class Mix: Fully Undifferentiated Fare Environment, Without Matching
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In contrast, it can be seen from that same figure that for Airline 2, due to its load 
thresholds for each fare class and its load factor target, about 40% of its bookings are not 
made in the cheapest fare class.  In the example shown in Figure 4-4, Airline 2 has an 
initial load threshold of 35% for fare class 6 but adapts to the low demand and tolerates 
50% of the plane being filled with fare class 6 passengers instead.  In other words, 
although Airline 2’s fare class loads are adaptive, they are relatively rigid compared to 
Airline 1’s – the AT90 system with medium thresholds, targeting 35% of seats for fare 
class 6, would allow 50% but not 90% of the plane to be filled with fare class 6.  Airline 
1 could reduce spiral down by emulating and achieving Airline 2’s fare class mix. 
 
Airline 2’s better fare class mix is reflected in the revenues – without Closure Matching, 
Airline 2 obtains higher revenues than Airline 1, except at low demand where their 
revenues are similar (Figure 4-5). 
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FIGURE 4-5
Base Cases Without Matching
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4.2.3 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
In general, by Closure Matching Airline 2, Airline 1’s yields rise more than load factors 
fall, leading to revenue improvements – these effects become more pronounced as 
demand rises and fare class load threshold targets tighten (Figure 4-6).  The increase in 
demand impacts revenue improvements much more than the tightening of fare class load 
threshold targets. 
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FIGURE 4-6
Changes in Revenues, Load Factors and Yields as AL1 Closure Matches
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Looking at the specific situation of medium demand when Airline 2 has medium fare 
class load thresholds, as Airline 1 closure matches Airline 2, its fare class mix improves.  
Airline 1 sheds passengers from the cheapest fare class 6 to gain passengers in higher fare 
classes 4 and 5 (Figure 4-7, compare with Figure 4-4). 
 
FIGURE 4-7
Fare Class Mix: With Closure Matching
Number of passengers
AL1 EMSRb with standard forecasting
AL2 AT90 (Medium Fare Class Load Threshold)
Fare Class0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
$500 $400 $315 $175 $145 $125
-26
Change from 
Closure Matching
19
5
At Medium Demand
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4.2.3.a Less Revenue-Effective at Low Demand 
 
Closure Matching is less revenue-effective for Airline 1 at a low demand.  This is 
because even before Closure Matching, Airline 2 already underperforms Airline 1 in 
terms of revenues when it has medium or restrictive fare class load thresholds (Figure 4-
8).  At this low demand, Airline 2 does poorly – it has load factors that range from 71% 
to 79%, even though its target is 90%.  Airline 1, being less restrictive, took all the low-
fare demand. 
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When Airline 1 closure matches Airline 2’s revenue management system, its yields still 
rise and its load factors fall as they should, and spiral down is reduced as demonstrated 
by the improved fare class mix (Figure 4-9).  However, the improvement in yield is not 
much larger relative to the drop in load factor, so Airline 1 revenues increase by only 
between 0.51% and 1.23% with Closure Matching.  
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FIGURE 4-9
Fare Class Mix: with Closure Matching
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4.2.3.b Very Revenue-Effective at High Demand 
 
At high demand, the benefits of Closure Matching are enormous for Airline 1, with 
revenues increasing by an average of about 40%, more than it had spiraled down from a 
semi-restricted fare environment.  Airline 1’s revenues also surpass those of Airline 2.  
Closure Matching by itself would not explain the dramatic improvements – from the fare 
class closure curves in Figure 4-10, we see that Airline 1 starts closing down fare classes 
4 to 6 more aggressively than Airline 2.  We also see that Airline 1 correspondingly 
closes fare classes 1 to 3 less aggressively.  Closure Matching would only make Airline 1 
as aggressive.  As it turns out, Airline 1’s standard forecasting builds on the effects of 
Closure Matching.  By latching onto Airline 2’s relatively rigid and more ideal fare class 
mix, Airline 1 moves into a reverse-of-spiral-down, or “spiral up” phenomenon at high 
demand: the better fare class mix leads to improved forecasts of bookings-to-come and 
more protection for higher fare classes, subsequently encouraging sell-up and eventually 
generating a better fare class mix again.  Airline 1 is able to take advantage of the sell-up 
opportunities available at high demand that Airline 2’s AT90 are not as capable of 
exploiting. 
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4.2.3.c Market Share 
 
Although Airline 1’s market share falls as it closure matches (Figure 4-11), it maintains 
approximately 50% market share at lower and medium demand levels.  It is only at high 
demand that Airline 1’s market share loss should be a worry, since market share falls by 
about 10% to about 40% with Closure Matching, compared to the spiral down base cases.   
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4.2.4 Impacts on Airline 2 
 
Airline 2 benefits in terms of revenues as Airline 1 closure matches, especially at high 
demand (Table 4-4).  In other words, Airline 1’s revenue gains from Closure Matching 
Airline 2 are not at the expense of Airline 2.  Airline 2’s stable revenues can be attributed 
to its AT system, which is hardly affected by Closure Matching.  In particular, its fare 
class thresholds ensure that it would not take many more low-fare passengers just 
because Airline 1 rejected them.  At low and medium demand, Airline 2’s revenues, 
yields, loads and fare class mixes are not significantly changed by Airline 1’s matching, 
as shown in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4: Changes in Airline 2’s Revenue, Yield, Load Factor and Fare Class Mix 
as Airline 1 Matches 
Change in Number of Passengers  
in Fare Class 
Demand 
Level 
Fare 
Class 
Load  
Thresholds 
Revenue 
Change 
Yield 
Change 
Load 
Factor 
Change 1 
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Restrictive 1.2% -1.0% 2.2% 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.2 2.0 0.0 
Medium 1.3% 0.1% 1.3% 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.0 
Low 
(0.80) 
Loose 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Restrictive 0.0% -0.8% 0.9% 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.2 1.1 0.0 
Medium 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 
Medium 
(1.00) 
Loose 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Restrictive 8.0% 6.5% 1.5% 0.0 1.4 3.7 0.2 -1.3 -2.7 
Medium 10.2% 9.2% 0.8% 1.1 2.6 2.2 0.2 -0.9 -4.4 
High 
(1.20) 
Loose 4.3% 3.5% 0.7% 0.4 1.2 0.5 0.6 0.1 -2.2 
 
At high demand, Airline 2 load increases with Airline 1 Closure Matching are modest 
(rising by 0.7% to 1.5%), since it already reaches its target of 90% load factor before 
matching.  Instead, its large yield increases (3.5% to 9.2%) drive the improvements in 
revenues (4.3% to 10.2%).  Airline 2, the matched airline, benefits even as its rival 
Airline 1 performs better with Closure Matching – Table 4-4 illustrates that Airline 2’s 
fare class mix leans towards a heavier percentage of higher fare class passengers. 
 
By analyzing the changes in sources of revenues for Airline 2 as Airline 1 matches 
(shown in Table 4-5), we see that the revenue improvements come primarily from an 
increase in sell-up.  With Airline 1 becoming more restrictive, Airline 2 also starts to 
close its lower fare classes earlier.  This leads to more passengers being forced to buy a 
fare class higher than they wanted as a first choice. 
 
Table 4-5: Sources of Changes in Revenue 
Change in Revenues (Summed across fare classes) Demand 
Level 
Fare 
Class 
Load  
Thresholds 
Total First 
Choice 
Sell-up Recapture 
(Horizontal 
and Vertical) 
Spill-in from Airline 
1 (Horizontal and 
Vertical) 
Restrictive 3711 867 8132 -56 -5232 
Medium 4862 -4632 9453 -283 327 
High 
(1.2) 
Loose 2112 -4794 7451 -500 -46 
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4.2.5 Conclusions  
 
The simulation results show that the effects of Availability Matching are not trivial.  
Closure Matching an AT90 system successfully decreases spiral down in the revenue 
management system based on standard forecasting and EMSRb.  In general, Closure 
Matching allows the matching airline to experience an increase in yield that outweighs its 
loss in load factor.  By shadowing a more restrictive system, the matching airline’s 
system rejects more low-fare passengers in favor of fewer passengers that pay higher 
fares. 
 
In this scenario, Closure Matching is not as effective at low demand because both the 
matching and matched airlines have almost equal revenues prior to matching.  The nature 
of Closure Matching requires a well-performing revenue management system to latch 
onto. 
 
The reduction in spiral down from Closure Matching is especially pronounced at high 
demand in this scenario.  With Closure Matching, EMSRb with standard forecasting sets 
in motion a positive cycle of more sales, better forecasts and greater protection of higher 
fare classes, taking advantage of the fact that the AT90 system used by the competitor is 
less capable of exploiting high demand. 
 
Except at high demand, Airline 1’s loss of market share from Closure Matching is minor 
and not a cause of concern.  At high demand, even though Airline 1’s market share 
typically falls by 10%, these drops appear acceptable against the revenue gains from 
Closure Matching, which average 40%. 
 
When Airline 2, the matched airline, uses AT90, it remains stable in face of Closure 
Matching.  It does not lose revenue when Airline 1 gains revenues.  In fact, at high 
demand, it obtains sizeable revenue increases of up to 10.2% because its yields rise 
significantly.  The high demand combined with Airline 1 becoming more restrictive 
allows Airline 2 to force more sell-up. 
 
 
4.3 EMSRB WITH STANDARD FORECASTING CLOSURE 
MATCHING EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING 
 
In the second scenario that tests the hypothetical use of Closure Matching to reduce spiral 
down, Airline 2 uses EMSRb with Q-forecasting.  EMSRb with Q-forecasting’s key 
difference with AT90 is that it is more sophisticated and responsive to changes in 
demand.  Q-forecasting is designed to encourage sell-up and counteract spiral down.  
Therefore, Airline 2 is expected to outperform Airline 1 by even more in the base 
scenarios without matching. 
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4.3.1 Inputs 
 
For Airline 2’s Q-forecasting capability, we first use the input Frat5s “C” that is an 
arbitrarily generated set of Frat5s.  It demonstrates a medium willingness-to-pay.  The 
willingness-to-pay increases monotonically as the date of departure approaches.  Its 
details were explained earlier in Chapter 3.3.1.a and illustrated in Figure 3-4. 
 
Since an airline would not have a ready set of Frat5s to use in real life, the runs are 
repeated with the Frat5s estimation method known as Average Conditional Forecast 
Prediction (ACFP).  Airlines are able to estimate Frat5s with a method like ACFP, which 
approximates passengers’ willingness-to-pay based on the lowest available fare in the 
market.  This method was clarified in detail in Chapter 3.3.1.b.  In short, ACFP is 
preferred over the other estimation methods because its estimates are conditional on the 
lowest competitor class open and therefore in line with rest of the simulation. 
 
All the runs are duplicated in demand settings of low, medium and high. 
 
 
4.3.2 Base cases  
 
For the outcomes resulting from the use of input Frat5s, Airline 1 underperforms Airline 
2 because it has a less adept revenue management system.  The difference becomes more 
pronounced as demand strengthens, as evident in Figure 4-12.  At low demand, Airline 2 
obtains 12% more revenue than Airline 1, but at high demand, Airline 2 achieves revenue 
that is one and a half times that of Airline 1’s.   
 
For each level of demand, Airline 1 has similar revenues to the previous scenario when 
Airline 2 uses AT90.  As expected, using EMSRb with Q-forecasting, Airline 2 
outperforms Airline 1 by more than when it uses AT90 (Figure 4-12, compare with 
Figure 4-5). 
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FIGURE 4-12
Base Cases Without Matching (Input Frat5 “C”)
Revenues
AL1 EMSRb with standard forecasting
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Demand 
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Yield 0.089 0.104 0.0910.133 0.093 0.154  
 
The fare class mix (Table 4-6) shows that Airline 1’s revenue management system using 
standard forecasting spirals down to the lowest fare class consistently whereas Airline 2 
successfully resists the degeneration of fare class mix.  As such, Airline 1 has an 
incentive to closure match Airline 2, in order to approach the more ideal fare class mix 
Airline 2 gets. 
 
Table 4-6:  Fare Class Mix before Airline 1 Closure Matches Airline 2 
Number of Passengers in Fare Class Demand 
Level 
Airline 
1 
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125)
Airline 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.7 Low 
(0.80) Airline 2 0.7 0.6 3.9 5.3 7.2 60.8 
Airline 1 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.2 88.9 Medium 
(1.00) Airline 2 1.0 3.5 13.0 19.3 17.7 28.4 
Airline 1 0.0 0.1 1.2 3.8 2.3 88.9 High 
(1.20) Airline 2 1.9 6.1 20.1 29.2 17.2 14.2 
 
 
4.3.3 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
As Airline 1 closure matches Airline 2, it experiences positive revenue effects across the 
range of demands.  These revenue increases become larger as demand increases (Figure 
4-13), chiefly because the two airlines had a bigger revenue difference prior to Closure 
Matching (Figure 4-12). 
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FIGURE 4-13
Revenue Changes as Airline 1 Closure Matches (Input Frat5)
% Revenue change
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The Closure Matching manifests clearly as Airline 1’s revenues rise, load factors fall and 
yields rise while the exact reverse happens to Airline 2 – Airline 1’s figures converge 
towards Airline 2’s figures, as shown in Table 4-7.  Spiral down is reduced in Airline 1 
and the fare class mixes of both airlines are now much more similar.  That is especially 
true in fare classes 4 to 6, where the numbers for both airlines are very close.  Spiral 
down in the matching airline is reduced at the expense of the matched airline. 
 
Table 4-7:  Metrics after Airline 1 Closure Matches Airline 2 
Number of Passengers in Fare Class Demand 
Level 
Airline Revenues Load 
Factor 
Yield 
1  
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Airline 1 335253 79.8% 0.095 0.0 0.1 0.9 5.0 7.3 66.5 Low 
(0.80) Airline 2 333134 79.3% 0.101 0.4 0.6 2.7 6.4 7.8 61.5 
Airline 1 354639 84.4% 0.101 0.0 0.1 2.0 18.3 29.0 35.0 Medium 
(1.00) Airline 2 360302 85.8% 0.119 0.7 2.1 6.5 19.0 26.2 31.2 
Airline 1 41987 89.6% 0.112 0.0 0.1 3.7 26.6 35.7 23.5 High 
(1.20) Airline 2 51400 90.4% 0.135 1.5 3.8 11.3 29.2 30.8 13.9 
 
 
4.3.3.a Revenues Increase at High Demand  
 
There is a large revenue increase of almost 12% when demand is high.  However, the 
increase is still not as dramatic as those seen when Airline 1 was using EMSRb with 
standard forecasting and Closure Matching Airline 2’s AT90 at high demand.  It appears 
that the revenue management system of Airline 1 cannot build on Closure Matching 
Airline 2’s EMSRb with Q-forecasting the same way it could with Airline 2 using AT90.  
For this scenario, post-matching, Airline 1’s revenues remain below Airline 2’s.  The 
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difference is probably because the EMSRb with Q-forecasting system adapts more to the 
competitor and demand, and would not let Airline 1 monopolize the high fare classes like 
AT90 allowed. 
 
 
4.3.3.b Market Share 
 
Airline 1’s market share falls as it closure matches and becomes more restrictive (Figure 
4-14), but it should not be a major concern as Airline 1 maintains approximately 50% 
market share.   
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FIGURE 4-14
Market Share Changes as Airline 1 Closure Matches
 
 
 
4.3.4 Impacts on Airline 2 
 
Earlier, when Airline 2 used AT90, its revenues did not suffer from Airline 1’s improved 
performance with Closure Matching.  However, in this case, when Airline 2 uses a 
system based on EMSRb with Q-forecasting, its revenues are hurt by Airline 1 Closure 
Matching (Figure 4-13).  At low demand, Airline 2’s revenues even go below Airline 1’s 
after Closure Matching. 
 
Before Closure Matching, Airline 2 has a strong RM dominating Airline 1’s weak RM, 
especially at high demand levels (Figure 4-12).  With Closure Matching, Airline 1’s 
system converges upon Airline 2’s.  Airline 2 loses revenues because it is flexible (more 
so than AT90) and therefore susceptible to competitive effects.  It faces losses because its 
yields drop more than its load factors rise.   
 
Table 4-8 demonstrates the greater flexibility of EMSRb with Q-forecasting and the 
associated vulnerability to competitive effects caused by availability matching.  The 
fluctuations in the number of passengers in Airline 2’s fare classes caused by Closure 
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Matching are much greater compared to the mild changes experienced when Airline 2 
used AT90 at the corresponding level of demand (Table 4-4).  
 
Table 4-8:  Changes to Airline 2’s Revenue, Yield, Load Factor and Fare Class Mix as 
Airline 1 Closure Matches 
Change in Number of Passengers in Fare 
Class 
Demand Level Revenue 
Change 
Yield 
Change 
Load 
Factor 
Change 1 
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Low (0.80) -1.7% -2.6% 1.0% -0.3 0.0 -1.2 1.1 0.6 0.7 
Medium (1.00) -7.6% -10.8% 3.5% -0.3 -1.4 -6.5 -0.3 8.5 2.8 
High (1.20) -10.3% -12.0% 2.0% -0.4 -2.3 -8.8 0.0 13.6 -0.3 
 
 
4.3.5 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5s 
 
Overall, the base cases obtained using estimated Frat5s are similar to the input Frat5s 
base cases, as shown in Figure 4-15.  The only exception occurs at low demand when 
Frat5s are estimated – Airline 2 achieves revenue similar to Airline 1 even though Airline 
2 has Q-forecasting.  It is likely that the Frat5s are underestimated.  Like standard 
forecasting, Q-forecasting fails to prevent spiral down at low demand when Frat5s are 
underestimated, since the protection of seats are still from the top fare class down. 
 
FIGURE 4-15
Base Cases without Matching (Estimated cf. Input)
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Similarly, for the revenue changes, there is one significantly different result when Frats5s 
are estimated (circled in Figure 4-16).  It is also at low demand, for Airline 2.  Airline 2 
gains 4.6% in revenues because its load factor drops by 0.4% while its yield rises by 
4.9%, even though the reverse should happen. 
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FIGURE 4-16
Revenue Changes as Airline1 Closure Matches (Estimated Frat5)
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When Frat5s are estimated, after being closure matched by Airline 1, unlike when input 
Frat5s are used, Airline 2 goes through unusual changes: it loses passengers in the lowest 
fare class but gains passengers in the higher fare classes (Table 4-9). 
 
Table 4-9:  Changes to Airline 2’s Revenue, Yield, Load Factor and Fare Class Mix as 
Airline 1 Closure Matches (Estimated Frat5s) 
Change in Number of Passengers in Fare 
Class 
Demand Level Revenue 
Change 
Yield 
Change 
Load 
Factor 
Change 1 
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Low (0.80) 4.6% 4.9% -0.4% 0.2 0.1 1.0 3.0 4.0 -8.5 
Medium (1.00) -10.9% -16% 6% -0.6 -2.0 -11.4 5.7 11.9 1.2 
High (1.20) -14.4% -17% 4% -1.7 -3.8 -14.5 18.0 5.1 -0.2 
 
At low demand, without matching, Airline 2 is not sufficiently protective because it 
underestimates the Frat5s.  Estimated Frat5s change according to the demand and supply, 
unlike the input Frat5s that remain the same.  As Airline 1 Closure Matches and becomes 
more restrictive, Airline 2 estimates a higher set of Frat5s (Figure 4-17).  Consequently, 
Airline 2 gains revenue with Closure Matching instead of being hurt by it.  This 
exception illustrates the problems of estimating willingness-to-pay and Frat5s. 
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FIGURE 4-17
Frat5 Changes as Airline1 Closure Matches
Fare Ratio
Time Frame
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3
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Without Closure Matching
 
 
Frat5 estimation is more accurate at medium and high demand and less affected by 
Closure Matching.  At those demand levels, the outcomes are similar regardless of 
whether Frat5s are input or estimated (Figure 4-16). 
 
 
4.3.6 Conclusions 
 
Closure Matching is also effective in reducing spiral down and increasing revenues of 
Airline 1 when the matching target, Airline 2, uses EMSRb with Q-forecasting.  There 
are three other similarities with the earlier scenario (when Airline 2 used AT90): Closure 
Matching allows Airline 1 to improve its yield by a factor that more than offsets the fall 
in loads, Closure Matching becomes more effective as demand increases and Airline 1’s 
market share losses are negligible. 
 
The two major differences with the earlier scenario can be attributed to the 
responsiveness of Airline 2’s revenue management system of EMSRb with Q-
forecasting.  Firstly, Airline 1 is unable to reap incredible 35% to 45% gains in revenues 
at high demand because Airline 2 is no longer the relatively passive AT90.  Secondly, 
compared to the earlier AT90, the EMSRb with Q-forecasting system gets hurt much 
more by Closure Matching because its forecasts and allocation are more affected by the 
matching. 
 
Overall, the results obtained using estimated Frat5s are similar to those from input Frat5s, 
with an exception at low demand, where estimating Frat5 is problematic. 
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4.4 EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING OPEN MATCHING AT90 
 
Moving away from the hypothetical scenarios, I will now examine the more realistic 
applications of availability matching – where an airline with a more advanced revenue 
management system matches the low fare seat availability of an airline with a simple 
system.  In response to the bargain-hunting consumer behavior brought by the growth of 
the LCC and the Internet distributors, legacy airlines, with their advanced revenue 
management systems, match low fare availability to be displayed earlier in fare searches.  
They are wary of ceding market share that would encourage further LCC growth, 
although the outcomes of such matching are unclear. 
 
To represent an advanced revenue management system used by a legacy airline, Airline 1 
is assigned a system of EMSRb with Q-forecasting.  Airline 2 uses the simple AT90 
system, representing a more basic LCC system. 
 
There are three possible forms of lowest fare seat availability matching.  This section 
examines the first – Open Matching.  A legacy airline may open match a LCC when it 
wants to ensure that it shows up as the lowest fare on airfare searches.  Open Matching 
causes the legacy airline to be at least as open and available as the LCC and retain market 
share among low-fare passengers, against low-priced competitors.  The downside of 
Open Matching is that fewer seats are protected for higher-fare passengers.  The two 
other forms – Closure Matching and Bi-directional Matching – will be covered in the 
sections 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. 
 
 
4.4.1 Inputs 
 
Airline 1 first uses input Frat5s “C” and then uses estimated Frat5 method ACFP.  For 
Airline 2’s AT90, I will vary the fare class load thresholds between loose, medium and 
restrictive.  Runs are performed across low, medium and high demand levels.  
 
Specifically for the Open Matching, I will simulate an even lower demand (0.60 scaling).  
The reason is to test the hypothesis that an airline Open Matching at such low demand 
would deny passengers from the competitor while hurting its own revenues.  The airline 
trusts its more capable revenue management system and knows that certain competitors 
have either a basic revenue management system or lack a formal one. 
 
 
4.4.2 Base Cases 
 
The base cases are where there is no seat availability matching – they are the same for 
Open Matching, Closure Matching and Bi-directional Matching.  In other words, the base 
cases described here are valid for chapters 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
As expected, Airline 1’s EMSRb with Q-forecasting outperforms Airline 2’s AT90 
consistently in terms of revenue (Figure 4-18).  Airline 1 achieves superior yields with 
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the singular exception when demand is low and Airline 2 is using restrictive fare class 
load thresholds.  Airline 1 always has an equal or higher load factor than Airline 2. 
 
FIGURE 4-18
Base Cases Without Matching (Input Frat5)
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Airline 1’s intelligent RM system is more successful in saving seats for higher-yield 
passengers, as seen in the fare class mix example shown in Figure 4-19. 
 
FIGURE 4-19
Fare Class Mix: at Medium Demand without Open Matching
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4.4.3 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
In this scenario, Open Matching – the selective overriding of an advanced revenue 
management system by re-opening closed fare classes to match the competitor’s lowest 
available fare – causes Airline 1’s revenues to fall consistently.  The falls become greater 
as demand levels rise and fare class threshold tighten, by as much as 9.2% (Left to right 
on Figure 4-20).  Although Airline 1’s load factor is boosted by additional low-fare 
passengers, its yield suffers because the high-fare passengers buy down to cheaper fare 
classes or fail to book as a result of fewer seats protected for them.  In other words, even 
when Airline 1 sees an increase in the number of passengers in lowest fare class, these 
passengers are either customers who used to buy higher fares but are now able to book at 
a lower fare class or travelers with low willingness-to-pay who displace the higher-fare 
passengers arriving later. 
 
Airline 1’s revenues fall from Open Matching by a greater percentage as demand 
increases.  At a high demand, without Open Matching, Airline 1’s revenue management 
system acts effectively to close down cheaper fare classes faster while Airline 2’s 
relatively inflexible system is less able to take advantage of the situation.  This means 
that as Airline 1 open matches Airline 2, more overriding and sub-optimal adjustment 
occurs.  More closed fare classes are re-opened than compared to the low demand level, 
resulting in the steeper drops in revenues. 
 
FIGURE 4-20
Changes as Airline 1 Open Matches
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As Airline 2’s fare class load thresholds become looser, Airline 1 is Open Matching an 
increasingly less restrictive Airline 2, causing Airline 1’s revenues to decrease by larger 
amounts as the intervening Open Matching prevails more over the optimizing revenue 
management system.  The drops in yield outpace the rises in load factors.  Figure 4-20 
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shows that the impact of demand is stronger than that caused by the differences in fare 
class load thresholds. 
 
For example, where demand level and fare class threshold levels are both medium, the 
fare class mix shifts towards lower fare classes.  The higher fare classes 3, 4 and 5 
decrease in number of passengers while the lowest fare class 6 sees a big increase (Figure 
4-21). 
 
FIGURE 4-21
Fare Class Mix: at Medium Demand with Open Matching
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Airline 1’s load factor improves by 2%, but is unable to offset the erosion of yield (-6%).  
Although revenue gains from the cheapest fare class 6 are impressive, the cumulative 
losses from the next four higher fare classes are even greater (Figure 4-22) – leading to an 
overall loss. 
 
FIGURE 4-22
AL1 Revenue Changes by Fare Class
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In order to be as available as Airline 2, with Open Matching Airline 1 keeps fare class 6 
open for much longer than without matching, allowing it to get extra passengers and 
revenues in that fare class.  
 
For Airline 1’s fare classes (2, 3, 4 and 5) that decreased in revenues after Open 
Matching, the dominant reason, accounting for 54% of lost revenues, is the loss of first 
choice passengers (Figure 4-23).  These passengers who used to select one of fare classes 
2 to 5 as their first choice now either buy from a lower fare class that has become 
available or are spilled to Airline 2.  Similarly, Airline 1 sees a drop in revenue because 
there is now less sell-up for higher fares, since availability of low fares mean passengers 
are no longer forced to sell-up.  Sell-up refers to passengers buying a higher fare class 
when denied a lower fare class booking.  There is also less spill-in from Airline 2 for 
these higher fare classes. 
 
FIGURE 4-23
Sources of Losses
54% from loss of
first choice passengers
23% from loss of
sell-up passengers
22% from loss of
passengers spilled 
in from AL2
 
 
 
4.4.3.a Market Share 
 
With increased load factors brought by Open Matching, Airline 1 improves its market 
share across demand levels and fare class load thresholds, though the improvements are 
slight.  In other words, Airline 1 does not capture much market share from Airline 2 
through Open Matching.  The greatest increase is only 0.88%, which happens when 
demand is medium and fare class load thresholds are loose (Table 4-10). 
 
Table 4-10: Market Share with Open Matching (and without Open Matching) 
 Low Demand (0.80) Medium Demand (1.00) High Demand (1.20) 
 Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose 
Market 
Share 
55.14% 
(55.12%) 
51.98% 
(51.94%) 
50.05% 
(49.83%) 
52.10% 
(51.82%) 
50.51% 
(49.81%) 
49.61% 
(48.73%) 
51.35% 
(50.94%) 
51.03% 
(50.42%) 
50.95% 
(50.30%) 
Change 0.02% 0.04% 0.22% 0.28% 0.70% 0.88% 0.41% 0.61% 0.65% 
 
 
4.4.4 Impacts on Airline 2 
 
Although Airline 2 is hurt, ironically it loses less revenue than Airline 1 in all of the 
simulated settings (Figure 4-20).  At medium and low demand, when Airline 2 has 
medium or loose fare class load thresholds, its revenues decrease slightly when open 
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matched.  In these situations, Airline 2 loses passengers in the lower fare classes 5 and 6 
as Airline 1 intended, since Airline 1 no longer spills passengers in these classes over to 
Airline 2 because of Open Matching.  Moreover, Airline 2 does not fill the additional 
empty seats with higher-yield passengers because its fare class load threshold is not 
sufficiently restrictive – incoming passengers are still booked in lower fare classes that 
remain open.  Regardless, the magnitude of revenue decreases is slight, with the greatest 
loss capped at -1.6%. 
 
Airline 2 even improves its revenues in some situations, when it becomes sufficiently 
restrictive.  With Open Matching, Airline 1 sells out its inventory faster than before, so 
more late booking, higher yield passengers are spilled to Airline 2.  With stricter 
thresholds, Airline 2 gains revenues by channeling these passengers to higher fare 
classes.  In addition, at high demand, Airline 2’s system adapts to the increased demand 
and performs even better by rejecting low-fare passengers for higher-fare ones.  
 
 
4.4.5 Even Lower (0.60) Demand 
 
Perhaps where there is insufficient demand to satisfy both Airline 1 and Airline 2, Airline 
1 would consider Open Matching a tactic – fighting for low-fare passengers with Airline 
2 by Open Matching so that Airline 2 cannot fill its seats.  Airline 1’s revenues would 
still be boosted by high-fare bookings as a result of its advanced revenue management 
system, while Airline 2 would only have insufficient low-fare bookings. 
 
The simulation results suggest that at a lower demand level (0.60), there is little 
opportunity for Open Matching (Table 4-11).  The legacy carrier’s sophisticated revenue 
management system will keep low fare class open anyway when demand is low. 
 
Table 4-11: At Lower (0.60) Demand, Figures Hardly Change with Open Matching (Input 
Frat5s) 
Change in Number of Passengers in Fare Class Fare Class 
Load 
Thresholds 
of Airline 2 
Airline Revenue 
Change 
Yield 
Change 
Load 
Factor 
Change 
1 
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Airline 1 -0.09% -0.11% 0.00% 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 0.16 Loose 
Airline 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Airline 1 -0.13% -0.11% 0.01% -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.2 0.12 0.11 Medium 
Airline 2 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Airline 1 -0.07% -0.11% 0.01% 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.24 0.23 0.04 Restrictive 
Airline 2 0.05% 0.10% 0.02% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 
 
4.4.6 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5s 
 
Compared to the base cases obtained when Airline 1 used input Frat5s, the base cases 
generated when Airline 1 uses estimated Frat5s are similar in a qualitative sense – Airline 
1 does better than Airline 2 (Figure 4-24).   
 
Quantitatively, Airline 2’s revenues achieved with AT90 are consistent whether Airline 1 
used input or estimated Frat5s.  At low demand, Airline 1’s revenues are lower when 
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using estimated Frat5s instead of inputting them.  As explained earlier, the lower 
revenues reflect the difficulty of estimating Frat5s.  The reverse happens at medium and 
high demand – Airline 1 does better with estimated Frat5s than input Frat5s. 
 
FIGURE 4-24
Base Cases without Matching (Estimated cf. Input)
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From these differences in base case revenues, Open Matching is expected to hurt Airline 
1 less (with estimated Frat5s instead of input Frat5s) at low demand levels since Airline 1 
starts off with figures that are closer to Airline 2’s.  Conversely, we expect Open 
Matching to hurt Airline 1 more at medium and high demand.   
 
With estimated Frat5s, the changes caused by the legacy airline Open Matching the LCC 
exhibit less stability (Figure 4-25, compare with Figure 4-20).  The legacy airline only 
does consistently worse with Open Matching at high demand.  
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FIGURE 4-25
Changes as Airline 1 Open Matches (Estimated Frat5)
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At low demand, Airline 1 gains surprising improvements in revenues and yields.  These 
counter-intuitive improvements are derived from the fare class mix improvements, as 
shown in Table 4-12.  Airline 1 becomes more restrictive with Open Matching at low 
demand and medium/loose thresholds.  These anomalies indicate the complications of 
estimating Frat5s at low demand. 
 
Table 4-12:  Fare Class Mix Improvements for Airline 1 at Low Demand (Estimated Frat5s) 
Demand 
Level 
Threshold 
Levels 
Airline 1 ($500) 2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Airline 1 0.13 0.3 0.66 1.23 0.79 -3.75Medium 
Thresholds Airline 2 0 0 -0.01 0.1 0.16 0.07
Airline 1 0.15 0.33 1.05 1.18 0.55 -3.58
Low 
Demand Loose 
Thresholds Airline 2 0 0 0 0.04 0.13 0.07
 
 
4.4.7 Conclusions  
 
Open Matching hurts the matching Airline 1 more than the matched Airline 2.  The more 
Open Matching occurs, the greater the damage to Airline 1, so Open Matching causes the 
greatest revenue loss at high demand and when Airline 2 uses loose fare class load 
thresholds.  The least damage occurs at the lowest (0.60) demand simulated, since almost 
no Open Matching takes place then. 
 
Even though Open Matching allows the Airline 1 to gain passengers in lower fare classes, 
those increases in revenues are insufficient to compensate for the loss of revenues from 
higher fare classes.  Airline 1’s revenue management system, though sophisticated, is 
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unable to repair the disruption caused by Open Matching.  The increases in market share 
are insignificant, especially in light of the costs incurred to obtain them. 
 
 
4.5 EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING CLOSURE MATCHING 
AT90 
 
Closure Matching allows Airline 1 to shut down the lowest fare class as soon as that fare 
is no longer available Airline 2.  Such availability matching represents an Airline 1 that 
only wants a low fare seat to be available when it is also available at Airline 2. 
 
 
4.5.1 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
Figure 4-26 illustrates that the changes caused by Closure Matching display an obvious 
positive trend moving from restrictive to loose thresholds but no definite trend moving 
from low to high demand. 
 
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
FIGURE 4-26
Changes as Airline 1 Closure Matches
AL1 EMSRb with Q-forecasting
AL2 AT90
Low Demand Medium Demand High Demand
Restrictive Medium Loose
AL2 Fare Class Load Thresholds
R M L R M L
-8
4
-4
3
-5
11
% change in load factor
% change in yield
-6
6
-6
11
-9
18
-8
8
-10
11
-19
26
Change in Revenue
 
 
 
4.5.1.a Revenue Losses at Restrictive Thresholds 
 
When Airline 2 uses restrictive thresholds, Airline 1 overrides the optimal closure levels 
determined by its revenue management system and becomes overly restrictive with 
Closure Matching.  Although it gains 4% to 8% in yield, it loses 6% to 8% in load factor, 
resulting in overall losses in revenues. 
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Example: At Low Demand 
An approximation of the Closure Matching rates is obtained by subtracting Airline 1’s 
base case closure rates from Airline 2’s base case closure rates.  For example, at low 
demand and restrictive thresholds, since Airline 2 is closing down fare classes 1, 2, 5 and 
6 faster than Airline 1 (Figure 4-27), Closure Matching is expected to cause Airline 1 to 
increase closure rates in those fare classes by about the differences shown.  The 
differences are very large, going up to as much as 40%, because Airline 2 has restrictive 
fare class load thresholds. 
 
FIGURE 4-27
Difference between Airline 1 and 2 Closure Rates in Base Case
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The change in Airline 1’s fare class mix from Closure Matching (Table 4-13) suggests 
that it probably becomes more restrictive in fare classes 2 and 6, as expected.  The loss of 
revenue from fare class 6 is crucial in causing the overall loss in revenues.  At the same 
time, Airline 1 becomes less restrictive in fare classes 1 and 5.   
 
Table 4-13:  Airline 1’s Change in Fare Class Mix from Closure Matching (Restrictive 
Thresholds) 
Demand 
Level 
Threshold 
Levels 
Airline Change in: 1  
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Average 
number of 
Pax 0.1 -0.2 0.4 1.4 10.4 -18.8 Low Demand 
Restrictive 
Thresholds 
Airline 
1 Average 
Revenues $57 -$84 $136 $240 $1512 -$2342 
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FIGURE 4-28
Changes in Airline 1’s Closure Rates as it Closure Matches
Changes in Airline 1’s Closure Rates (Low Demand, Restrictive Thresholds)
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Airline 1’s changes in closure rates (Figure 4-28) exhibit very similar trends to the 
expected Closure Matching rates (Figure 4-27) for fare classes 5 and 6 in the later time 
frames.  However, Airline 1’s revenue management system incorporates these later 
external increases in closures and compensates for them by opening up fare class 5 more 
before the Closure Matching takes place.  Although the revenue management system 
increases Airline 1’s number of passengers and revenues in fare class 5 (Table 4-13), it is 
insufficient to offset the loss of revenues from fare class 6.  Airline 1’s revenues decrease 
overall – Closure Matching a restrictive Airline 2 causes too much overriding that Airline 
1’s revenue management system cannot bring back to balance. 
 
 
4.5.1.b Revenue Gains at Loose Thresholds 
 
On the other hand, when Airline 2 uses loose thresholds, Airline 1 gains revenues through 
Closure Matching.  Although its load factors fall by 5% to 19%, its yields rise by more – 
by 11% to 28%. 
 
Example: At Low Demand 
When Airline 2 is relatively less restrictive, Airline 1 closure matches relatively less.  
Table 4-14 shows that the changes in Airline 1’s fare class mix from Closure Matching 
an Airline 2 with loose thresholds happen on a smaller scale.  The increases and 
decreases are limited to fewer than 10 passengers, in contrast to the much larger shifts of 
almost 19 passengers experienced when the thresholds were restrictive (Table 4-13). 
 
Table 4-14:  Airline 1’s Change in Fare Class Mix from Closure Matching (Loose 
Thresholds) 
Demand 
Level 
Threshold 
Levels 
Airline 1 ($500) 2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Low 
Demand 
Loose 
Thresholds Airline 1 5.1 -1.1 -2.9 0.8 2.0 -7.5 
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Figure 4-29 illustrates that the changes in closure rates of Airline 1 when Airline 2’s 
thresholds are loose are limited to 20%, as opposed to the changes that exceed 40% in the 
case of restrictive thresholds.  Moreover, the Closure Matching tends to occur much later, 
from time frame 10 onwards.  Since more bookings have already been made by then, 
Closure Matching is less disruptive of Airline 1’s optimized revenue management 
system. 
 
FIGURE 4-29
Changes in Airline 1’s Closure Rates as it Closure Matches
Changes in Airline 1’s Closure Rates (Low Demand, Loose Thresholds)
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4.5.1.c Market Share 
 
Airline 1’s market shares fall when it closure matches.  The changes in market share as 
the legacy airline closure matches is of much greater magnitude (Table 4-15) than when it 
open matches (Table 4-10).  For example, at high demand and loose thresholds, Airline 1 
loses 6% in market share. 
 
Although Airline 1 maintains approximately 45% to 50% market share, in many of these 
situations it loses both market share and revenues (highlighted in Table 4-15) 
 
Table 4-15: Market Share with Closure Matching (and without Closure Matching) 
 Low Demand (0.8) Medium Demand (1.0) High Demand (1.2) 
 Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose 
Airline 
1 
52.10% 
(55.14%) 
50.55% 
(51.98%) 
48.34% 
(50.05%) 
49.42% 
(52.10%) 
47.74% 
(50.51%) 
46.27% 
(49.61%) 
48.62% 
(51.35%) 
47.59% 
(51.03%) 
44.95% 
(50.95%) 
Change -3.04% -1.43% -1.71% -2.68% -2.77% -3.34% -2.73% -3.44% -6.00% 
 
 
4.5.2 Impacts on Airline 2 
 
Airline 2’s revenues improve in all scenarios from Closure Matching (Figure 4-26).  
Specifically, revenues rise more as demand increases.  At low demand, Airline 2’s 
- 86 - 
revenues increase by about 2% to 4%, at medium demand, the increases are from around 
4% to 6% and at high demand the increases are approximately 8% to 12%. 
 
Table 4-16 indicates that at low demand, revenue improvements are driven mainly by 
increases in load factors rather than changes in yields.  However, at medium and high 
demand, the yield increases take over as the primary reasons revenues rise. 
 
Table 4-16: Airline 2’s Improvements in Load Factors and Yields from Closure Matching 
  Low Demand (0.8) Medium Demand (1.0) High Demand (1.2) 
  Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose 
Load 
Factor 
4% 2% 1% 3% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% AL2 
Yield 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 7% 7% 11% 12% 
 
With Closure Matching, Airline 1 becomes more restrictive, and the rejected passengers 
turn to Airline 2.  At low demand, the increased number of passengers improve Airline 
2’s load factor because Airline 2 does not hit its target load factor of 90% with those 
extra passengers (Table 4-17).  As demand increases, Airline 2 achieves the target load 
factor without matching.  Then, as Airline 1 closure matches, Airline 2 starts rejecting 
lower-fare passengers and saves seats for higher-fare passengers instead, while 
maintaining the 90% load factor. 
 
Table 4-17: Airline 2’s Load Factors 
  Low Demand (0.8) Medium Demand (1.0) High Demand (1.2) 
  Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose Restrictive Medium Loose 
Load 
Factor 
(Without 
matching) 
70% 76% 80% 82% 86% 89% 88% 90% 90% AL2 
Load 
Factor 
(With 
matching) 
73% 78% 81% 84% 88% 89% 89% 90% 90% 
 
 
4.5.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5s 
 
In general, outputs using estimated Frat5s confirm the results found using input Frat5s 
(Figure 4-30).  With Closure Matching, Airline 1 tends to do better with estimated Frat5s 
than with input Frat5s.  This is because the revenue management systems of the airlines 
become more restrictive with Closure Matching, improving the Frat5s estimated.  Input 
Frat5s do not change with matching.  These estimated Frat5 results suggest that actual 
results achieved by an airline are more positive than the input Frat5 results show. 
 
- 87 - 
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
FIGURE 4-30
Changes as Airline 1 Closure Matches
AL1 EMSRb with Q-forecasting
(Estimated Frat5)
AL2 AT90
(Estimated Frat5)
Restrictive Medium Loose
AL2 Fare Class Load Thresholds
R M L R M L
Changes in Revenues
Low Demand Medium Demand High Demand
AL1 EMSRb with Q-forecasting
(Input Frat5)
AL2 AT90
(Input Frat5)  
 
 
4.5.4 Conclusions 
 
In contrast to Open Matching, Closure Matching sometimes benefits the matching airline 
(using EMSRb with Q-forecasting) as much as or more than the matched airline (AT90).  
Like the Open Matching scenarios, Airline 2 benefits from all Closure Matching 
scenarios simulated. 
 
Closure Matching is still a process that disrupts the revenue management system, so the 
more Closure Matching occurs, the more it causes Airline 1 to be overly restrictive and 
lose revenues.  Airline 1’s revenue management system responds to Closure Matching 
and maximizes revenue while taking into account the changes Closure Matching brings.  
At more extreme cases, for example when Airline 2 uses restrictive fare thresholds, the 
revenue management system is unable to completely recoup the revenues lost through 
being unnecessarily restrictive. 
 
Airline 1’s losses in market share are significant, especially when considering it loses 
both market share and revenues in some cases.  The input Frat5 results may be overly 
pessimistic, since input Frat5s do not change with Closure Matching.  When Frat5s are 
allowed to change through estimation, Closure Matching performs significantly better.  
Overall, Closure Matching is more beneficial to Airline 1 (using EMSRb with Q-
forecasting) than Open Matching is. 
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4.6 EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING BI-DIRECTIONAL 
MATCHING AT90 
 
Bi-directional Matching allows Airline 1 (using EMSRb with Q-forecasting) to match in 
both directions.  Airline 1 manually re-opens the lowest fare class as long as that fare 
class remains available at Airline 2.  At the same time, it shuts down the lowest fare class 
as soon as that fare class is closed at Airline 2.  Bi-directional Matching shadows the 
competitor more closely than either of Open Matching and Closure Matching. 
 
 
4.6.1 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
Overall, Bi-directional Matching tends to hurt Airline 1 – its revenues fall except in the 
two scenarios (Figure 4-31).  Load factors fall throughout the scenarios simulated and is 
accompanied by falls in yield at high demand. 
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At low and medium demand, Bi-directional Matching makes Airline 1 more restrictive, 
since loads fall consistently while yields rise – Closure Matching dominates.  At low 
demand, little Open Matching takes place.  At low demand, where Airline 2 has loose 
thresholds, Bi-directional Matching increases revenues Airline 1, echoing the results of 
Closure Matching (Figure 4-32). 
 
At high demand, Open Matching dominates.  As described earlier, it is very costly to 
open match at high demand because yields fall greatly while load factors hardly improve.  
Adding Closure Matching to Open Matching softens the damage to yields – they fall by 
only 4%.  Unfortunately, load factors also fall from Closure Matching, making Bi-
directional Matching a revenue-losing strategy at high demand. 
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4.6.1.a Market Share 
 
Table 4-18 shows that the drops in market share that come with Bi-directional Matching 
follow the Closure Matching changes closely, while moderated by the slight 
improvements in market share with Open Matching. 
 
Table 4-18: Market Share Change with Bi-directional Matching 
 Low Demand (0.8) Medium Demand (1.0) High Demand (1.2) 
 Restrict 
-ive 
Medium Loose Restrict
-ive 
Medium Loose Restrict 
-ive 
Medium Loose 
Base cases 55.14% 51.98% 50.05% 52.10% 50.51% 49.61% 51.35% 51.03% 50.95% 
With Bi-directional 
Matching 
52.11% 
 
50.63% 49.04% 49.89% 48.85% 48.51% 49.86% 49.62% 49.41% 
Change with Bi-
directional 
Matching 
-3.03% -1.35% -1.01% -2.21% -2.77% -1.10% -1.49% -1.41% -1.54% 
Change with Open 
Matching 
0.02% 0.04% 0.22% 0.28% 0.70% 0.88% 0.41% 0.61% 0.65% 
Change with 
Closure Matching 
-3.04% -1.43% -1.71% -2.68% -2.77% -3.34% -2.73% -3.44% -6.00% 
 
 
4.6.2 Impacts on Airline 2 
 
In every scenario simulated, Airline 2’s revenues increase after it is matched in both 
directions (Figure 4-33).  At low and medium demand, the increases average around 2 to 
3%, while at high demand, the increases run as high as 10%.  
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Moving from left to right of Figure 4-33, the driver of revenue improvements shift from 
load factor gain to yield increase.  At low demand, Closure Matching is dominant. Airline 
2 picks up more passengers as they are rejected by Airline 1.  As demand becomes higher 
and as restrictions become looser, Airline 2 begins before matching with a load factor 
close to 90%.  Having already achieved its load factor target, Airline 2 then benefits from 
Bi-directional Matching by improving its yield – allowing high-fare passengers to 
displace low-fare passengers. 
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Figure 4-34 verifies that the revenue effects of Closure Matching dominate at low and 
medium demand.  At high demand, the two forms of matching moderate each other, 
resulting in revenue changes higher than when Open Matching is used but lower than 
when Closure Matching is carried out. 
 
 
4.6.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5s 
 
In comparisons of results of input and estimated Frat5s in earlier scenarios, two 
phenomena surfaced: firstly, without matching, estimated Frat5s tend to be 
underestimated at low demand.  Secondly, with Closure Matching, results using 
estimated Frat5s tend to be better those using input Frat5s, since Closure Matching 
improves the Frat5s estimated. 
 
Looking at the results using estimated Frat5s with those two concepts in mind, we look at 
a deviation of estimated Frat5 results from input Frat5s results (circled in Figure 4-35). 
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The deviation can be explained by the two concepts, since it occurs with Bi-directional 
Matching.  In part, at low demand without matching, estimated Frat5s are too low.  Open 
Matching leads to improvements about 5% higher than input Frat5 results (explained 
earlier in Chapter 4.4.6 and Figure 4-25).   In addition, the Closure Matching component 
also causes a further improvement of about 5% with improvements in willingness-to-pay 
estimates (discussed in Chapter 4.5.3 and Figure 4-30). 
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4.6.4 Conclusions  
 
Bi-directional Matching occasionally benefits the matching Airline 1 as much as or more 
than Airline 2, but because of the Open Matching component, it is damaging at high 
demand. 
 
If the goal of an airline is to match exactly the availability of a competitor, Bi-directional 
Matching is more appealing than either Open Matching or Closure Matching alone.  
However, the goal of an airline is to maximize revenues.  The simulated results suggest 
that matching in both directions helps sometimes in hedging against losses, although that 
also means that the gains are more restrained.  Moreover, since there are no gains from 
Closure Matching at high demand, the Open Matching causes large losses.  Comparing 
the three forms of matching, Closure Matching remains the most sensible form for an 
airline using EMSRb with Q-forecasting. 
 
The market share losses follow largely the trends seen in Closure Matching, but are 
moderated by the slight market share improvements that come with Open Matching. 
 
 
4.7 EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING OPEN MATCHING EMSRB 
WITH Q-FORECASTING 
 
In the following scenarios of Chapters 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, both Airline 1 and Airline 2 use 
the same revenue management system so that the only difference is availability matching.  
Both airlines use EMSRb with Q-forecasting, representing an advanced revenue 
management system capable of avoiding spiral down significantly.  As before, the Frat5s 
used are input “C” or Frat5s estimated using the average conditional forecast prediction 
method.  Two scenarios are simulated: first, Airline 1 matches Airline 2.  The second 
scenario has both airlines matching each other. 
 
 
4.7.1 Base cases 
 
Since neither airline matches, these are the base cases for all three groups of matching 
scenarios.  Open Matching is discussed in Chapter 4.7, Closure Matching in Chapter 4.8 
and Bi-directional Matching in Chapter 4.9.  When both airlines use EMSRb with Q-
forecasting, they mirror each other in terms of revenues, load factors, yields and fare 
class mixes (Figure 4-36).   
 
- 93 - 
FIGURE 4-36
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4.7.2 Airline 1 Open Matching: Impacts on Airline 1 
 
When the revenue management systems are symmetric, Open Matching has minimal 
impact on either airline, as shown in Figure 4-37.  Even at high demand, the changes 
barely exceed 2%.  This is different from the larger scale of changes when the airlines use 
asymmetric revenue management systems. 
 
Open Matching lowers the revenues of the matching airline insignificantly at low demand 
and by greater amounts as demand increases.  Airline 1, the matching airline, turns less 
protective compared to its baseline, non-matching RM system.  The loosening in 
inventory control is seen the simulation results – Airline 1 maintains or improves slightly 
its load factor but dilutes its yield with Open Matching.  Its revenues decrease because 
the falls in yields cause more losses than the rises in loads bring gains. 
 
FIGURE 4-37
Changes as Airline 1 Open Matches (Input Frat5)
AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2
Load Factor 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Yield 0% 0% -1% 1% -4% 2%
% Revenue change
Demand 
Level
AL1 EMSRb with QF
AL2 EMSRb with QF
-2%
0%
2%
Low Medium High
 
 
- 94 - 
For example, at high demand, the Open Matching airline loses 2.5% of its revenues 
because its yield falls by 4% while its load factor increases by only 1%.  It gains 
passengers in the cheapest fare class but loses passengers from all the remaining five 
higher fare classes (Figure 4-38). 
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4.7.3 Impacts on Airline 2 
 
When revenue management systems are symmetric, Airline 2 gains less than 2% in 
revenues when Airline 1 open matches it (Figure 4-37).  The airline does not benefit 
much from a more open competitor.  This is especially true in that Airline 2’s loads do 
not improve, since Open Matching reduces the spill of passengers from Airline 1 to 2 – 
Airline 1’s fare class would be open for as long as Airline 2’s is open.  Previously, 
Airline 2 could have been available exclusively and pick up passengers shut out by 
Airline 1 fare class closures.  When Airline 1 open matches Airline 2, Airline 2’s revenue 
gains tend to be derived from increased yields, especially when demand is high.  As 
Airline 2 loses some lowest-fare passengers to Airline 1, it fills these seats with higher-
fare passengers instead, as shown in Table 4-19.  These results echo the findings when 
revenue management systems of the two airlines are asymmetric. 
 
Table 4-19:  Airline 2’s Change in Fare Class Mix from Open Matching 
Change in Number of Passengers in Fare Class Demand Level Change 
in Yield 1 
($500) 
2 3 4 5 6 
($125) 
Low  0.1% 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.11 
Medium  0.5% 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.03 -0.61 
High  2.0% 0.12 0.35 0.91 0.68 -1.62 -0.82 
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4.7.4 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5s 
 
The simulation outcomes for the base cases using estimated Frat5s are similar to those for 
the base cases using input Frat5s (Figure 4-39).  The exception happens at low demand, 
where estimated Frat5s for EMSRb with Q-forecasting underestimate passengers’ 
willingness-to-pay. 
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At low demand, both airlines 1 and 2 improve their revenues with Airline 1 Open 
Matching Airline 2 when estimated Frat5s are used (circled in Figure 4-40), unlike when 
input Frat5s are used.  As explained earlier, this unusual result can be attributed to the 
underestimation of Frat5s before matching. 
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We witness the increased estimate of willingness-to-pay indirectly by comparing the 
Figures 4-41 and 4-42.  Figure 4-41 illustrates the difference between the two airlines’ 
closure rates.  The difference curves of the higher fare classes fall below the horizontal 
axis at later timeframes.  That means Airline 2 is more open in those fare classes then and 
Airline 1 will open match accordingly.  From Figure 4-42 we see that on top of Open 
Matching those higher fare classes, Airline 1 closes its lower fare classes much more 
aggressively to force more sell-up, motivated by a higher estimate of willingness-to-pay. 
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4.7.5 Both Airlines Open Match 
 
With input Frat5s, both airlines lose revenues when they open match each other, as 
shown in Table 4-20.  Their losses deepen as demand strengthens.  The magnitude of 
change is small – less than 2%. 
 
Their revenues decrease from the less restrictive availability produced by their mutual 
Open Matching.  Both airlines gain more passengers, at the expense of lowering yields.  
With Open Matching, they keep their lower fare classes open for longer than their 
revenue management systems deem optimal.  Since fare classes are undifferentiated, by 
failing to close lower fare classes in time, they discourage sell-up but encourage buy-
down. 
 
Table 4-20:  Changes in Revenues, Load Factors and Yields when Both Airline Open Match 
Low Demand (0.8) Medium Demand (1.0) High Demand (1.2)  % Change in 
AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2 
Revenues -0.13% -0.11% -0.52% -0.52% -1.59% -1.26% 
Load Factors 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.5% 
Input 
Yields -0.1% -0.2% -0.7% -0.6% -2.3% -1.7% 
Revenues 3.98% 3.44% 0.50% 0.33% 0.71% 0.88% 
Load Factors -0.05% -0.46% 0.9% 0.4% 1.54% 1.71% 
Estimated 
Yields 4.07% 3.93% -0.4% -0.1% -0.82% -0.82% 
 
Results from using estimated Frat5s show slight increases in revenues, but at less than 
1%, the increases are negligible at medium and high demand.  At low demand, the 
increases are atypically high because without matching, the Frat5s are underestimated. 
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4.7.6 Conclusions 
 
When two airlines use the same advanced revenue management system like EMSRb with 
Q-forecasting in a single symmetric market, Open Matching is often counterproductive 
for the airline that open matches.  When one airline open matches, the matching airline 
loses revenues but the matched airline gains.  The difference with earlier asymmetric 
cases is that the losses for the matching airline are capped at a much lower percentage. 
 
Both airlines’ revenues are lowered when they open match each other.  It is not lucrative 
for the airlines to be both more open than the optimal level determined by their revenue 
management systems, especially as demand becomes higher.  Open Matching extends the 
period of time a low fare class is available, encouraging bookings in lower fare classes 
instead of higher fare classes. 
 
 
4.8 EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING CLOSURE MATCHING 
EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING 
 
4.8.1 Airline 1 Closure Matching: Impacts on Airline 1 
 
As Airline 1 closure matches Airline 2, its revenues stay constant – changing by less than 
1% (Figure 4-43).  Airline 1 becomes slightly more restrictive with Closure Matching.  It 
protects more seats for higher fare passengers than when its fare class closures relied 
solely on its revenue management system.  Consistently, Airline 1’s load factor falls but 
yield rises.  Its falling load factor is offset by its rise in yield.  For Airline 1, Closure 
Matching Airline 2 is marginally worse for its revenues as demand increases because 
more availability matching and overriding of the revenue management system takes 
place. 
 
When compared to the earlier scenario when Airline 2 uses a different revenue 
management system, with symmetric revenue management systems, the revenue changes 
are very limited, because Airline 1 is availability matching an airline that uses the same 
revenue management system as itself. 
 
FIGURE 4-43
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4.8.2 Airline 1 Closure Matching: Impacts on Airline 2 
 
Airline 2, the matched airline, gains revenues for two reasons: it absorbs the passengers 
spilled by Airline 1 and it carries more higher-fare passengers.  Its revenue improvements 
are also of a smaller scale (not exceeding 4%) than in the asymmetric revenue 
management systems scenario. 
 
Closure Matching is one-directional.  Airline 1 closes fare classes, but does not re-open 
fare classes, to match the lowest available class of Airline 2.  As a result of Closure 
Matching, Airline 2 is always as open or more open, but never less open, when compared 
to Airline 1.  The spill of passengers from Airline 1 to 2 increases, and that is reflected in 
Airline 2’s load factors improvements by 1% (Figure 4-43).   
 
The second way that Airline 2 benefits from Airline 1’s Closure Matching is that its 
yields improve in the more restrictive environment.  For example, at high demand, 
Airline 2 drops passengers from its lowest fare class but picks up more passengers from 
its next three higher fare classes (Figure 4-44).  This is because of two phenomena in the 
more restrictive environment:  first, Airline 2 saves more seats for, and therefore has 
more successful bookings from, passengers whose first choice is a higher fare.  Secondly, 
there is more sell-up.  For example, passengers who wanted to buy fare class 4 are pushed 
by fare class closures to purchase the more expensive fare class 3 instead. 
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4.8.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5s 
 
When Airline 1 uses the average-conditional Frat5s estimator and closure matches, its 
revenues improve significantly when demand is low (Figure 4-45).  That is significantly 
different from the input Frat5 outcomes. 
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FIGURE 4-45
Changes as Airline1 Closure Matches (Estimated Frat5)
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Once again, estimating Frat5s at low demand is problematic.  When estimated Frat5s are 
used, willingness-to-pay is estimated based on demand.  At low demand, without 
matching, Airline 1 starts with more than 60% of passengers buying the lowest fare class, 
suggesting that it underestimated the passengers’ willingness-to-pay.  With Closure 
Matching, the loss of 22 low-yielding passengers in the lowest fare class is more than 
offset by the gain of passengers in higher-yielding fare classes (Figure 4-46).  Revenues 
increase as the yield gain (20%) outpaces the load loss (-6%).  The Frat5s estimated 
improve dramatically. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
$500 $400 $315 $175 $145 $125
FIGURE 4-46
Fare Class Mix: at Low Demand with Airline 1 Closure Matching
Average number of passengers
Fare Class
-22
6
6
3
0
2
Change from 
Closure Matching
AL1 EMSRb with Q-forecasting
AL2 EMSRb with Q-forecasting
Estimated Frat5 used:
Average Conditional Forecast Prediction
 
- 100 - 
4.8.4 Both Airlines Closure Match 
 
In theory, both airlines should see increases in revenues when they closure match each 
other, regardless of demand, since they would act as two airlines colluding 
monopolistically. 
 
The simulated revenues verify the theory, as shown in Table 4-21.  Both airlines’ 
revenues improve by 1% to 2% when they closure match each other. 
 
Table 4-21:  Changes in Revenues, Load Factors and Yields when Both Airlines Closure 
Match (Input Frat5s) 
Low Demand (0.8) Medium Demand (1.0) High Demand (1.2) % Change in 
AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2 
Revenues 1.2% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 
Load Factors -1.5% -1.6% -3.3% -3.4% -3.8% -4.0% 
Yields 2.8% 3.1% 4.8% 5.0% 5.5% 5.8% 
 
The revenue improvements come from increased yields that overcome the decline in load 
factors.  For example, looking at the fare class mix at low demand when both airlines 
Closure Match (Figure 4-47), both airlines reject passengers from the lowest fare class to 
accept in their place fewer passengers from the higher fare classes. 
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The results obtained using estimated Frat5s are similar, as seen in Table 4-22 – both 
airlines still gain from Closure Matching. 
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Table 4-22:  Changes in Revenues, Load Factor s and Yields when Both Airlines Closure 
Match (Estimated Frat5s) 
Low Demand (0.8) Medium Demand (1.0) High Demand (1.2) % Change in 
AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2 AL1 AL2 
Revenues 7.9% 7.3% 1.1% 0.7% 2.0% 1.9% 
Load Factors -5.3% -5.2% -7.4% -7.7% -9.2% -9.5% 
Yields 14.0% 13.3% 9.1% 9.1% 12.3% 12.6% 
 
 
4.8.5 Conclusions  
 
Typically, when an airline with a sophisticated revenue management system like EMSRb 
with Q-forecasting closure matches unilaterally, it overrides its optimal revenue 
management system to be overly restrictive.  It loses revenue – protecting too many seats 
for higher-fare passengers by rejecting lower-fare passengers.  The same happens when 
an airline closure matches another that has the same revenue management system.  
However, the losses and improvements are very limited in this symmetric scenario 
compared to the earlier asymmetric scenario where Airline 2 uses a different revenue 
management system. 
 
Airline 2 benefits from being closure matched because Airline 1 becomes more 
restrictive.  Airline 2 improves its yield from increased sell-up and gains passengers from 
the greater amount of spill from Airline 1.  In this symmetric scenario, the benefits are 
less than in the earlier asymmetric scenario, since the symmetry implies less closure 
matching takes place. 
 
When Airline 1 and its competitor Airline 2 both decide to match each other in terms of 
closing fare classes, they both benefit.  Together, they create a more restrictive fare 
environment and increase their yields by forcing more sell-up. 
 
 
4.9 EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING BI-DIRECTIONAL 
MATCHING EMSRB WITH Q-FORECASTING 
 
4.9.1 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
Airline 1 Bi-directional Matching Airline 2 increases Airline 1’s revenues by about 1% at 
low demand.  However, as demand increases, it causes revenue drops from 1% to around 
3% (Figure 4-48).   
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The worsening performance as demand increases and the limited scale of change are 
similar to the results from Open and Closure Matching (Figure 4-49).  Bi-directional 
Matching seems to simply sum up the changes caused by both forms of matching.  
However, the two forms of matching do not cause the same magnitude of change – 
Airline 1’s lower load factors and higher yields after Bi-directional Matching indicate 
that it becomes more restrictive and suggests that the impacts of Closure Matching is 
more dominant. 
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4.9.2 Impacts on Airline 2 
 
The revenues of the matched airline, Airline 2, increase as a result of Bi-directional 
Matching for all the demand levels simulated.  Both its yield and load factor rise from the 
matching, suggesting the airline benefits through increased spill from Airline 1 and a 
more restrictive fare availability environment.  The increase is greater as demand rises.  
Once again, the changes for Bi-directional Matching seem to be accumulated changes 
from Open and Closure Matching (Figure 4-49). 
 
Compared to the asymmetric scenario where Airline 2 uses AT90, in this symmetric 
scenario, Airline 2’s gains and losses are on a smaller scale because less seat availability 
matching takes place. 
 
 
4.9.3 Results Obtained using Estimated Frat5s 
 
With estimated Frat5s, the changes are larger than but similar in general to when input 
Frat5s are used (Figure 4-50, compare to Figure 4-48).  For Airline 1, its loads fall and 
yields rise from Bi-directional Matching with estimated Frat5s as with input Frat5s. 
 
The main differences occur at low demand.  As explained earlier, the improvements with 
matching at low demand for Airline 1 comes mainly from it underestimating passengers’ 
willingness-to-pay at low demand without matching. 
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4.9.4 Both Airlines Match 
 
When the two airlines match each other in both directions, the general outcome is 
revenue gains for both airlines, except at high demand when revenues stay constant 
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(Figure 4-51).  For all demand levels, the load factor falls while the yield rises, indicating 
that Closure Matching is prevalently more dominant than Open Matching.  That helps to 
explain the increases in revenues – both airlines force more sell-up among their 
passengers.  At high demand, the negative impacts of both airlines Open Matching negate 
the positive impacts of Closure Matching.   
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With estimated Frat5s, the same results of improvements are seen at low and medium 
demand (Figure 4-52).  Improvements in revenues are seen even at high demand, and that 
can be attributed to the fact that with estimated Frat5s, Open Matching causes revenues 
increases when both airlines open match (Chapter 4.7.5). 
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4.9.5 Conclusions 
 
When Airline 1 uses EMSRb with Q-forecasting and matches in both directions Airline 2 
that also uses EMSRb with Q-forecasting, Airline 1 loses revenues because it overrides 
what its revenue management system decided as optimal.  As demand increases, more 
Open Matching and Closure Matching occur, leading to greater adjustments to the 
revenue management system and worse revenue performances.  In contrast, Airline 2 
gains revenues, improving both its load factor and yield with Bi-directional Matching. 
 
As with Closure Matching, if instead both airlines bi-directional match each other, they 
both increase their revenues, at low and medium demand where Closure Matching 
dominates.  At high demand, the results are more mixed because Open Matching causes 
large losses, negating the gains from Closure Matching. 
 
 
4.10 SUMMARY 
 
Table 4-23: Summary 
No. Scenario 
Type 
AL1 RM 
System 
AL2 RM 
System 
Type of Low 
Fare Seat 
Availability 
Matching 
Impacts on 
Airline 1’s 
Revenues 
Impacts on 
Airline 2’s 
Revenues 
1 EMSRb with 
Standard 
Forecasting 
AT90 Closure Always positive 
(especially at 
high demand, 
up to 42%) 
Always positive 
(especially at 
high demand, 
up to 10.2%) 
2 
Hypothetical 
use of 
Closure 
Matching to 
reduce spiral 
down 
EMSRb with 
Standard 
Forecasting 
EMSRb 
with  
Q-
forecasting 
Closure Always positive 
(up to 11.6% 
with input 
Frat5s) 
Always negative 
(down to -10.3% 
with input 
Frat5s) 
3 Open Always negative 
(especially at 
high demand, 
down to -9.2%) 
Positive at 
restrictive 
thresholds and 
high demand 
(up to 4.2%) 
4 Closure Positive (Loose 
thresholds) 
Negative 
(Restrictive 
thresholds) 
Between -3.9% 
and 7.1%. 
Positive 
(especially at 
high demand, 
up to 12.3%) 
5 
Advanced 
revenue 
management 
system 
matching 
simple 
system 
EMSRb with
Q-
forecasting 
AT90 
Bi-directional Mostly negative. 
Between  
-6.7% and 
3.9%. 
Always positive 
(up to 9.8%) 
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6 Open (AL1) Slightly negative 
(down to -2.5%) 
Slightly positive 
(up to 1.7%) 
7 Open (Both) Slightly negative 
(down to -1.6%) 
Slightly negative 
(down to -1.3%) 
8 Closure 
(AL1) 
Slightly negative 
(down to -0.6%) 
Slightly negative 
(up to 2.8%) 
9 Closure 
(Both) 
Slightly positive 
(up to 1.4%) 
Slightly positive 
(up to 1.6%) 
10 Bi-directional 
(AL1) 
Mostly negative 
(down to -3.2%) 
Always positive 
(up to 4.0%) 
11 
Symmetric: 
Advanced 
revenue 
management 
system 
matching the 
same system 
EMSRb with
Q-
forecasting 
EMSRb 
with 
Q-
forecasting 
Bi-directional 
(Both) 
Mostly positive 
(up to 1.2%) 
Mostly positive 
(up to 1.3%) 
 
Availability matching constitutes an adjustment to the revenue management system that 
is not integrated into the process.  It affects the revenue management system and although 
the system adjusts to account for this external force, it often results in losses for the 
matching airline.  Scenarios three to five suggest that when an airline’s revenue 
management system is already doing well, the less availability matching is done by an 
airline with an advanced revenue management system on an airline with a simple system, 
the better for its revenues. 
 
Out of the three forms of matching, Closure Matching appears to be the best-performing 
for Airline 1.  This is probably an artifact of the direct feedback and spilling between the 
two airlines as one becomes more restrictive with Closure Matching.  Although Bi-
directional Matching has the benefits of hedging losses and gains, it is also causes the 
most availability matching, and therefore does not perform as well.  The matched airline 
gains revenues, especially at high demand. 
 
In the symmetric scenarios where both airlines use the same revenue management 
system, the losses and gains are more restrained, because the matching airline is 
following the actions of an airline that is very much like itself.  This finding concurs with 
the concept that less availability matching is better.  The most gains are derived when the 
two airlines closure match each other, forcing a more restrictive fare availability 
environment. 
 
In the first two scenarios where Closure Matching is used to reduce the spiral down of 
Airline 1’s revenue management system, there are visible improvements to Airline 1’s 
revenues and fare class mixes.  The impacts of availability matching depend on the 
revenue management systems the airlines use.  In the first scenario, Airline 1’s gains are 
not at the expense of Airline 2 that uses AT90, in the second scenario where Airline 2 
uses a more responsive revenue management system of EMSRb with Q-forecasting, they 
are. 
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CHAPTER 5   
SIMULATION INPUTS AND ANALYSIS OF 
RESULTS (NETWORK ‘S’) 
 
 
The scenarios in the previous chapter were simulated in a single symmetric market were 
useful for isolated, theoretical studies of the effects of lowest fare seat availability 
matching.  To add more realism to my analysis, in this chapter, I will proceed to simulate 
scenarios in a network of markets.  
 
The network used, known as Network ‘S’ in PODS, is a simplified representation of the 
U.S. airline network.  Two main features make it much more realistic than the single 
symmetric market.  First, there are more airlines, and these airlines are asymmetric – four 
airlines with different revenue management systems and varying network coverage are 
simulated in this network.  As a result, less direct feedback occurs between any two 
airlines.  Second, two fare structures exist: around half of the markets, 276 markets, have 
a more restricted, traditional fare structure while the other half, 296 markets, have a less 
restricted fare structure, representing markets where LCCs have entered. 
 
I will first provide an overview of Network ‘S,’ then describe and analyze the four 
scenarios simulated.  In the first and second scenarios, Airline 1 uses revenue 
management systems that control inventories on a leg-basis.  Airline 1 uses EMSRb with 
standard forecasting in the first scenario and EMSRb with hybrid forecasting in the 
second scenario.  For the third and fourth scenarios, Airline 1 uses revenue management 
systems that control inventory by itineraries – specifically those based on the DAVN 
method of Origin-Destination control, which was introduced in Chapter 2.1.1.b and 
explained technically in Chapter 3.3.3.  Airline 1 bases its system on DAVN with 
standard forecasting in the third scenario and DAVN with hybrid forecasting in the fourth 
scenario. 
 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF NETWORK ‘S’ 
 
5.1.1 Route Networks and Revenue Management Systems 
 
The four airlines have route networks that vary in size, location of hub and markets 
served.  They all provide services that connect through their hubs, as well as point-to-
point services that bypass their hubs.  They compete in two ways: first, they overlap in 
many O-D markets served through their respective hubs.  In addition, each airline serves 
the hubs of all three competitors.  Figures 5-1 to 5-4 illustrate their route networks. 
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FIGURE 5-1
Route Network of Airline 1 (MSP/Legacy)
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FIGURE 5-2
Route Network of Airline 2 (ORD/Legacy)
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Airline 1 is a legacy airline based in Minneapolis-Saint Paul.  As a default, it uses the 
basic leg-based EMSRb inventory control algorithm with standard forecasting for 
revenue management.  It serves every O-D market in Network ‘S.’  To represent a 
traditional hub-and-spoke carrier, it has only three point-to-point services that bypass its 
hub. 
 
With its hub in Chicago, Airline 2 is another legacy airline.  Its revenue management 
system is based on O-D inventory control method DAVN with standard forecasting.  It 
has a network that is comparable to Airline 1’s, covering most, but not all, the O-D 
markets.   
 
FIGURE 5-3
Route Network of Airline 3 (MCI/LCC)
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FIGURE 5-4
Route Network of Airline 4 (DFW/Legacy)
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Airline 3 is the only LCC of the four airlines.  Its hub is located in Kansas City.  For 
revenue management, it controls its inventories using the adaptive load factor threshold 
method, described earlier in Chapter 3.3.2.b.  It is present in slightly more than half of 
Airline 1’s markets and characteristic of LCCs, it has significantly more point-to-point 
services. 
 
Airline 4, the third network carrier, has its hub at Dallas-Fort Worth.  Like Airline 2, it 
uses DAVN network inventory control with standard forecasting as part of its revenue 
management system.  Its network is smaller than those of airlines 1 and 2. 
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The route networks are summarized in Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1: Summary of Network ‘S’ Route Networks 
Airline Number of Origin 
Cities (Includes 
Competitor 
Hubs) 
Number of 
Destination 
Cities (Includes 
Competitor 
Hubs) 
Number of 
Services that 
Bypass Hub 
O-D Markets 
(Local/Connect) 
Airline 1 
(MSP) 
24 
 
24 
 
3  572 
(49/523) 
Airline 2 
(ORD) 
24 
 
23 
 
6  548 
(51/497) 
Airline 3 
(MCI) 
15 20 19 296 
(44/252) 
Airline 4 
(DFW) 
18 24 4 428 
(44/384) 
 
 
5.1.2 Mixed Fare Structures 
 
Network ‘S’ has a mixed fare structure.  In the 296 markets where the LCC (Airline 3) 
has entered, fares are lower and many restrictions have been removed (Table 5-2).   
 
Table 5-2:  Fare Structure for Markets with LCC 
Requirements and Restrictions Fare 
Class 
Average Fares 
Advance 
Purchase 
Minimum 
Stay 
Cancellation 
Fee 
Non-
refundable 
1 $324.14 None None None No 
2 $250.95 None None Yes No 
3 $188.21 7 days None None Yes 
4 $146.38 7 days None Yes Yes 
5 $125.47 14 days None Yes Yes 
6 $104.56 14 days None Yes Yes 
 
On the other hand, without the LCC present, higher fares persist (Table 5-3).  There are 
slightly stricter advance purchase and cancellation fee restrictions.  However, as with the 
LCC markets, fares in these non-LCC markets no longer carry a minimum stay 
requirement.  There are 276 non-LCC markets.  
 
Table 5-3: Fare Structure for Markets without LCC 
Requirements and Restrictions Fare 
Class 
Average Fares 
Advance 
Purchase 
Minimum 
Stay 
Cancellation 
Fee 
Non-
refundable 
1 $674.96 None None None No 
2 $530.33 3 days None Yes No 
3 $385.69 7 days None Yes Yes 
4 $257.13 10 days None Yes Yes 
5 $208.92 14 days None Yes Yes 
6 $160.71 14 days None Yes Yes 
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5.2 AIRLINE 1 (EMSRB WITH STANDARD FORECASTING) 
MATCHING AIRLINE 3 (AT90) 
 
5.2.1 Inputs 
 
The revenue management combinations for the first scenario are the defaults of Network 
‘S’ as described in the previous section.  Airline 1 uses EMSRb with standard 
forecasting.  In most of the markets without the LCC, it faces competition from Airline 2 
and Airline 4 using the more advanced network revenue management system – DAVN 
with standard forecasting.  At the same time, it competes with the LCC Airline 3 in the 
less restricted markets.  Airline 3 uses AT90 with initial fare class load thresholds that are 
loose (Table 5-4). 
 
Table 5-4:  Loose Initial Fare Class Load Thresholds for AT90 
LOOSE 
Fare 
Class 
Load 
Threshold 
1 100% 
2 90% 
3 80% 
4 70% 
5 60% 
6 50% 
 
I will first simulate the base case where there is no matching.  Then, I will have Airline 1 
availability match Airline 3’s (the LCC) lowest fare seat availability in three ways: 
Closure Matching, Open Matching and Bi-directional Matching. 
 
 
5.2.2 Base Case 
 
Airline 1, the main airline under investigation, has the highest yield, but slightly less 
revenue and market share than Airline 2 because it has the lowest load factor (Figure 5-
5).  Airline 2 has the highest revenue, load factor and market share because of its O-D 
revenue management system (DAVN) and wide network.  Since Airline 4 uses the same 
revenue management system as Airline 2, but has a smaller route network, it has very 
similar load factor and yield, but lower revenue and market share.  Airline 3 has the 
lowest revenues and market share because it operates in the fewest markets that also have 
lower fares. 
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The breakdown of revenues between the LCC and non-LCC markets (Figure 5-6, Figure 
5-7) indicate that 80% of Airline 4’s revenues are exposed to the LCC , the highest of all 
three legacy airlines.  Both Airline 1 and Airline 2 derive about 60% of their revenues 
from LCC markets, since the LCC has entered the markets with denser traffic.   
 
FIGURE 5-7
Baseline Metrics in Non-LCC Markets (AL1: EMSRb with Standard Forecasting)
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5.2.3 Overview of Changes with Seat Availability Matching 
 
First, all three types of availability matching cause Airline 1 to lose approximately 6% to 
7% of its revenues (Figure 5-8).  However, the underlying reasons are different: for Open 
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Matching, Airline 1 gains extra passengers but dilutes its yield, for Closure Matching, the 
reverse happens.  For Bi-directional Matching, both load factor and yield drop, with a 
magnitude of change between those of Open and Closure Matching.  The revenue losses 
are especially unfavorable because for all three types of seat availability matching, all the 
other airlines gain revenues. 
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FIGURE 5-8
Overview of Changes as AL1(EMSRb with SF) Matches AL3
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Having initially the second highest revenue of $1,771,185, lowest load factor of 86% and 
highest yield of 0.129, as Airline 1 open matches Airline 3, its load factor overtakes 
Airline 3’s but its yield falls to the lowest among all four airlines (Table 5-5).  As Airline 
1 closure matches, its load factor drops to a relatively low 67.5%, although it yield is 
boosted proportionally.  With Bi-directional Matching, Airline 1’s load factor falls and 
remains the lowest, while its yield falls slightly but remains the highest.  With each type 
of seat availability matching, Airline 1’s revenue falls but remains second highest among 
the four airlines. 
 
Table 5-5: Metrics after Matching (AL1: EMSRb with SF) 
Type of 
Matching 
Metric Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
Revenue 1661261 1887109 992096 1236038 
Load Factor  88.5% 90.3% 87.9% 89.1% 
Open 
Yield  0.117 0.122 0.125 0.120 
Revenue 1658085 1931304 981896 1268841 
Load Factor  67.5% 92.5% 88.3% 91.6% 
Closure 
Yield  0.153 0.122 0.123 0.120 
Revenue 1648071 1916495 988662 1251647 
Load Factor  80.2% 91.3% 87.9% 89.7% 
Bi-directional 
Yield  0.129 0.123 0.124 0.121 
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5.2.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes in Revenues 
 
The impacts of seat availability matching on the revenues are direct if the changes result 
immediately from the LCC markets, where the matching takes place.  However, if the 
impacts are collateral or indirect, the revenue changes are derived from the non-LCC 
markets, where availability matching does not take place.  For example, all four airlines 
serve SFO (San Francisco) and DCA (Washington, DC) through their hubs, but only 
Airline 3 does not serve ORF (Norfolk Airport).  When Airline 1 matches the seat 
availability of Airline 3 in the LCC market SFO-DCA, direct revenue impacts to all four 
airlines come from that market.  Collateral or indirect impacts to airlines 1, 2 and 4 come 
from a non-LCC market like SFO-ORF. 
 
If the impacts of seat availability matching come evenly from the two types of markets, 
the proportion of revenue changes from the LCC markets should correspond to the 
proportion of revenue derived from that the LCC markets prior to matching.  In other 
words, if the revenue losses from availability matching come equally from both types of 
markets, 62% of Airline 1’s losses should come from LCC markets, where it used to 
obtain 62% of its revenues from. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5-9, when Airline 1 matches the seat availability of Airline 3, 
most of its losses stem directly from the LCC markets (73%/90%/85% respectively for 
Open/Closure/Bi-directional). 
  
FIGURE 5-9
Changes in LCC Markets as AL1(EMSRb with SF) Matches AL3
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FIGURE 5-10
Changes in Non-LCC Markets as AL1(EMSRb with SF) Matches AL3
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Similarly, Airline 2 and Airline 4 gain directly from LCC markets when Airline 1 closure 
matches or bi-directional matches Airline 3’s seat availability.  The exceptions happen 
when Open Matching takes place.  Respectively, Airline 2 and 4 gain 60% and 32% of 
their revenue improvements from the non-LCC markets, where they only used to obtain 
41% and 20% of their total revenues.  Furthermore, seat availability matching does not 
take place in these markets and the matching target is neither of these two airlines. 
 
These collateral gains by Airline 2 and Airline 4’s revenues are drive by two causes.  The 
first cause is that Airline 1 uses leg-based inventory control on itineraries that may 
involve more than one leg.  For example, when Airline 1 makes the legs SFO-MSP and 
MSP-DCA more available as it open matches Airline 3 in the LCC market SFO-DCA, it 
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cannot ensure that the seats on the two legs are offered to SFO-DCA passengers as 
intended.  The seats may be taken by passengers on non-LCC itineraries.  By taking 
excessive low-fare passengers, Airline 1 then spills higher-fare passengers to airlines 2 
and 4.  The second reason explains why the indirect changes only happen with Open 
Matching.  Airline 1 was more restrictive than Airline 2 and Airline 4 in the non-LCC 
markets before seat availability matching, so Open Matching, rather than Closure 
Matching, makes a bigger difference in these markets. 
 
 
5.2.3.b Market Share 
 
The changes to Airline 1’s market share are mostly at the expense of, or to the benefit of, 
Airline 2 and Airline 4, even though Airline 1 matches Airline 3’s seat availability (Table 
5-6).  Like in the single symmetric market, this can be attributed to the relative rigidity of 
AT90, the revenue management system assumed for Airline 3.  Moreover, unlike the 
single market scenario, where passengers spilled from the matching airline tend to book 
on the matched airline or vice versa, passengers now have more airlines to choose from.  
 
In addition, since Airline 1 controls inventory by legs but matches lowest fare seat 
availability by path, there is a significant proportion of collateral market share changes in 
the non-LCC markets.  With Open Matching, Airline 1’s gain of market share from 
competitors is much more significant in the non-LCC markets (1.5 pp) than the LCC 
markets (0.1pp).  With Closure Matching, Airline 1 not only loses market share in the 
LCC markets (5.1pp, mostly to airlines 2 and 4) but also in the non-LCC markets (1.7pp, 
to airlines 2 and 4). 
 
Table 5-6: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: EMSRb with SF)  
LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 25.8 - 27.0 - 23.4 - 23.8 - 
Open 25.9 0.1 26.9 -0.1 23.5 0.1 23.7 -0.1 
Closure 20.7 -5.1 29.3 2.3 24.4 1.0 25.6 1.8 
Bi-
directional 
23.8 -2.0 27.9 0.9 23.9 0.5 24.4 0.6 
Non-LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 39.6 - 46.3 - - - 14.1 - 
Open 41.1 1.5 45.3 -1.0 - - 13.6 -0.5 
Closure 37.9 -1.7 47.3 1.0 - - 14.8 0.7 
Bi-
directional 
40.3 0.7 45.9 -0.4 - - 13.8 -0.3 
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5.2.4 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
The other three airlines will be discussed in later sections; for this section, I will focus on 
analyzing Airline 1’s losses.  Airline 1’s revenues decline 6% to 7% with all three types 
of seat availability matching and the greatest drop in revenues happens with Bi-
directional Matching. 
 
The fare class mix of Airline 1 as it matches Airline 3 in seat availability (Figure 5-11) 
and the changes in fare class mix (Figure 5-12) show that as Airline 1 becomes less 
restrictive with Open Matching, its load factor rises.  There is a pronounced increase in of 
17 passengers from fare class 6 that outweighs the loss of fewer passengers from fare 
classes 1 to 5.  Since fare class 6 passengers pay the lowest fares, Airline 1’s yield falls, 
and by more than its load factor rises, leading to the revenue loss.  The changes to Airline 
1’s fare class mix from Open Matching occur mainly in the LCC markets. 
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When Airline 1 closure matches Airline 3, its increase in the average number of fare class 
1 passengers causes a significant rise in yield of 19%.  Unfortunately, it becomes overly 
restrictive and loses passengers in all the other fare classes, especially fare class 6 where 
it loses an average of about 17 passengers.  This translates to a 22% drop in load factor 
and an overall revenue loss.   
 
When Airline 1 matches Airline 3’s seat availability in both directions, the passenger 
number for fare class 6 rises because of Open Matching.  At the same time, the average 
number of passengers rises for fare class 1 because of Closure Matching.  The downside 
to matching in both directions is that the decreases in passenger numbers for the fare 
classes in between – fare classes 2 to 4 – are compounded.  As a result, Airline 1’s load 
factor and yield both fall, causing an overall greatest loss in revenue across the three 
types of lowest fare seat availability matching. 
 
 
5.2.5 Impacts on Airline 3 
 
The changes to Airline 3 when it is matched in the lowest fare seat availability are on a 
relatively smaller scale, because it uses AT90 – a revenue management system that does 
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not respond directly to seat availability matching.  The revenues increase, but are capped 
at 2%.  The changes in load factor or yield are also limited to about 2%.  The fare class 
mix, shown in Figure 5-13, experiences only relatively small fluctuations.  The middle 
fare classes 3 and 4 are almost constant throughout the absence or presence of different 
types of seat availability matching. 
 
These findings of slightly improved revenues and small changes in yields and loads 
concur with the earlier single symmetric market scenario where an airline using AT90 
was the subject of seat availability matching by an airline using EMSRb with standard 
forecasting (Chapter 4.2.4).  
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5.2.6 Impacts on Airlines 2 and 4 
 
Airlines 2 and 4 have very similar fare class mixes before seat availability matching, and 
they tend to change in the same way after matching (Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15).  
However, Airline 2 has more passengers in fare classes 4 to 6.  Both airlines have similar 
load factors and these extra passengers are from Airline 2’s with larger average aircraft 
capacity. 
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With Open Matching, the number of passengers rise in fare classes 1, 2 and 3 but fall in 
fare classes 5 and 6 for both airlines.  Their revenue gains are driven by their yields rise.  
With Closure Matching, load factors improvements build on the increases in yields, 
caused mainly by the increase in passengers in fare classes 2 to 4. 
 
 
5.2.7 Conclusions 
 
When Airline 1 performs seat availability matching against Airline 3’s lowest fares, 
regardless of the type of matching (Open, Closure or both), the revenue effects are 
consistently negative for itself (loss of 6% to 7%) but positive for the other three airlines.  
Most of the impacts are direct – revenues increase or decrease in the LCC markets.   
 
However, particular to Open Matching, a significant portion of the revenue changes of 
Airline 2 and Airline 4 are collateral or indirect, from the non-LCC markets.  There are 
two reasons for these indirect changes: first, LCC and non-LCC markets share the same 
legs but Airline 1’s leg-based inventory control loosens or tightens control by leg, and is 
unable to isolate seat availability matching to the specific O-D pair.  The second reason, 
which makes the phenomenon unique to Open Matching, is that Airline 1 was more 
restrictive than Airline 2 and Airline 4 in the non-LCC markets before seat availability 
matching.  The influence Open Matching exerts indirectly on non-LCC markets rather 
than directly on LCC markets is also reflected in Airline 1’s 1.5pp gain in market share in 
the former and 0.1pp gain in the latter. 
 
Changes in Airline 1’s market share are most pronounced with Closure Matching – 
Airline 1 loses 5.1pp market share in LCC markets and 1.7pp in non-LCC markets.  In 
general, Airline 1 gains or loses market share to Airline 2 and Airline 4, rather than 
Airline 3 that it is matching.  This exchange of market share is more realistic than the 
single market scenario, where passengers spilled from the matching airline book on the 
matched airline or do not travel at all.  Airline 3 undergoes limited changes in load factor 
and therefore market share when the airline is matched in terms of lowest fare seat 
availability because its AT90 revenue management system is relatively inflexible. 
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In this scenario, standard forecasting is used by Airline 1 even though the fare structures 
have becomes less-restricted.  As a result, standard forecasting leads to overly loose 
inventory control.  In the next scenario, I will examine Airline 1’s performance when it 
uses hybrid forecasting instead.  For product-oriented demand, Airline 1 would still 
control inventory based on standard forecasting, but towards price-oriented demand, it 
would use Q-forecasting. 
 
 
5.3 AIRLINE 1 (EMSRB WITH HYBRID FORECASTING) 
MATCHING AIRLINE 3 (AT90) 
 
5.3.1 Inputs 
 
Airline 1 uses EMSRb with hybrid forecasting, meaning it continues to forecast demand 
using standard pick-up forecasting for product-oriented passengers but now uses Q-
forecasting for price-oriented passengers.  Although demand forecasting is now done on a 
O-D basis, inventory control remains leg-based.  For the categorization of historical 
bookings necessary for hybrid forecasting, the “path rule” is used, meaning a passenger is 
considered “product-oriented” if he/she booked a fare class when the next lower class is 
still available on the same path.  The other airlines use the same revenue management 
systems as they have before – airlines 2 and 4 use DAVN with standard forecasting while 
Airline 3 uses AT90. 
 
The base case will be presented first, followed by the changes when Airline 1 matches the 
seat availability of Airline 3 in the three ways of Open Matching, Closure Matching and 
Bi-directional Matching. 
 
 
5.3.2 Base Case 
 
With hybrid forecasting, Airline 1 performs better than with standard forecasting – its 
revenues increase by 2%.  The revenue improvements come mainly from an increase in 
yield rather than load factor (Figure 5-16).  The other three airlines have revenues and 
yields that are generally the same as when Airline 1 used standard forecasting.  Airline 2 
increased its load factor slightly, as Airline 1’s load factor drops by 2%. 
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The breakdown of revenue by market type indicates that the revenue gains by Airline 1 
with hybrid forecasting come from both the LCC and non-LCC markets (Figure 5-17 and 
Figure 5-18).  This is expected since the more suitable method of Q-forecasting is now 
used for price-oriented demand whereas standard forecasting continues to be used for 
product-oriented demand.  The use of Q-forecasting that tightens inventory control 
towards price-oriented demand also explains yield – rather than load factor – as the driver 
of revenue improvements.   
 
FIGURE 5-18
Baseline Metrics in Non-LCC Markets (AL1: EMSRb, HF cf. SF)
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4
Revenues
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
FIGURE 5-17
Baseline Metrics in LCC Markets (AL1: EMSRb, HF cf. SF)
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4
Revenues
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
62%
of total revenues
59%
of total revenues 80%
of total revenues
100%
of total revenues
38%
of total revenues
41%
of total revenues
20%
of total revenues
0%
of total revenues
3% increase in 
revenues
1% increase 
in revenues
 
- 120 - 
5.3.3 Overview of Changes with Seat Availability Matching 
 
Similar to when Airline 1 used standard forecasting, when Airline 1 uses hybrid 
forecasting, it does worse in revenues with all three ways of matching (Figure 5-19).  
Once again, the other airlines gain from the seat availability matching.  However, in this 
scenario, with Open Matching and Closure Matching, the drops in Airline 1’s revenue are 
less negative in both absolute and percentage terms.  The magnitude of the changes in 
Airline 1’s load factors and yields is also smaller.  In other words, not only does the 
revenue management system using hybrid forecasting do better than the system using 
standard forecasting without lowest fare seat availability matching, it is less negatively 
affected by either Open Matching or Closure Matching.  At the same time, the three other 
airlines gain less revenue from Airline 1 Open or Closure Matching than before. 
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Starting from the initial second highest revenue of $1,805,799, the lowest load factor of 
84% and the highest yield of 0.134, as Airline 1 open matches Airline 3, Airline 1’s load 
factor increases but remains the lowest.  Its yield falls but remains the highest (Table 5-
7).  Clearly, the negative impacts of Open Matching are less pronounced in this scenario 
where Airline 1 uses hybrid forecasting than previously when it used standard 
forecasting.   
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Table 5-7: Metrics after Matching (AL1: EMSRb with HF) 
Type of 
Matching 
Metric Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
Revenue 1715348 1887325 9840389 1233847 
Load Factor  85.2% 91.1% 87.9% 89.4% 
Open 
Yield  0.126 0.121 0.124 0.119 
Revenue 1700107 1929533 979162 1263758 
Load Factor  68.9% 92.8% 88.3% 91.4% 
Closure 
Yield  0.154 0.122 0.122 0.120 
Revenue 1652863 1934462 989792 1260200 
Load Factor  75.5% 92.2% 88.3% 90.2% 
Bi-directional 
Yield  0.139 0.123 0.124 0.121 
 
As Airline 1 closure matches, its load factor drops to 68.9%, which is not as low as when 
it did the same while using standard forecasting (67.5%).  It is only with Bi-directional 
Matching that the negative impacts are stronger when Airline 1 uses hybrid forecasting 
instead of standard forecasting.  Airline 1’s load falls to 74.5% from 84% – a much 
bigger drop than when it used standard forecasting and matched in both directions (80.2% 
from 86.0%). 
 
 
5.3.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes in Revenues 
 
Like the earlier scenario, most of the revenue changes happen directly in the LCC 
markets (Figure 5-20) while Airline 2 and 4 benefit indirectly from Open Matching in 
non-LCC markets (Figure 5-21).  The difference with the previous scenario is that with 
hybrid forecasting, Airline 1 does less badly in the LCC markets when Open or Closure 
Matching is implemented.  The source of the overall improvements in revenues is the 
performance in the LCC markets rather than the non-LCC markets.  In the LCC markets, 
with Open Matching, Airline 1 now loses only 5.5% of revenues (hybrid forecasting) 
instead of losing 7.3% of revenues (standard forecasting).  With Closure Matching, 
Airline 1 loses only 8.6% of revenues (hybrid forecasting) rather than losing 9.3% of 
revenues (standard forecasting).   
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5.3.3.b Market Share 
 
As before when Airline 1 uses standard forecasting, the changes to Airline 1’s market 
share when it uses hybrid forecasting are tied to changes at airlines 2 and 4 (Table 5-8).  
In addition, since inventory control remains leg-based, there is still pronounced collateral 
impacts from seat availability matching.  For Open Matching, Airline 1 loses 0.6pp 
market share in the non-LCC markets but maintains the same market share in LCC 
markets.  As for Closure Matching, it loses 4.2pp market share in the LCC markets but 
also 1.2pp in the non-LCC markets. 
 
The main difference from the previous scenario is that as a result of stricter inventory 
control from using Q-forecasting towards price-oriented demand, Airline 1 starts with a 
lower overall load factor.  The changes in load factor for Airline 1 are also slightly 
smaller in scale with hybrid forecasting (up to 4.2pp) compared to standard forecasting 
(up to 5.1pp). 
 
Table 5-8: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: EMSRb with HF)  
LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 25.6 - 27.1 - 23.4 - 23.9 - 
Open 25.6 0.0 27.2 0.1 23.4 0.0 23.8 -0.1 
Closure 21.4 -4.2 28.9 1.8 24.3 0.9 25.4 1.5 
Bi-
directional 
22.6 -3.0 28.5 1.4 24.1 0.7 24.9 0.9 
Non-LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 38.4 - 47.3 - - - 14.3 - 
Open 39.0 0.6 47.0 -0.3 - - 14.0 -0.3 
Closure 37.2 -1.2 48.1 0.8 - - 14.7 0.4 
Bi-
directional 
38.5 0.1 47.3 0.0 - - 14.2 -0.1 
 
 
5.3.4 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
One of two possible reasons explain why Airline 1 using EMSRb with hybrid forecasting 
is less negatively affected by Open or Closure Matching in the LCC markets when 
compared to when it uses EMSRb with standard forecasting.  First, the explanation could 
be straightforward – less seat availability matching takes place in the LCC markets when 
Airline 1 uses EMSRb with hybrid forecasting.  This would be true should hybrid 
forecasting make Airline 1’s inventories more open than Airline 3’s before Open 
Matching, or more closed than Airline 3’s before Closure Matching.  Second, it could be 
that the revenue management system based on EMSRb with hybrid forecasting recovers 
more quickly and strongly from the disruption caused by the non-RM seat availability 
matching. 
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For Open Matching, Figure 5-22 and Figure 5-23 illustrate that the first hypothesis is 
probably untrue.  We compare the average availabilities of the fare classes across all 
flights of Airline 1 and Airline 3.  Where Airline 3 is more available than Airline 1, the 
positive difference in availability gives an idea of the scale and the timeframe when 
Airline 1 may open match Airline 3.  When Airline 1 uses EMSRb with standard 
forecasting, it is only less open than Airline 3 in the first time frame for fare classes 5 and 
6 and at a later time frame for fare class 4.  The differences in percentage availability do 
not exceed 5%. 
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On the other hand, when Airline 1 uses hybrid forecasting, the gap it needs to bridge with 
Open Matching appears to be greater than 10% for fare class 6 – more Open Matching is 
needed. 
 
FIGURE 5-23
Difference in Availability of AL3 and AL1
(EMSRb with Hybrid Forecasting)
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For Closure Matching, Figure 5-24 shows that it is probably true that less availability 
matching takes place with hybrid forecasting.  Closure Matching happens where Airline 3 
is less available than Airline 1, as illustrated in Figure 5-24.  When Airline 1 uses hybrid 
forecasting, there is a smaller difference in the availability than when it uses standard 
forecasting, especially in fare class 6 – less Closure Matching is needed. 
 
Hybrid forecasting, relative to standard forecasting, reduces spiral down and makes the 
inventory control system more restrictive towards price-oriented demand in LCC 
markets.  As a result, there is more Open Matching and less Closure Matching in the LCC 
markets.   
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However, the data on the differences in the seat availability of Airline 1 and Airline 3 
before matching is static.  It suggests what may happen, but the actual process would be 
dynamic.  The change in availability results from a combination of the matching of seat 
availability and the reaction by the revenue management system to the availability 
matching.  The revenue management system reacts to the seat availability matching by 
generating new forecasts of demand and booking limits for inventory control. 
 
Figure 5-25 illustrates the changes in fare class availabilities as Airline 1 open matches 
Airline 3.  Surprisingly, when Airline 1 uses hybrid forecasting, even though it should 
perform more Open Matching, it ends up being less open and available in fare classes 5 
and 6 than when it uses standard forecasting.  The change in fare class availability also 
reveals that the initial Open Matching in lower fare classes sets off further changes in 
higher fare classes.  It appears that the revenue management system based on EMSRb 
with hybrid forecasting is more robust and reacts quickly against seat availability 
matching to limit the revenue damage, when compared to the system based on EMSRb 
with standard forecasting. 
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At the same time, when Airline 1 uses hybrid forecasting, less Closure Matching is 
needed and correspondingly the changes to the fare class availabilities are on a smaller 
scale than when it uses standard forecasting (Figure 5-26). 
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As a result, the changes in fare class mix for Airline 1 when it uses hybrid forecasting are 
smaller than when standard forecasting is used, as shown in Figure 5-27 and Figure 5-28. 
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5.3.5 Conclusions 
 
With Airline 1’s revenue management system based on hybrid forecasting instead of 
standard forecasting, before seat availability matching, Airline 1 now has 2.0% more 
revenues.  Most of the revenue improvements come from the LCC markets as a result of 
hybrid forecasting. 
 
As Airline 1 matches the seat availability of Airline 3’s lowest fares, the revenue effects 
are still negative for each type of matching.  However, the losses in revenue are lower for 
Open Matching (-5.0%) and Closure Matching (-5.9%) than before (-6.2%/-6.4% 
respectively).  The improved performance comes from the switch in the revenue 
management system to hybrid forecasting, and are derived mainly from the LCC markets.  
In these markets, less Closure Matching is needed with Q-forecasting since Airline 1 is 
more restrictive towards price-oriented demand than before.  For Open Matching, looking 
at the change in the fare class availabilities, it appears that the revenue management 
system based on hybrid forecasting reacts more quickly and capably to Open Matching 
and limits the revenue loss more effectively.   
 
Airline 1 performs better with or without seat availability matching when it uses a 
revenue management system that incorporates hybrid forecasting instead of standard 
forecasting, while controlling inventory based on EMSRb.  However, the control of seats 
is still being done leg-by-leg.  As explained earlier in an example, with leg-based 
inventory control, seats made available for a passenger flying SFO-DCA on the legs 
SFO-MSP and MSP-DCA may not be taken by a connecting passenger on that itinerary.  
With O-D control, a seat made available for the path SFO-DCA cannot be taken by 
passengers on other paths.  In the next section, I will investigate if a more specific form 
of network-based inventory control, namely DAVN, performs better with lowest fare seat 
availability matching. 
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5.4 AIRLINE 1 (DAVN WITH STANDARD FORECASTING) 
MATCHING AIRLINE 3 (AT90) 
 
5.4.1 Inputs 
 
Like Airline 2 and Airline 4, Airline 1 now uses DAVN with standard forecasting.  
DAVN is an O-D form of inventory control, in contrast to earlier scenarios that used leg-
based methods for inventory control.  Airline 3 retains its AT90 revenue management 
system. 
 
Firstly, I will present the base case where no seat availability matching is done.  Then, I 
will discuss the changes when Airline 1 matches the seat availability of Airline 3 in the 
three ways of Open Matching, Closure Matching and Bi-directional Matching.  I will 
highlight the differences between using DAVN with O-D inventory control and EMSRb 
with leg-based inventory control. 
 
 
5.4.2 Base Case 
 
Using O-D inventory control instead of only leg-based inventory control, Airline 1’s 
revenues improve by 1.4%, led by a 3.2% rise in its load factor (Figure 5-29).  Unlike 
leg-based inventory control, DAVN does not erroneously favor high-yielding local 
passengers over lower-yielding – but overall more lucrative – connecting passengers.  
Airline 2 is hurt the most by Airline 1’s change of revenue management system since its 
network overlaps most with Airline 1.  Its revenues decrease by 1.6% as its load factor 
falls, causing Airline 1’s and Airline 2’s revenues, load factors and market shares to be 
about the same.  Airline 1’s yield drops, but remains the highest.  The changes at Airline 
3 and Airline 4 are minor – slight drops in load factor and market share. 
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There is a 6% increase in revenue in LCC markets when O-D inventory control is used 
instead of leg-based control.  At the same time, there is a 2% decrease in revenues in the 
non-LCC markets.  However, the percentage of revenue each airline derives from the 
LCC and non-LCC markets remain similar to the two earlier scenarios (Figure 5-30 and 
Figure 5-31).  
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5.4.3 Overview of Changes with Seat Availability Matching 
 
Overall, the changes as Airline 1 matches Airline 3 in terms of the lowest fare seat 
availability are the similar to the two earlier scenarios – Airline 1’s revenues fall while 
the other three airlines gain (Figure 5-32). 
 
Specifically, when Airline 1 bases its revenue management system on O-D inventory 
control DAVN and standard forecasting, as it open matches Airline 3’s lowest fare seat 
availability, it loses only 5.5% of its revenues, less than the 6.2% it loses when its method 
of inventory control is leg-based EMSRb.  Its yield falls by less than before, and more 
interestingly, its load rises slightly instead of falling, even as it open matches to make its 
lower-fare seats more available.  This finding reveals that while the EMSRb form of leg-
based inventory control allowed overly large increases in loads because availability 
matching could not be specific to the path, the DAVN form of O-D inventory control 
corrected the problem.  As a result, less displacement of high-yield passengers by lower-
yield passengers takes place and less revenue is lost. 
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As Airline 1 bi-directional matches Airline 3, it also does better with O-D inventory 
control DAVN than leg-based inventory control EMSRb, losing 6.2% of its revenues 
instead of 7.0%.  However, as Airline 1 closure matches Airline 3, it loses 8.3% in 
revenues instead of 6.4%.  The reasons for this inferior performance will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
Initially, Airline 1 has the second highest revenue of $1,795,958, the highest load factor 
of 89.2% and the highest yield of 0.126.  After it open matches Airline 3, Airline 1’s 
yield becomes the lowest (Table 5-9).  After Closure Matching Airline 3, Airline 1 has a 
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yield that is significantly higher than the other airlines, but also a load factor that is 
smaller by a wide margin.   
 
Table 5-9: Metrics after Matching (AL1: DAVN with SF) 
Type of 
Matching 
Metric Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
Revenue 1697468 1852770 979581 1228979 
Load Factor  88.8% 89.7 86.8 88.6 
Open 
Yield  0.119 0.121 0.125 0.120 
Revenue 1646013 1916808 983107 1274061 
Load Factor  63.3% 92.0% 88.1% 90.9% 
Closure 
Yield  0.163 0.122 0.123 0.121 
Revenue 1685011 1877660 979470 1239394 
Load Factor  85.1% 90.5% 86.8% 88.9% 
Bi-directional 
Yield  0.124 0.121 0.124 0.121 
 
 
5.4.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes in Revenues 
 
In general, the revenue change to each airline still comes directly from the LCC markets 
(Figure 5-33 and Figure 5-34).  The exceptions remain that Airline 2 and Airline 4’s 
revenue changes with Open Matching are still derived indirectly from the non-LCC 
markets. 
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FIGURE 5-34
Changes in Non-LCC Markets as AL1(DAVN with SF) Matches AL3
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With Closure Matching, Airline 1 gains revenues in the non-LCC markets.  This is a 
deviation from the earlier two scenarios.  The improvement in the non-LCC markets is 
the result the O-D inventory control method DAVN.  When Airline 1 uses leg-based 
inventory control method EMSRb, to closure match the lower seat availability of Airline 
3 in a LCC market, it makes both legs of the market less available to all passengers, 
without regard for their itineraries.  For example, Airline 3 has lower seat availability 
than Airline 1 in fare class 6 for the market SFO-PHL.  With Closure Matching, Airline 1 
adjusts its inventory to make fare class 6 less available on the legs SFO-MSP and MSP-
PHL.  Airline 1 inadvertently rejects many fare class 6 passengers from the non-LCC 
markets that involve either of the two legs.  When Airline 1 uses leg-based EMSRb 
inventory control, it loses $11,210 on non-LCC markets involving either the SFO-MSP or 
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MSP-PHL leg (Table 5-10).  In contrast, when Airline 1 uses O-D DAVN inventory 
control, it only loses $733 on those non-LCC markets.  The collateral damage on the non-
LCC markets – where seat availability matching does not occur – is sharply reduced with 
O-D inventory control.  Overall, Closure Matching brings an improvement in revenues in 
non-LCC markets when Airline 1 uses O-D inventory control with DAVN. 
 
Table 5-10: Revenues of LCC Market SFO-PHL and Associated Non-LCC 
Markets (Standard Forecasting, EMSRb cf. DAVN) 
Leg-based Inventory Control
(EMSRb with SF) 
O-D Inventory Control
(DAVN with SF) 
Market 
Without 
Matching 
With 
Matching Difference 
Without 
Matching 
With 
Matching Difference 
LCC SFO-PHL  $2,597 $3,190 $593 $3,707 $3,657 -$50
SFO-YUL $2,084 $890 -$1,194 $2,058 $2,148 $90
SFO-ORF $1,012 $549 -$463 $972 $882 -$90
SFO-DTW $2,517 $1,863 -$654 $2,390 $2,579 $189
SFO-MKE $1,703 $1,268 -$435 $1,615 $1,717 $102
Non-LCC 
involving 
SFO-MSP 
Total $7,316 $4,570 -$2,746 $7,035 $7,326 $291
YVR-PHL $4,627 $3,015 -$1,612 $4,496 $4,598 $102
SMF-PHL $2,852 $1,922 -$930 $3,645 $3,171 -$474
BOI-PHL $2,635 $1,792 -$843 $3,451 $3,470 $19
GEG-PHL $2,600 $1,951 -$649 $3,735 $3,847 $112
TUS-PHL $818 $433 -$385 $1,146 $972 -$174
BZN-PHL $1,927 $1,021 -$906 $2,316 $2,378 $62
ABQ-PHL $5,488 $4,061 -$1,427 $3,567 $3,677 $110
RAP-PHL $793 $458 -$335 $1,405 $1,311 -$94
AUS-PHL $3,738 $2,361 -$1,377 $2,733 $2,046 -$687
Non-LCC 
involving 
MSP-PHL 
Total $25,478 $17,014 -$8,464 $26,494 $25,470 -$1,024
Non-LCC Total $32,794 $21,584 -$11,210 $33,529 $32,796 -$733
 
In the LCC markets, when Airline 1 closure matches Airline 3, the decrease in revenues 
is much larger when Airline 1 uses the O-D inventory control method DAVN than when 
it uses the leg-based method EMSRb.  The reason for the larger drop with DAVN is 
twofold: Airline 1 starts with better performance in the LCC markets and the specificity 
of O-D inventory control means that these better-performing markets lose revenues from 
Closure Matching.  The losses that used to be accounted for in the non-LCC markets now 
show up rightfully in the LCC markets.  Table 5-10 shows the example of the SFO-PHL 
market.  Compared to leg-based inventory control, Airline 1 has higher revenue with O-D 
inventory before matching, but loses, instead of gains, revenue from Closure Matching.   
 
Another example is the LCC market SAN-ATL.  When Airline 1 uses the EMSRb leg-
based inventory control method, it derives $2,689 from that market before Closure 
Matching Airline 3 and $3,639 after Closure Matching.  Although Airline 1 closure 
matches Airline 3 in this market to reduce seat availability on SAN-MSP and MSP-ATL, 
the bookings rejected are not from SAN-ATL, but from other itineraries.  The number of 
passengers with the SAN-ATL itinerary increases from around 12 to 19.  With O-D 
inventory control method DAVN, Airline 1 obtains $4,217 from this market because it 
allows more connecting passengers to book.  The number of passengers is around 26.  
However, when Airline 1 implements Closure Matching, the effective and specific O-D 
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inventory control rejects passengers from the itinerary SAN-ATL.  As a result, Airline 1 
earns only $1,608 from the SAN-ATL market after Closure Matching.  Aggregated over 
all the LCC markets, the overall result is a much greater loss from Closure Matching 
when Airline 1 uses DAVN. 
 
 
5.4.3.b Market Share 
 
When Airline 1 uses leg-based inventory control, as it open matches and becomes less 
restrictive, it gains loads and market share in the non-LCC markets instead of the LCC 
markets.  As it closure matches and turns more restrictive, it sheds passengers and market 
share in both the non-LCC and LCC markets.   
 
With O-D inventory control, Airline 1 now isolates the direct effect of seat availability 
matching to the LCC markets (Table 5-11).  With Open Matching, Airline 1 becomes less 
restrictive and gains market share by 0.5pp in the LCC markets.  In the non-LCC 
markets, it loses 1.7pp of market share.  O-D inventory control only allows passengers 
with the matched itinerary to book, unlike leg-based inventory control that allows 
passengers with any itinerary involving the re-opened legs to book.  With Closure 
Matching, Airline 1 loses market share by 8.2pp in the LCC markets – leading to Airline 
1’s lowest market share in LCC markets (17.8%) in the scenarios so far.  At the same 
time, its market share in the non-LCC markets is unaffected by Closure Matching.  
 
Table 5-11: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: DAVN with SF)  
LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 26.0 - 27.1 - 23.1 - 23.8 - 
Open 26.5 0.5 26.8 -0.3 23.1 0.0 23.6 -0.2 
Closure 17.8 -8.2 30.9 3.8 24.7 1.6 26.6 2.8 
Bi-
directional 
25.3 -0.7 27.4 0.3 23.3 0.2 24.0 0.2 
Non-LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 43.3 - 43.7 - - - 13.0 - 
Open 41.6 -1.7 45.0 1.3 - - 13.4 0.4 
Closure 43.3 0.0 43.7 0.0 - - 13.0 0.0 
Bi-
directional 
41.5 -1.8 45.1 1.4 - - 13.4 0.4 
 
 
5.4.4 Impacts on Airline 1 
 
The fare class mix of Airline 1, as shown in Figure 5-35 and Figure 5-36, show that with 
Open Matching, Airline 1 gains fare class 6 passengers but loses passengers from all 
higher fare classes, as with previous scenarios. 
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With Closure Matching, Airline 1 gains fare class 1 passengers but loses passengers from 
all lower fare classes.  Although this is the same as previous scenarios, the loss in fare 
class 6 is much higher than when Airline 1 uses leg-based inventory control. 
 
 
5.4.5 Conclusions 
 
With O-D inventory control, Airline 1 gets more revenue in the base case as it allows 
more connecting passengers to book, correcting the local-bias of leg-based inventory 
control.  As it matches the seat availability of Airline 3, Airline 1 loses revenue, to the 
benefit of the other three airlines, which gain revenue. 
 
With Open Matching, Airline 1 loses less revenue using O-D inventory control than leg-
based inventory control.  O-D inventory control allows Airline 1 to restrict bookings to 
only the passengers booking the specific itinerary as open matched, limiting the number 
of low-yield passengers displacing higher-yield passengers  At the same time, the path-
specific inventory control causes more losses with Closure Matching.  In the LCC 
markets, the losses become much greater than before as the negative effects of Closure 
Matching are now fully accounted for there.  In the non-LCC markets, Airline 1 benefits 
slightly from Closure Matching as collateral damage is minimized. 
 
In general, with and without lowest fare seat availability matching, Airline 1’s 
performance is enhanced by O-D DAVN.  However, Airline 1 results in LCC markets 
remains weak, because it still uses standard forecasting, which makes it not sufficiently 
restrictive in the base case and subsequently to reject too many low-fare passengers with 
Closure Matching.  In the next scenario, I will investigate if pairing O-D inventory 
control with hybrid forecasting improves Airline 1’s outcomes. 
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5.5 AIRLINE 1 (DAVN WITH HYBRID FORECASTING) 
MATCHING AIRLINE 3 (AT90) 
 
5.5.1 Inputs 
 
In this scenario, Airline 1 combines the DAVN form of O-D inventory control that is 
more suited to networks with hybrid forecasting that is more suited to mixed fare 
structures.  Airline 2 and Airline 4 continue to use the DAVN system with standard 
forecasting, while Airline 3 still uses AT90. 
 
I will first discuss the base case where there is no seat availability matching.  Following 
that, I will examine the outcomes as Airline 1 matches the seat availability of Airline 3 
with Open Matching, Closure Matching and Bi-directional Matching.  Since O-D control 
and hybrid forecasting are more suited to the mixed fare structure network, this system is 
expected to generate the best performance for Airline 1 with and without seat availability 
matching. 
 
 
5.5.2 Base Case 
 
Before seat availability matching is done, Airline 1 achieves the highest revenue and 
yield among the four airlines using the system based on DAVN and hybrid forecasting 
(Figure 5-37).  Its revenues are also the highest so far in the four scenarios simulated.  
The revenues represent a 1.6% increase over those obtained using the earlier system of 
DAVN with standard forecasting and a 1.1% improvement compared to the results from 
the system based on EMSRb with hybrid forecasting.  Airline 2 has slightly lower 
revenues than Airline 1, but has the highest load factor and market share.  Airline 3 and 
Airline 4 remain largely unchanged compared to when Airline 1 uses standard 
forecasting. 
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The split of revenues between the LCC and non-LCC markets remain similar to the three 
earlier scenarios (Figure 5-38 and Figure 5-39).  Airline 1 improves in both the LCC 
markets and the non-LCC markets. 
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5.5.3 Overview of Changes with Seat Availability Matching 
 
Airline 1’s revenues decrease while the other three airlines’ revenues increase with each 
of the three types of seat availability matching (Figure 5-40).  This general finding agrees 
with the outcomes of the three earlier scenarios.  The difference is that Airline 1’s 
decreases and the other airlines’ increases for each type of availability matching are the 
lowest so far.  With Closure Matching especially, Airline 1’s drop in revenue is 3.4%, in 
contrast to the drops of in revenue of 6.4%, 5.9% and 8.3% for the previous three 
scenarios.  Another difference in this scenario is that when Airline 1 closure matches it, 
Airline 3 barely benefits, unlike the earlier three scenarios where it gains at least 1% in 
revenues. 
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Like the previous scenario when Airline 1 uses DAVN with standard forecasting, with 
DAVN and hybrid forecasting, for Open Matching, the load factor for Airline 1 
experiences no change.  This indicates that the O-D method of DAVN is able to limit the 
influx of passengers as it becomes less restrictive with Open Matching.   
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5.5.3.a Direct, Collateral or Indirect Changes in Revenues 
 
The causes of revenue changes are largely the same as the scenario when Airline 1 uses 
DAVN with standard forecasting, but hybrid forecasting causes significant improvements 
in the LCC markets, especially for Closure Matching (Figure 5-41 and Figure 5-42). 
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In the non-LCC markets, Airline 1’s improvement with Closure Matching is slightly 
higher with hybrid forecasting (1.8%) than with standard forecasting (1.3%).  At the same 
time, in LCC markets, with hybrid forecasting Airline 1’s decline in revenue of 7.0% is 
greatly improved from the 15% decline when it uses standard forecasting.  This 
improvement is generated by two phenomena: first, less Closure Matching is required in 
LCC markets with Q-forecasting as Airline 1 becomes more restrictive compared to with 
standard forecasting.  Second, as explained in Chapter 5.3.4, revenue management 
systems based on hybrid forecasting appear to recover better from seat availability 
matching than systems based on standard forecasting. 
 
As a result, the fare class mix of Airline 1 using DAVN with hybrid forecasting shows 
more restrained changes (Figure 5-43 and Figure 5-44).  This is especially true for the 
change in passenger numbers in fare class 1 and fare class 6 with Closure Matching, 
compared to when Airline 1 uses DAVN with standard forecasting. 
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5.5.3.b Market Share 
 
Similar to the earlier scenario when Airline 1 uses DAVN and standard forecasting, in 
this scenario when it uses DAVN and hybrid forecasting, the O-D method of inventory 
control restricts the direct impacts of seat availability matching to the LCC markets.  
With Open Matching, Airline 1 becomes more open and gains market share only in the 
LCC markets and with Closure Matching, it becomes more restrictive and loses market 
share only in the LCC markets (Table 5-12).  In the non-LCC markets, Airline 1 loses 
market share with Open Matching and gains market share with Closure Matching instead. 
 
Unlike the earlier scenario when the forecasting method is standard forecasting, the 
changes in market share when hybrid forecasting is used are smaller – the largest fall is 
3.9pp as Airline 1 closure matches (much lower than the earlier 8.2pp). 
 
Table 5-12: Market Share by Market Type (AL1: DAVN with HF)  
LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 25.6 - 27.3 - 23.2 - 23.9 - 
Open 26.3 0.7 26.9 -0.4 23.1 -0.1 23.7 -0.2 
Closure 21.7 -3.9 29.1 1.8 24.1 0.9 25.1 1.2 
Bi-
directional 
25.2 -0.4 27.5 0.2 23.3 0.1 24.0 0.1 
Non-LCC Markets 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 4 
 Market 
Share % 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Market 
Share 
% point 
change 
Without 43.0 - 43.7 - - - 13.3 - 
Open 41.6 -1.4 44.9 1.2 - - 13.5 0.2 
Closure 43.5 0.5 43.4 -0.3 - - 13.1 -0.2 
Bi-
directional 
41.6 -1.4 44.9 1.2 - - 13.5 0.2 
 
 
5.5.4 Conclusions 
 
The combination of O-D inventory control and hybrid forecasting is more suited to the 
mixed fare structure of this network, resulting in the stronger performance of Airline 1.  
Airline 1 achieves the highest revenue among all four airlines, which is also its highest 
revenue for all four scenarios.  With lowest fare seat availability matching, Airline 1 loses 
revenue, but the least compared to the previous three scenarios.  DAVN with hybrid 
forecasting does better than both DAVN with standard forecasting and EMSRb with 
hybrid forecasting.  The improvement is the most pronounced in Closure Matching, 
where O-D inventory control isolates the negative effects to the LCC markets and hybrid 
forecasting enhances Airline 1’s performance against availability matching in LCC 
markets. 
 
However, in spite of Airline 1’s best performance in this scenario when compared to 
other combinations of revenue management systems simulated, seat availability matching 
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still produces negative outcomes for the matching airline and positive outcomes for the 
matched airline and the other airlines. 
 
 
5.6 SUMMARY 
 
Table 5-13: Summary 
With Availability Matching Scenario Inventory 
Control 
Forecasting 
Method 
Base Case 
Revenues On Airline 1 On Other 
Airlines 
1 Standard - Loss of 6% to 7%, 
mostly direct from 
the LCC markets. 
Gains, up to 4%.   
Collateral gains 
for Open 
Matching. 
2 
EMSRb 
(Leg-
based) 
Hybrid Improvements 
mostly from 
the LCC 
markets. 
Loss of 5% to 8%, 
mostly direct.   
Gains, up to 4%. 
Collateral gains 
for Open 
Matching. 
3 Standard DAVN (SF) 
improves 
1.4% cf. 
EMSRb (SF) 
Loss of 5.5% to 
8.3%.  Closure 
Matching 
damaging in the 
LCC markets but 
positive in the 
non-LCC markets. 
Collateral gains of 
up to 5.3% with 
Closure Matching. 
4 
DAVN 
(O-D) 
Hybrid Further 
improvement 
of 1.6% with 
HF cf. SF. 
Loss of 3.4% to 
5.8%, lowest of 
four scenarios. 
Gains, less than 
3%, lowest of all 
scenarios.  Airline 
3 does not gain 
with Closure 
Matching. 
 
Seat availability matching of Airline 3’s lowest fare when Airline 1 has a more advanced 
revenue management system hurts the matching Airline 1 while benefiting the matched 
Airline 3, across the four scenarios simulated (Table 5-13).  This is true regardless of the 
type of matching.  The overarching finding is that lowest fare seat availability matching 
causes Airline 1 to lose at least 3.4% and up till 8.5% of its pre-matching revenue.  In this 
network setting, the two airlines that neither match nor are matched, Airline 2 and Airline 
4, gain collateral benefits consistently.  
 
In general, the degree of revenue loss with seat availability matching for Airline 1 is 
lower with O-D inventory control (DAVN) than leg-based inventory control (EMSRb).  
It is also lower when hybrid forecasting is used instead of standard forecasting.  The more 
advanced the revenue management system, the better Airline 1 performs both before and 
after lowest fare seat availability matching. 
 
O-D inventory control isolates the negative effects to the LCC markets where the lowest 
fare seat availability matching takes place.  At the same time, hybrid forecasting 
improves the performance in the LCC markets, with or without availability matching.  
Therefore, when the O-D form of inventory control DAVN is used together with hybrid 
- 142 - 
forecasting, the performance of Airline 1 is the strongest.  Without seat availability 
matching, it starts with the highest revenues.  Moreover, with seat availability matching, 
it loses the least revenues of all four scenarios.  In fact, it gains collateral revenue benefits 
in non-LCC markets when it closure matches Airline 3 in the LCC markets.  In addition, 
with Airline 1 using DAVN with hybrid forecasting, Airline 3 does not benefit from 
Closure Matching, unlike the other three scenarios.   
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CHAPTER 6   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1 SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
 
At the start of this thesis, I explained how the growth of Internet-based applications for 
airline ticket distribution coupled with the wide fare fluctuations caused by airline 
differential pricing practices and revenue management systems have encouraged 
passengers to intensify their searches for the lowest fares available.  Subsequently, I 
noted that airlines have not effectively incorporated competitors’ low-fare seat 
availabilities into their revenue management systems.  As an intermediary measure for 
retaining market share, airlines match the price level and seat availability of their 
competitors’ lowest fares.  The objective of this thesis is to investigate how seat 
availability matching affects the airlines implementing it or subject to it, using the 
Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator.  I varied the revenue management systems 
examined between the earlier methods designed for traditional fare structures (like leg-
based inventory control with standard forecasting) and the more complex methods 
optimized for simplified fare structures (like O-D inventory control with hybrid 
forecasting).  Three levels of demand were simulated.  Simulations were carried out in 
either a single symmetric market of two airlines or a much larger mixed-fare network of 
572 asymmetric markets involving four airlines.  Three types of matching were tested: 
Open Matching to ensure the matching airline is at least as available as its lowest fare 
competitor, Closure Matching to cause the airline to be at least as unavailable as its 
lowest fare competitor and Bi-directional Matching that performs both of the above.   
 
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
AIRLINES 
 
In general, seat availability matching of the lowest competitor fare has significant 
impacts on the revenues of the matching and matched airlines.  Often, these impacts are 
negative for the airline implementing seat availability matching but positive for the other 
airlines.  For example, in the single unrestricted fare and symmetric market, where an 
airline using a relatively sophisticated revenue management system (EMSRb with Q-
forecasting) matches the lowest fare seat availability of an airline using a simple system 
(AT90), the lesser the degree of matching, the better the performance of the matching 
airline.  This finding holds regardless of the type of matching (Figure 6-1). 
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Although the airline revenue management system responds to and recovers from the 
external adjustment of seat availability matching, the matching airline loses as much as 
9.2% of its revenue.  That worst performance happens with Open Matching when the 
matching airline’s revenue management system is most asymmetric with its competitor 
and the demand is at the highest.  The best performance of the Open Matching airline 
happens when demand is lowest and when revenue management systems are the least 
asymmetric, precisely when the least seat availability matching takes place.  In the single 
symmetric market, Closure Matching tends to be more beneficial than Open Matching.  
This is probably an artifact resulting from the single symmetric market – where there is 
more direct feedback and spilling between the two airlines as one becomes more 
restrictive with Closure Matching.  
 
As for market share, often, the improvements with Open Matching are not impressive for 
the matching airline.  Unfortunately, the losses are significant with Closure Matching, 
especially in light of the concurrent revenue losses incurred. 
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When two airlines use the same revenue management methods in the single symmetric 
market, due to the similarity of their systems, there is less matching activity when one 
airline shadows the lowest fare seat availability of the other.  Consequently, the revenue 
changes are more limited than in the scenarios where the two airlines have asymmetric 
revenue management systems.  The matching airline loses at most 3.2% in revenues.  
However, both airlines gain slightly if they match each other in lowest fare seat 
availability. 
 
When extended to a much larger network of four airlines operating in 572 markets, the 
finding remains that a legacy airline with a mores sophisticated revenue management 
system loses revenue by at least 3.4% and as much as 8.5% when it matches the lowest 
fare seat availability of its LCC competitor.  Across the four scenarios simulated, the 
matching airline’s revenue falls consistently, while the matched airline and the other two 
peripheral airlines benefit.  In addition, Origin-Destination revenue management – 
DAVN inventory control with hybrid forecasting – performs better than leg-based 
EMSRb inventory control with standard forecasting in the mixed fare structure network.  
This is true not just before seat availability matching, but also with matching – fewer 
losses result, especially for Closure Matching (Figure 6-2).  Unlike leg-based inventory 
control, O-D control isolates the revenue loss to the LCC markets, where hybrid 
forecasting performs better than standard forecasting. 
 
FIGURE 6-2
Airline 1’s Revenues Changes (Network ‘S’)
Change in revenues
Open Matching Closure Matching Bi-directional
Matching
DAVN with HF
EMSRb with HF
EMSRb with SF
DAVN with SF
-10.0%
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
 
 
Airline 1 only consistently benefits from seat availability matching in the hypothetical 
scenarios of the single symmetric market: when its revenue management system spirals 
down using standard forecasting and matches an Airline 2 using a better performing 
system.  Airline 2’s revenue does not fall from being matched when it uses a less 
responsive AT90 revenue management method but falls significantly when it uses a 
responsive EMSRb with Q-forecasting system. 
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The implications for airlines are that lowest fare seat availability matching may be more 
detrimental to revenues and less effective in retaining or attaining market share than they 
believe.  The less seat availability matching is implemented by an airline, the better it 
performs.  However, if such matching has to be done, the network simulations show that 
the use of a revenue management system that is better adapted to the fare environment is 
still preferable.  For example, in a mixed-fare network, O-D revenue management that 
makes use of path-based DAVN with hybrid forecasting outperforms the simple system 
of leg-based EMSRb with standard forecasting – regardless of the absence or presence of 
lowest fare seat availability matching. 
 
 
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
Since simulations seek to be as realistic as possible in order to be meaningful and 
applicable, future work done on lowest fare seat availability matching can be improved 
by taking three further factors into account.  Although this thesis has isolated seat 
availability matching to LCC markets, an airline is unlikely to match all the paths where 
LCCs have entered.  Future studies may wish to take path quality into consideration – 
where an airline only matches its competitor if they have comparable non-stop or 
connecting products.  I have also focused on one airline matching another or two airlines 
matching each other.  An interesting extension would be to investigate scenarios where 
more airlines match the seat availability of their competitors.  Thirdly, it may be useful to 
model strategic consumers who wait for fare classes to re-open, or Internet companies 
representing these strategic consumers, when forecasting demand, controlling inventory 
and deciding whether to match the lowest fare availability of competitors. 
 
Stepping back from tactical lowest fare seat availability matching, broader studies of how 
an airline performs if its revenue management system strategically takes into account 
competitors’ seat availabilities would be meaningful to the development of airline 
revenue management. 
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